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I. THE	MODULAR	APPROACH	TO	MSME	
INSOLVENCY:	AN	OVERVIEW	
Micro,	 small	 and	medium	 enterprises	 (“MSMEs”)	 constitute	 the	
bulk	 and	 beating	 heart	 of	 virtually	 all	 of	 the	world’s	 economies.	
They	 are	 a	 primary	 means	 by	 which	 entrepreneurs	 bring	 new	
business	propositions	to	the	market,	and	deliver	a	range	of	prod-
ucts	 and	 services	 to	 local	 economies.1	They	 often	 constitute	 the	
most	 accessible	 route	 to	 employment,	 and	 typically	 provide	 the	
majority	of	private	sector	jobs.	They	thus	deepen	and	diversify	the	
economy,	enhance	its	resilience,	and	are	key	engines	of	entrepre-
neurial	dynamism	and	creativity,	of	wealth	and	employment.		
Whereas	 larger	businesses	tend	to	be	robust	 in	a	variety	of	 legal	
and	 regulatory	 climates,	MSMEs’	 ability	 to	 survive	 and	 thrive	 is	
highly	 sensitive	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 their	 environment.	 Insolvency	
regimes,	 in	particular,	can	have	profound	effects	on	whether	the	
social	 wealth	 that	 MSMEs	 represent	 is	 increased,	 preserved,	 or	
destroyed;	and	on	the	fairness	with	which	that	wealth	and	those	
losses	 are	 distributed.	 There	 are	 knock-on	 secondary	 effects	 on	
the	efficiency	with	which	an	economy’s	commercial	lending	sector	
can	work	through	distressed	assets,	and,	in	turn,	on	that	sector’s	
ability	 to	 successfully	 perform	 critical	 financial	 intermediation	
functions.	
Insolvency	laws	are	especially	relevant	at	three	critical	stages	in	a	
MSME’s	financial	life.	One	key	challenge	arises	when	the	personal	
funds	 of	 the	 entrepreneur	 no	 longer	 suffice	 to	meet	 the	 enter-
prise’s	 growth	 potential.	 Another	 is	 when	 the	 MSME	 lacks	 the	
resources,	 financial	 or	 technical,	 to	 weather	 a	 crisis.	 A	 third	 is	
when	the	business	has	failed,	often	leaving	 its	entrepreneur	per-
sonally	 burdened	 with	 its	 obligations.	 An	 efficacious	 insolvency	
regime	would	sift	through	distressed	businesses	to	identify	those	
that	 remain	 viable,	 and	 would	 provide	 cost-effective	 means	 for	
their	 preservation.	 Non-viable	 distressed	 businesses	 would	 be	
expeditiously	dismantled	and	their	assets	recycled	to	more	prom-
ising	uses.	Creditors	would	receive	the	highest	feasible	returns	on	
their	claims	over	an	appropriate	period,	and	their	resulting	confi-
dence	in	the	insolvency	regime	would	pro	tanto	 incentivize	them	
																																																						
1	Different	jurisdictions	use	different	terms	for	small	business	operators.	In	this	
report,	the	term	“entrepreneur”	is	used	generically	to	refer	to	natural	persons	
who	design,	organize,	manage	and/or	operate	a	business	enterprise.	It	includes	
service	providers,	tradespeople,	products	providers	and	other	individuals	who	
are	the	principals	in	a	MSME.		
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to	lend	more	and	on	more	affordable	terms.	Honest	and	coopera-
tive	entrepreneurs	would	be	extricated	from	the	ruins	of	a	failed	
business,	liberated	from	obligations	that	can	no	longer	reasonably	
be	met,	 and	 promptly	 returned	 to	 economic	 productivity.	 There	
would	be	due	accountability	 for	any	wrongdoing	connected	with	
the	insolvency.		
Historically,	 insolvency	 systems	 have	 been	 designed	 with	 larger	
enterprises	 in	mind.	They	assume	an	extensive	 insolvency	estate	
of	 significant	 worth,	 and	 the	 presence	 of	 creditors	 and	 other	
stakeholders	with	sufficient	value	at	stake	that	they	participate	in	
and	 oversee	 the	 process.	 These	 assumptions	 undergird	 mecha-
nisms	by	which	creditors	and	other	stakeholders	may	ensure	that	
the	 insolvency	process	 faithfully	 serves	 their	 interests,	 for	 an	 in-
dependent	professional	 to	run	the	business	undergoing	an	 insol-
vency	process,	and	for	extensive	judicial	oversight.	
These	assumptions	and	features	are	 incongruent	with	the	reality	
of	 MSMEs.	 Mirroring	 the	 general	 population	 of	 businesses	 and	
reflecting	the	particular	fragility	associated	with	smaller	asset	ba-
ses	and	relative	absence	of	risk	diversification,	the	vast	majority	of	
businesses	 entering	 insolvency	 proceedings	 are	 MSMEs.	 On	
MSME	insolvency,	little	or	no	value	is	available	for	distribution	to	
anyone	other	than	secured	creditors	in	a	significant	proportion	of	
insolvency	 estates,	 and	 secured	 creditors	 tend	 to	 have	 effective	
collection	 methods	 under	 non-insolvency	 law.	 Correspondingly,	
most	 secured	 and	 unsecured	 creditors,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 stake-
holders,	 are	 rationally	disinterested	 in	 the	 insolvency	process.	 In	
many	 cases,	 it	 is	 not	 worthwhile	 for	 either	 the	 estate	 or	 most	
stakeholders	 to	 engage	 lawyers	 to	 represent	 them	 in	 court.	 Es-
tates	may	possess	 inadequate	value	even	to	pay	an	independent	
insolvency	professional.		
Such	incongruence	between	the	design	of	insolvency	regimes	and	
the	nature	of	most	of	 the	businesses	 to	which	 they	apply	 leaves	
the	insolvency	process	unbalanced,	inadequately	supervised,	non-
efficacious,	and	sometimes,	simply	unfeasible.	Policy-makers	and	
legislators	have	often	 responded	 through	ad	hoc	 changes	 to	 the	
‘standard’	 regime,	 such	as	by	 shearing	 some	elements	of	 the	 in-
solvency	process	when	applied	to	smaller	businesses,	by	shorten-
ing	statutory	timelines,	and	by	dispensing	with	the	necessary	par-
ticipation	 of	 certain	 stakeholders.	 The	 resulting	 processes	 have	
been	 marked	 by	 arbitrary	 boundaries,	 rigid	 preconditions	 for	
availability,	and	limited	effectiveness.		
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The	Modular	Approach	described	in	the	following	pages	systemat-
ically	 rethinks	 the	 treatment	of	MSME	 insolvency.	 It	 shares	with	
‘standard’	 insolvency	 regimes	 the	 core	 objectives	 of	 preserving	
and	maximizing	the	value	in	the	insolvency	estate,	ensuring	distri-
bution	over	an	appropriate	period	of	time	of	the	highest	feasible	
proportion	of	that	value	to	those	entitled	to	it,	providing	due	ac-
countability	 for	 any	 wrongdoing	 connected	 with	 the	 insolvency,	
and	 enabling	 discharge	 of	 over-indebted	 natural	 persons.	 The	
Modular	Approach	differs	 in	the	way	 it	pursues	these	objectives.	
Its	basic	assumption	 is	 that	 the	parties	 to	a	particular	 insolvency	
case	are	best	placed	to	select	the	tools	appropriate	to	that	case.	
The	role	of	the	legal	regime	should	be	to	provide	these	tools	in	a	
maximally	 flexible	way,	while	 creating	 the	 correct	 incentives	 for	
their	deployment.		
Traditionally,	 insolvency	 regimes	provide	particular	 ‘packages’	or	
combinations	of	 these	 tools	and	 label	 them	 ‘liquidation’	and	 ‘re-
structuring’.	The	Modular	Approach	unpacks	those	combinations.	
It	assumes	a	core	process,	geared	towards	enabling	the	entrepre-
neur	to	propose	a	restructuring	of	the	business’	 liabilities	and	to	
obtain	 discharge	 of	 any	 unrepayable	 obligations.	 The	 entrepre-
neur	may	 access	 any	 of	 the	 full	 range	 of	 insolvency	 law	mecha-
nisms	to	enable	attainment	of	these	objectives.	At	the	same	time,	
creditors	and	other	stakeholders	have	the	right	to	adequate	noti-
fication	 of	 each	 step	 in	 the	 process,	 coupled	with	 the	 power	 to	
override	the	entrepreneur’s	choices	where	a	sufficient	proportion	
of	them	consider	it	appropriate	to	do	so.	The	process	may	obtain	
and	retain	momentum	by	virtue	of	 the	presumptions	 that	stake-
holders	who	have	not	positively	objected	to	a	step	in	the	process	
have	consented	to	that	step,	and	that	the	non-exercise	of	proce-
dural	 rights	within	 the	process	precludes	 the	relevant	stakehold-
ers	from	objecting	to	the	part	of	the	process	to	which	the	unexer-
cised	rights	relate.	Stakeholders	are	divided	into	appropriate	clas-
ses;	they	must	act	by	stipulated	majority	by	value;	and	stipulated	
majorities	by	value	of	a	class	may	bind	dissenting	minorities.		
The	Modular	 Approach	 also	 responds	 to	 differences	 in	 the	 eco-
nomic,	 social	 and	 legal	 circumstances	 of	 different	 countries.	 It	
does	so	by	guiding	national	policymakers	with	respect	to	the	fac-
tors	 relevant	 to	 determining	 the	 proper	 boundaries	 between	
‘standard’	and	MSME	insolvency	regimes,	and	by	identifying	three	
functions:	management,	administrative	and	judicial.	The	approach	
explains	 the	 costs	 and	 benefits	 of	 assigning	 those	 functions	 to	
different	entities.	
	 	 July	8	2016	version	
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The	Modular	Approach	is	designed	to	provide	appropriate	 incen-
tives	for	the	entrepreneur	and	other	stakeholders	alike.	Entrepre-
neurs	have	positive	 incentives	 to	 commence	 the	 insolvency	pro-
cess	in	a	timely	manner:	they	do	not	have	to	declare	the	business	
insolvent;	they	may,	in	principle,	retain	its	management;	and	they	
have	 the	 right	 to	 propose	 how	 the	 insolvency	 should	 proceed.	
Entrepreneurs	also	face	negative	 incentives	that	discourage	non-
timely	 commencement	 of	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 in	 that	 the	
Modular	 Approach	 imposes	 personal	 liability	 for	 any	 additional	
loss	 suffered	by	 the	business’	 creditors	because	of	blameworthy	
delay	 in	 commencement.	 The	 Modular	 Approach	 acknowledges	
that	in	many	MSME	insolvencies,	unsecured	creditors	are	rational-
ly	disinterested,	given	 their	 limited	economic	 stake	and	 the	very	
limited	 likelihood	of	 any	 recovery	 in	 the	process.	 They	need	not	
actively	participate	 in	 the	process	 if,	 upon	due	notification,	 they	
do	not	consider	it	worth	the	time	and	expense	of	participating.	As	
noted,	 their	 abstention	 is	 deemed	 approval,	 and	 the	 insolvency	
process	 may	 continue	 apace.	 Negative	 incentives	 for	 creditors	
arise	because	the	non-exercise	of	procedural	rights	amounts	to	a	
waiver	of	such	rights.	Positive	incentives	arise	in	creditors’	ability,	
acting	with	others	who	together	hold	a	sufficiently	 large	propor-
tion	 of	 the	 claims	 against	 the	 enterprise,	 to	 override	 the	 entre-
preneur’s	choice	of	tools	and	to	select	a	destiny	for	the	business	
different	 to	 the	one	 favoured	by	the	entrepreneur.	The	Modular	
Approach	is	aimed	at	MSMEs,	whether	incorporated	or	operated	
as	sole	trader/entrepreneurs.	
The	structure	of	this	report	is	as	follows.		Part	II	briefly	examines	
the	place	of	MSMEs	 in	 the	global	economy,	 including	 challenges	
for	defining	MSMEs,	and	the	significance	of	MSME	economic	ac-
tivity.	Part	III	examines	the	particular	needs	of	MSMEs	in	financial	
distress,	 analyzing	why	MSME	 insolvency	 should	 provide	 a	 fresh	
start	for	natural	person	entrepreneurs,	foster	the	rehabilitation	of	
viable	businesses,	prevent	further	loss	of	value,	and	provide	cost-
effective	strategies	and	mechanisms.	Part	 IV	examines	the	policy	
objectives	and	key	components	of	 the	Modular	Approach,	which	
are	aimed	at	the	core	objectives	of	 insolvency	law	and	create	in-
centives	for	timely	commencement	of	proceedings,	the	rescue	of	
viable	 businesses,	 the	 liquidation	 of	 non-viable	 businesses,	 and	
the	 devolvement	 of	 choice	 on	 stakeholders	 with	 the	 best	 infor-
mation	 and	 most	 appropriate	 incentives	 for	 value-maximizing	
outcomes.	Part	V	canvasses	in	detail	the	design	of	a	Modular	Ap-
proach,	 including	 the	 basic	 procedural	 framework	 and	 the	 due	
protection	of	stakeholder	rights.	It	offers	a	menu	of	modules	that	
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allow	national	policy	makers	to	choose	from	a	range	of	options	for	
resolving	MSME	 insolvency	and	 for	 the	 involvement	of	appropri-
ate	 institutions.	 Finally,	 Part	 VI	 discusses	 the	 implementation	 of	
the	 Modular	 Approach,	 including	 the	 position	 of	 various	 stake-
holder	 groups	 involved,	 and	 the	 regulatory	 and	 implementation	
challenges	 that	 insolvency	 systems	may	 face	when	 applying	 the	
Modular	Approach.	The	 report	 includes	an	Annex	with	 summary	
examples	 of	MSME	 regimes	 from	 several	 jurisdictions,	 including	
Greece,	Argentina,	US,	India,	Croatia,	Republic	of	Korea,	Germany,	
Japan	and	OHADA	[Annex	still	being	developed].		
This	research	report	represents	the	ongoing	collaboration	of	sev-
en	 scholars	 in	 six	 jurisdictions	and	one	member	of	 the	Canadian	
judiciary.	 	 In	 formulating	 the	 ideas	 and	 proposals,	 we	met	 as	 a	
group	 four	 times	 during	 2015-6	 in	 Madrid	 Spain,	 Bowen	 Island	
Canada,	 London	 UK	 and	 Tokyo	 Japan.	 The	 report	 draws	 on	 and	
refers	 to	 a	wide	 range	 of	 sources,	 including	 international	 stand-
ards,	reports	and	measures	available	in	domestic	jurisdictions.		
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II. MSMES	IN	THE	GLOBAL	ECONOMY	
	
A. NO	GLOBALLY	CONSISTENT	DEFINITION	OF	MSME	
There	 is	no	globally	accepted	definition	of	a	MSME.	Across	 juris-
dictions,	factors	taken	as	relevant	to	the	identification	of	this	type	
of	business	 include,	 among	others,	 annual	 gross	or	net	 revenue,	
value	of	assets	and/or	liabilities,	value	of	sales,	legal	structure,	or	
number	 of	 employees.2	The	 chart	 below	 illustrates	 several	 ap-
proaches.	
	
Country	 Micro/Small	 Medium	
European	Union	
	
Small	is	fewer	than	50	
employees	and	turnover	
≤€	10m	or	balance	sheet	
total	of	≤€	10m	
Micro	is	fewer	than	10	
employees	and	turnover	
≤€	2m	or	balance	sheet	
total	of	≤€	2m	
	
Medium	is	fewer	than	
250	employees	and	
turnover	≤€	50m	or	
balance	sheet	total	of	
≤€	43m	
	
																																																						
2	Janis	Sarra,	“Micro,	Small	and	Medium	Insolvent	Enterprises:	Do	We	Need	
Statutory	Reform	in	Canada?	First	the	Data…	then	the	Reform”,	in	J	Sarra	and	
BE	Romaine,	Eds,	Annual	Review	of	Insolvency	Law	2015	(Toronto:	Carswell,	
2016).		
• Varying	definitions	for	MSMEs	focus	on:	
• revenue	
• value	of	assets/liabilities	
• value	of	sales	
• legal	structure	
• number	of	employees	
Such	 definitions	 suffer	 from	 lack	 of	 data,	 and	may	 vary	 for	 different	
purposes.	
• MSME	structures	vary,	but	the	ubiquity	of	personal	guarantees	means	
that	an	effective	 insolvency	regime	must	deal	with	all	of	 the	debts	of	
the	natural	person	entrepreneur.	
• MSMEs	 have	 immense	 significance	 to	 the	 global	 economy	 and	 their	
numbers	are	growing.	
• MSMEs	employ	more	than	1/3	of	the	world’s	labour	force.	
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Country	 Micro/Small	 Medium	
United	Kingdom	 Small:	meet	two	or	more	
of	the	following	re-
quirements—	
Turnover	not	more	than	
£5.6	million	
Balance	sheet	total	not	
more	than	£2.8	million	
Number	of	employees	
not	more	than	50	
Micro:	not	defined	
	
Meet	two	or	more	of	
the	following	require-
ments—	
Turnover	not	more	
than	£22.8	million	
Balance	sheet	total	not	
more	than	£11.4	mil-
lion	
Number	of	employees	
not	more	than	250	
United	States	 Engaged	in	commercial	
or	business	activities	
other	than	primarily	
owning	or	operating	real	
property,	with	total	non-
contingent	liquidated	
secured	and	unsecured	
debts	of	$2,490,925	or	
less.		The	threshold	
specified	in	the	Bank-
ruptcy	Code	adjusts	
every	three	years.Micro:	
not	defined	
Not	defined	
Canada	 Small:	employing	5	to	99	
employees,	or	in	the	
service	industry,	em-
ploying	5	to	49	employ-
ees.	
Micro:	employing	1	to	4	
employees	
Medium:	employing	50	
to	499	employees	
World	Bank	 Small:	employing	5	to	30	
employees	
Micro:	employing	1	to	4	
employees	
	
Medium:	employing	21	
to	100	employees	
Sources:	European	Commission,	2014;	UK	Companies	Act,	c.	46;	US	Bankruptcy	
Code;	Canada,	Market	Framework	Policy	Branch,	Industry	Canada,	2015;	World	
Bank,	2014;	United	States	Bankruptcy	Court	services,	2016.	
Ardic	et	al	found	that	the	most	common	definitions	used	by	regu-
lators	are	based	on	the	number	of	employees,	sales,	and/or	loan	
size.	 The	 most	 common	 among	 the	 three	 is	 the	 number-of-
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employees	 criterion.3	Of	 68	 countries	 for	 which	 Ardic	 et	 al	 had	
data,	50	countries	use	the	number-of-employees	criterion,	and	29	
out	of	these	50	also	use	the	other	two	criteria.4	A	total	of	41	regu-
lators	use	maximum	sales	value	criteria	and	15	use	maximum	loan	
value	criteria	to	define	an	SME.5		
Ardic	et	al	conclude	that	number	of	employees	and	sale	volumes	
are	 likely	 the	 most	 accurate	 parameters	 to	 define	 an	 SME,	 but	
these	data	are	not	always	available	from	lenders.	They	note	that	
while	banks	may	collect	this	information	at	the	time	of	evaluating	
loan	 applications,	 they	 often	 do	 not	 retain	 it	 in	 their	 systems.6	
Their	study	found	that	some	countries	choose	to	rely	on	loan	size	
as	a	proxy	 for	MSME	finance.	Financial	Access	2010	 reports	 that	
only	15	countries	use	loan	size	as	relevant	to	defining	an	SME;	and	
within	this	criterion,	there	 is	considerable	variation	among	coun-
tries.7	Ardic	 et	 al	 also	 observe	 that	 even	 when	 MSME	 data	 are	
available,	it	is	extremely	difficult	to	perform	a	cross-country	anal-
ysis	in	the	absence	of	a	standard	definition	as	to	what	constitutes	
an	MSME,	given	the	extent	to	which	definitions	vary	from	country	
to	country.8		
Different	departments	of	a	national	or	state	government	may	use	
different	definitions	 for	different	purposes.	 In	Canada,	 for	exam-
ple,	Industry	Canada	defines	small	business	as	in	the	chart	above,	
reporting	 that	98	percent	of	 the	1.08	million	 small	businesses	 in	
Canada	 in	 2013	 had	 1	 to	 99	 employees.9	In	 contrast,	 Canada’s	
Office	of	the	Superintendent	of	Bankruptcy	(“OSB”)	defines	busi-
nesses	differently	 for	purposes	of	Canada’s	 insolvency	 legislation	
as	“any	commercial	entity	or	organization	other	than	an	individu-
																																																						
3	Oya	Pinar	Ardic,	Nataliya	Mylenko,	Valentina	Saltane,	“Small	and	Medium	
Enterprises	a	Cross	Country	Analysis	with	a	New	Data	Set”,	The	World	Bank	
Financial	and	Private	Sector	Development	Consultative	Group	to	Assist	the	
Poor,	Policy	Research	Working	Paper	5538,	January	2011	at	6	–	8	(“Ardic	et	al”).		
4	Ibid.	
5	Ibid	at	8.	
6	Ibid.	
7	Ibid.	
8	Ibid.	An	OECD	conference	on	SME	in	2004	made	two	key	policy	recommenda-
tions	to	both	member	and	non-member	economies:	(i)	develop	greater	inter-
national	comparability	of	SME	statistics,	and	(ii)	develop	a	common	definition	
of	an	SME,	citing	Second	OECD	Conference	of	Ministers	Responsible	for	Small	
and	Medium-Sized	Enterprises,	Istanbul,	2004)	at	4.	They	observe	that	they	are	
commonly	defined	as	registered	businesses	with	fewer	than	250	employees	
(IFC,	2009);	the	definition	still	varies	from	country	to	country.	
9	Industry	Canada,	Key	Small	Business	Statistics,	June	2016.	
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al,	or	an	 individual	who	has	 incurred	50	percent	or	more	of	total	
liabilities	as	a	result	of	operating	a	business.”10	Hence	an	individu-
al	consumer	debtor	is	characterized	by	the	OSB	as	a	business	for	
purposes	of	the	Bankruptcy	and	Insolvency	Act,	R.S.C.	1985,	c.	B-3,	
as	amended	(“BIA”)	where	his	or	her	business-related	debts	com-
prise	50	percent	of	total	debts.	This	definition	is	important	for	the	
kind	of	process	to	which	the	debtor	has	access	under	the	BIA.11		
Also	of	note	is	that	some	jurisdictions	use,	or	are	in	the	process	of	
developing,	new	definitions	that	are	responsive	to	particular	types	
of	MSME	activity.	 For	example,	 the	OHADA	countries	 (Organisa-
tion	 pour	 l'Harmonisation	 en	Afrique	 du	Droit	 des	 Affaires)	 have	
introduced	new	terminology	 for	small	entrepreneurs	 in	an	effort	
to	 promote	 migration	 of	 informal	 businesses	 into	 the	 formal	
MSME	sector.12	With	support	 from	the	World	Bank	Group,	OHA-
DA	has	 revised	 its	 general	 commercial	 law	 to	 introduce	 the	“en-
treprenant”	status.	The	status	can	apply	to	a	natural	person	run-
ning	a	small	business	who	practices	any	type	of	 limited	turnover	
activity,	civil,	commercial,	artisan,	or	agricultural.13		
A	crucial	definitional	issue	in	respect	of	micro	businesses	is	that	of	
sole	proprietorships.	Many	jurisdictions	define	“business”	as	hav-
ing	 at	 least	 one	 employee	 on	 the	 payroll.14	Thus,	 small	 business	
statistics	may	not	count	sole	proprietorships	 that	do	not	employ	
																																																						
10	OSB,	Insolvency	Statistics	in	Canada—August	2015,	
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/bsf-osb.nsf/eng/br03457.html#tbl3.	Consumer	
insolvency	is	defined	as	an	individual	for	whom	50	percent	or	more	of	total	
liabilities	relate	to	consumer	goods	and	services.	This	lack	of	alignment	of	defi-
nition	has	resulted	in	problems	with	data	analysis.	
11	For	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 Canadian	 treatment	 of	MSME,	 see	 Janis	 Sarra,	 “An	
Opportune	Moment	—	Retooling	the	Bankruptcy	and	Insolvency	Act	to	Address	
Micro,	Small	and	Medium	Enterprise	(MSME)	Insolvency	in	Canada,	in	JP	Sarra	
and	 BE	 Romaine,	 eds,	 Annual	 Review	 of	 Insolvency	 Law	 2016	 (forthcoming,	
Toronto:	Carswell	2017,	1193-1303).	
12	International	Finance	Corporation,	“An	Incentive	Package	to	Encourage	Small	
Business	Registration	in	Benin”,	
http://search.worldbank.org/all?qterm=definition+	percent22small+business	
percent22&title=&filetype=,	March	2014.	[“International	Finance”]	
13	Ibid.	
14	Khrystyna	Kushnir,	Melina	Laura	Mirmulstein	and	Rita	Ramalho,	“Counting	
MSMEs	Across	the	World”,	IFC	at	7,	
http://www.ifc.org/msmecountryindicators.	This	database	is	current	as	of	Au-
gust	2010	and	updates	and	expands	on	the	January	2007	“Micro,	Small,	and	
Medium	Enterprises:	A	Collection	of	Published	Data”,	
http://www.ifc.org/msmecountryindicators	(“Kushnir	et	al”)	
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anyone	or	that	employ	people	as	contractors.15	Many	small	busi-
nesses	are	owned	and	operated	by	the	same	person,	and	may	or	
may	 not	 be	 incorporated.	 Incorporation	 of	 the	 micro	 business	
typically	 occurs	 because	 someone	 has	 advised	 the	 entrepreneur	
that	 incorporation	would	 better	 protect	 the	 entrepreneur’s	 per-
sonal	assets.	This	protection,	 in	reality,	 is	partial	only.	 Incorpora-
tion	 of	 a	 limited	 liability	 entity	 usually	 precludes	 the	 entrepre-
neur’s	personal	liability	for	business	tax	claims,	tort	claims	against	
the	incorporated	entity,	and	contract	counter-party	claims,	etc.	At	
the	same	time,	the	reality	is	often	that	micro	and	small	businesses	
(“MSEs”)	cannot	get	financing	unless	their	owners	guarantee	the	
debt	with	personal	 assets.16	Such	 guarantees	 effectively	blur	 the	
distinction	 between	 personal	 and	 business	 debt.	 It	 follows,	 as	 a	
matter	of	 practical	 necessity,	 that	 a	 regime	governing	MSME	 in-
solvency	would	often	be	 required	 to	address	 the	entrepreneur’s	
personal	 liability.	 For	 the	 same	 reasons,	 a	MSME	 insolvency	 re-
gime	would	have	 to	 address	 the	entrepreneur’s	 non-business	or	
‘consumer’	 obligations	 as	 well.	 The	 boundary	 between	 business	
and	consumer	obligations	is	often	vague	–	as	when	personal	cred-
it	 card	 loans	 are	 invested	 in	 the	business	 –	 and	 it	would	not	 be	
cost-effective	 to	 distinguish	 between	 them	 by	 investigating	 the	
purposes	 for	which	a	 loan	was	made	and/or	 the	way	 in	which	 it	
was	spent.	 In	any	case,	a	regime	that	provided	differential	 treat-
ment	 for	 obligations	 depending	 on	 the	 purposes	 for	which	 they	
were	 incurred	 would	 create	 perverse	 incentives	 for	 the	 obliga-
tions	to	be	disguised.	The	sensible	response	is	to	enable	a	MSME	
insolvency	regime	to	deal	with	all	the	debts	of	the	natural	person	
entrepreneur.	 	 The	 definition	 and	 character	 of	MSMEs	 are	 that	
they	 require	 a	 flexible	 approach	 in	 the	 design	 of	 the	 insolvency	
regime.	
		
B. SIGNIFICANCE	OF	MSME	ECONOMIC	ACTIVITY	
While	it	has	proven	difficult	to	arrive	at	consistent	definitions	for	
MSMEs,	 there	 is	 no	 denying	 their	 immense	 significance	 to	 the	
global	 economy.	 They	 are	 a	 major	 source	 of	 jobs,	 economic	
growth,	 and	 dynamism	 in	 the	 economy,	 not	 least	 through	 their	
potential	for	utilizing	new	technologies.17	The	European	Economic	
																																																						
15	Sarra,	supra	note	2.	
16	Ibid.	
17	International	Finance,	supra,	note	12.	
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Area	 alone	 has	 approximately	 20	million	MSMEs,18	and	 over	 the	
2004	 to	 2006	 period,	 small	 and	 medium-sized	 enterprises	
(“SMEs”)	were	 the	 primary	 drivers	 of	 economic	 growth.19	In	 the	
United	 States,	 SMEs	make	 up	 99	 percent	 of	 all	 firms,20		 employ	
over	 50	 percent	 of	 private	 sector	 employees,	 and	 generate	 65	
percent	 of	 net	 new	 private	 sector	 jobs.21	Similarly,	 UK	 MSMEs	
account	for	99.9%	of	the	country’s	businesses,	provide	60%	of	all	
private	sector	employment,	and	account	for	47%	of	private	sector	
turnover.22	The	 immense	 significance	 of	 MSMEs	 to	 the	 US	 and	
European	 economies	 is	 broadly	 representative	 of	 the	 global	 pic-
ture.		
Kushnir	et	al	report	that	there	are	125	million	“formal”	MSMEs	in	
132	 countries	 for	 which	 data	 are	 collected	 by	 the	 International	
Finance	Corporation	(“IFC”),	including	89	million	in	emerging	mar-
kets.23	Formal	MSMEs	 are	more	 common	 in	 high-income	 econo-
mies,	but	in	low-and	middle-income	economies,	MSME	density	is	
rising	 at	 a	 faster	 pace.24	The	 overwhelming	 majority	 of	 formal	
MSMEs	 globally,	 83	 percent,	 are	 micro	 enterprises.25	The	 data	
collected	 in	 most	 jurisdictions	 cover	 only	 the	 formal	 registered	
sector;26	and	it	is	important	to	note	that	informal	MSMEs,	particu-
larly	 in	emerging	countries,	often	outnumber	formal	MSMEs.	For	
example,	in	India	in	2007,	there	were	fewer	than	1.6	million	regis-
tered	MSMEs	and	26	million	unregistered	MSMEs.27		
																																																						
18	European	Commission,	“Declaring	your	enterprise	to	be	an	SME”,	Commis-
sion	communication	—	Model	declaration	on	the	information	relating	to	the	
qualification	of	an	enterprise	as	an	SME,	Official	Journal	C	118,	20/05/2003	P.	
0005	–	0015,	http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:52003XC0520(02)	
19	M.	Schmiemann	(2009).	SMEs	were	the	main	drivers	of	economic	growth	
between	2004	and	2006,	Eurostat	Statistics	in	Focus	71/2009.	
20	Defined	in	their	study	as	firms	with	fewer	than	500	employees,	Shahin	
Firoozmand,	Philip	Haxel,	Euijin	Jung,	and	Kati	Suominen,	“State	of	SME	Finance	
in	the	United	States	in	2015”,	Tradeup	and	Nextrade	Group,	March	2015.		
21	Ibid.at	2.	
22	UK	Department	for	Business,	Innovation,	and	Skills,	Statistical	Release:	Busi-
ness	Population	Estimates	for	the	UK	and	Regions	2015	(14	October	2015).	
23	By	formal	is	meant	recognized	within	the	regulatory	structures	of	a	country,	
such	as	for	taxation	purposes.	Kushnir	et	al,	supra,	note	14.	
24	Ibid.	
25	Ibid,	the	authors	defining	micro	as	1	to	9	employees.	
26	Ibid,	except	for	16	economies	where	data	is	available.	
27	Ibid	at	2.	
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Globally,	studies	indicate	that	there	are	31	MSMEs	per	1,000	pop-
ulation	over	the	132	economies	for	which	the	IFC	collects	data.28	
Economies	with	higher	per	capita	income	tend	to	have	more	for-
mal	MSMEs	 per	 1,000	 people.	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	 Caribbean	
have	more	MSMEs	per	1,000	people	than	non-OECD	high-income	
economies.	However,	if	one	excludes	the	countries	that	are	heavi-
ly	dependent	on	mineral	resources,	such	as	United	Arab	Emirates	
and	Saudi	Arabia,29	the	MSME	density	for	non-OECD	high-income	
economies	 is	 at	 a	 similar	 level	 to	 that	 for	 Latin	America	and	 the	
Caribbean.30	Globally,	 the	 number	 of	 MSMEs	 per	 1,000	 people	
grew	by	6	percent	per	year	from	2000	to	2009,	with	Europe	and	
Central	Asia	experiencing	the	biggest	increase.31		
The	figure	below,	based	on	the	IFC	data,	illustrates	MSME	density	
per	1,000	population.	
	
Formal	MSMEs	employ	more	than	one-third	of	the	world’s	labour	
force.32		In	Canada,	for	example,	small	businesses	employ	7.7	mil-
lion	employees,	comprising	69.7	percent	of	the	total	private	sec-
tor	labour	force	and	account	for	78	percent	of	all	private	jobs	cre-
																																																						
28	Ibid.	
29	The	full	list	is:	United	Arab	Emirates,	Qatar,	Oman,	Kuwait,	and	Saudi	Arabia,	
Ibid.	
30	Ibid.	
31	Ibid.	They	suggest	that	a	possible	contributing	factor	may	be	the	accession	of	
the	Eastern	European	economies	to	the	European	Union.	
32	Ibid.	
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ated	 in	 Canada.33	In	 the	 European	 Union,	 9.4	 million	 jobs	 were	
created	 in	 the	MSME	sector	 in	27	European	Union	countries	be-
tween	 2002	 and	 2008.34	From	 a	 regional	 perspective,	 East	 Asia	
and	 the	 Pacific	 have	 the	 highest	 ratio	 of	MSME	 employment	 to	
total	employment,	driven	 largely	by	China,	where	formal	MSMEs	
account	 for	 80	 percent	 of	 total	 employment.35	The	 OECD	 coun-
tries	report	that	MSMEs	with	fewer	than	250	employees	account	
for	two-thirds	of	the	formal	work	force.36	
	
																																																						
33	Industry	Canada,	Key	Small	Business	Statistics	August	2013,	at	8,	figures	are	
for	2012,	and	job	creation	figures	represent	the	period	from	2002-2012;	
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/vwapj/KSBS-PSRPE_August-
Aout2013_eng.pdf/$FILE/KSBS-PSRPE_August-Aout2013_eng.pdf	[Industry	
Canada],	discussed	in	Sarra,	supra,	note	2.	
34	Ardic	et	al,	supra	note	3.	
35	Kushnir	et	al,	supra	note	14	at	2.	
36	Ardic	et	al,	supra	note	3,	citing	Beck	et	al,	2008b;	Dietrich,	2010.	
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Source:	MSME	 Country	 Indicators.	Note:	Name	 of	 the	 region	 [#]	 signifies	 the	
number	of	economies	from	the	region	included	in	the	analysis.	The	figure	uses	
data	from	103	economies.37	
																																																						
37	Ibid.	at	1.	
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III. MSME	INSOLVENCY	–	PARTICULAR	
VULNERABILITY,	PARTICULAR	NEEDS	
	
A. SIZE	AND	SUSCEPTIBILITY	
Just	as	MSMEs	are	significant	contributors	to	the	global	economy,	
they	also	fail	in	significant	numbers.	The	OECD	has	observed	that	
MSMEs	are	particularly	 vulnerable	 to	macroeconomic	and	 finan-
cial	 shocks,	observing	 that	MSME	 insolvencies	 in	Denmark,	 Italy,	
Spain,	 and	 Ireland	 exceeded	 25	 percent	 in	 2007-2008.38	A	 US	
study	 found	 that	 in	 1999,	 80	 percent	 of	 US	 firms	 that	 filed	 for	
bankruptcy	 reported	assets	under	1	million	USD,	and	88	percent	
reported	having	fewer	than	20	employees.39		
One	reason	why	most	 insolvency	proceedings	concern	MSMEs	 is	
simply	that	 they	constitute	the	 largest	proportion	of	private	sec-
tor	businesses.	In	addition,	however,	smaller	businesses	may	lack	
the	types	of	physical	assets	acceptable	to	financial	lenders	as	col-
lateral.	MSMEs	tend	to	be	relatively	undiversified	as	to	both	sup-
pliers	and	customers,	and	suffer	higher	default	risk	upon	the	loss	
of	a	significant	counterparty,	or	even	from	late	payments.	MSMEs	
																																																						
38	Organization	for	Economic	Co-operation	and	Development,	“The	Impact	of	
the	Global	Crisis	on	SME	and	Entrepreneurship	Financing	and	Policy	Respons-
es”,	2009	(“OECD”).	
39	E	Warren,	J	L	Westbrook,	“Financial	characteristics	of	business	in	bankrupt-
cy.”	(1999)	American	Bankruptcy	Law	Journal,	73:	499–589.	
MSMEs	tend	to:	
• fail	 in	 significant	 numbers	 and	 are	 vulnerable	 to	macroeconomic	
and	financial	shocks	
• lack	collateral,	are	undiversified,	and	suffer	higher	default	risk	
• lack	suitable	internal	governance	mechanisms	
• suffer	from	restricted	access	to	credit	across	their	life-cycle.	
MSME	insolvency	needs	to:	
• provide	a	fresh	start	for	natural	person	entrepreneurs	
• foster	the	rehabilitation	of	viable	businesses	
• prevent	further	loss	of	value	
• provide	cost-effective	strategies	and	mechanisms	for	use	through-
out	the	process.	
One	size	or	strategy	will	not	fit	all.	
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also	 tend	 to	 be	 overrepresented	 in	 economic	 sectors	 character-
ized	by	discretionary	 spending,	 such	as	hospitality	 and	 construc-
tion.	They	may	lack	suitable	internal	governance	mechanisms,	and	
may	 be	 unable	 to	 afford	 specialist	 credit	 and	 risk	 management	
expertise.	These	limitations	not	only	constrain	MSME	growth	po-
tential,	but	constitute	a	significant	vulnerability	in	times	of	stress	
or	crisis.	They	may	result	in	untimely	filing	of	insolvency	proceed-
ings,	 failure	 to	 prevent	 further	 downward	 spiralling	 of	 finances,	
failure	 to	 deal	with	 operational	 and	 financial	 deficiencies,	 and	 a	
lack	of	resources	to	hire	effective	expertise	to	deal	with	the	insol-
vency.	 Such	 diseconomies	 of	 small	 scale	 likely	 explain	 MSMEs’	
particular	vulnerability	to	insolvency.	
In	 addition	 to	 internal	 factors	 contributing	 to	 financial	 distress,	
there	are	also	issues	external	to	the	MSME	itself,	in	particular,	the	
issue	 of	 the	 obligations	 of	 institutional	 lenders	 vis-a-vis	MSME	
finance,	 as	 discussed	 in	 Part	 VI.B.1,	 “Creditor	 Behaviour	 at	 the	
Origin	and	Restructuring	of	Credit”.		
B. THE	IMPORTANCE	OF	INSOLVENCY	LAW	
Insolvency	 regimes	 that	 are	 responsive	 to	 the	 needs	 of	MSMEs	
are	particularly	important.	Insolvency	law	is	broadly	recognized	as	
an	 essential	 tool	 in	 a	 well-functioning	 economic	 framework.40	A	
balance	of	mechanisms	that	allow	for	timely	and	effective	liquida-
tion,	but	also	for	a	“fresh	start”	for	entrepreneurs	and	rehabilita-
tion	of	viable	businesses	tends	to	enhance	creditor	recoveries	and	
confidence.	 In	 turn,	 they	 can	 stimulate	 greater	 volumes	of	 lend-
ing,41	at	longer	maturity	periods,42	at	lower	cost43	and	lower	levels	
																																																						
40	The	Financial	Stability	Board,	which	monitors	the	global	financial	system,	
recognizes	“Insolvency	and	Creditor	Rights”	as	one	of	fourteen	policy	domains	
“designated	as	key	for	sound	financial	systems”,	in	which	internationally	recog-
nized	‘best	practice	standards’	are	considered	as	“deserving	of	priority	imple-
mentation	depending	on	country	circumstances.”	Financial	Stability	Board,	Key	
Standards	for	Sound	Financial	Systems	(http://www.fsb.org/what-we-
do/about-the-compendium-of-standards/key_standards/,	accessed:	7	March	
2016).		
41	J.P.	Fan,	S.	Titman,	and	G.	Twite,	“An	International	Comparison	of	Capital	
Structure	and	Debt	Maturity	Choices”,	(2012)	47(01)	Journal	of	Financial	and	
Quantitative	Analysis	23-56.	
42	Ibid.	
43	See	e.g.	J.	Qian	and	P.E.	Strahan,	“How	laws	and	institutions	shape	financial	
contracts:	The	case	of	bank	loans”	(2007)	The	Journal	of	Finance.	2007	Dec	
1;62(6):2803-34.	
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of	 collateral. 44 	Such	 mechanisms	 can	 also	 offer	 an	 effective	
framework	 for	 the	 creation	 of	 new	 business	 activity.45	Credible	
restructuring	schemes	can	ensure	that	businesses	with	viable	go-
ing-forward	 business	 plans	 can	 survive,	 in	 turn	 preserving	 jobs,	
supply	contracts,	customer	goodwill,	and	economic	stability	more	
generally.46	From	 a	 macro	 financial	 perspective,	 effective	 insol-
vency	laws	enable	financial	institutions	to	resolve	problem	assets	
more	 efficaciously,	 thereby	 freeing	 up	 provisioning	 resources,	
strengthening	 investors’	 perception	 of	 financial	 sector	 stability,	
pro	 tanto	 improving	 banks’	 ability	 to	 lend,	 and	 thus	 particularly	
benefitting	 small	 and	 medium	 enterprises	 in	 many	 economies	
where	such	businesses	are	particularly	dependent	on	bank	fund-
ing.47	The	World	Bank	has	observed	that	effective	insolvency	sys-
tems	 enhance	 predictability	 and	 thus	 lender	 confidence	 in	 loan	
recovery	on	default,	which	encourages	more	lending	and	leads	to	
financial	inclusion	for	more	businesses.48		
Of	significance	for	MSMEs	globally	are	both	the	formal	legal	rules	
and	 informal	 societal	 rules	and	practice	norms	 that	affect	entre-
preneurs,	 including	 the	design	of	 bankruptcy	 laws,	 the	 structure	
of	 capital	markets,	 and	 the	 perception	 of	 stigma	 related	 to	 per-
sonal	 responsibility.49	Cost-effective	 insolvency	 proceedings	 can	
encourage	 inefficient	 firms	 to	 exit,	 encourage	 greater	 entrepre-
neurial	 activity	 and	 new	 firm	 creation,	 and	 can	 result	 in	 greater	
																																																						
44	S.A.	Davydenko	and	J.R.	Franks,	“Do	bankruptcy	codes	matter?	A	study	of	
defaults	in	France,	Germany,	and	the	UK”	(2008)	The	Journal	of	Finance,	Apr	
1;63(2):565-608.	
45	See	e.g.	J.	Armour	and	D.	Cumming,	“Bankruptcy	law	and	entrepreneurship”	
(2008)	American	Law	and	Economics	Review,	Sep	21;10(2):303-50,	and	S.H.	Lee,	
Y.	Yamakawa,	M.W.	Peng,	and	J.B.	Barney,	“How	do	bankruptcy	laws	affect	
entrepreneurship	development	around	the	world?”	(2011)	Journal	of	Business	
Venturing,	Sep	30;26(5):505-20.	[“Armour	and	Cumming”]	
46	See	e.g.,	E.S.	Hotchkiss,	K.	John,	R.M.	Mooradian	and	K.	Thorburn,	“Bank-
ruptcy	and	the	Resolution	of	Financial	Distress”,	in	Handbook	of	Empirical	Cor-
porate	Finance:	Empirical	Corporate	Finance.	2011	Oct	13;	2:235.	
47	S.	Aiyar,	W.	Bergthaler,	J.M.	Garrido,	A.	Ilyina,	A.A.	Jobst,	K.	Kang,	D.	Kovtun,	
Y	Liu,	D.	Monaghan,	and	M.	Moretti,	“A	Strategy	for	Resolving	Europe’s	Prob-
lem	Loans”	(IMF	Staff	Discussion	Note,	SDN/15/19,	September	2015).		
48	World	Bank,	supra,	note	3	at	3.	
49	S.	Lee,	M.W.	Peng,	and	J.B.	Barney,	“Bankruptcy	law	and	Entrepreneurship	
Development:	a	real	options	perspective”,	(2007)	Academy	of	Management	
Review,	32(1):	257–272	(“Lee	et	al”);	M.W.	Peng,	“Institutional	transitions	and	
strategic	choices”,	(2003)	Academy	of	Management	Review,	28(2):	275-296.	
(“Peng”)	
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returns	 to	 creditors.50	Timely	 resolution	 of	 financial	 distress	 can	
reduce	uncertainty	for	entrepreneurs,	creditors	and	management,	
and	 improve	 asset	 value	 and	 transparency.51	A	 well-functioning	
MSME	insolvency	regime	can	heighten	the	salience	of	the	down-
side	risk	of	a	venture,	in	turn	increasing	the	number	and	variety	of	
people	pursuing	entrepreneurial	activities.52	It	can	benefit	lenders	
because	of	the	certainty	in	recovery	rules,	in	turn	increasing	con-
fidence	in	lending.		
The	 efforts	 of	 organizations	 such	 as	 UNCITRAL	 and	 the	 World	
Bank	have	 contributed	 significantly	 to	 creating	model	 insolvency	
legislation,	 best	 practice	 guidance,	 and	 to	 helping	 governments	
implement	reforms.53	The	effectiveness	of	insolvency	laws	never-
theless	varies	among	countries	around	the	world.54	According	to	a	
survey	 on	 debt	 enforcement	 in	 88	 countries,	 referenced	 by	 a	
World	 Bank	 Research	 Paper,	 bankruptcy	 procedures	 are	 time-
consuming,	 costly	 and	 inefficient	 in	 being	 able	 to	 preserve	 the	
business	as	a	going	concern;	in	only	36	percent	of	countries	is	the	
business	preserved	as	a	going	concern;	and	an	average	of	48	per-
cent	 of	 the	 business’s	 value	 is	 lost	 in	 debt	 enforcement.55	The	
World	 Bank	 Group	 Doing	 Business	 report	 for	 2014	 found	 that	
among	 38	 selected	 indicators/measures	 of	 the	 regulatory	 and	
institutional	 environment,	 the	 secured	 creditor	 recovery	 rate	 in	
distress	scenarios	was	the	single	most	valuable	measure.56		
The	 World	 Bank	 also	 examined	 MSMEs	 that	 had	 defaulted	 on	
bank	 loans	 and	 found	 that	 differences	 in	 the	 level	 of	 creditor	
rights	in	bankruptcy	in	the	different	jurisdictions	had	an	impact	on	
																																																						
50	Elena	Cirmizi,	Leora	Klapper,	and	Mahesh	Uttamchandani,	“The	Challenges	of	
Bankruptcy	Reform”,	Policy	Research	Working	Paper	5448,	The	World	Bank	
Development	Research	Group	Finance	and	Private	Sector	Development	Team,	
2010,	at	4.	[“Cirmizi	et	al”]	
51	Ibid	at	5.	
52	Lee	et	al,	supra	note	49.	
53	United	Nations	Commission	on	International	Trade	Law	(UNCITRAL),	Legisla-
tive	Guide	on	Insolvency	Law,	2005,	United	Nations	Publication	No.E.05.V.10;	
World	Bank,	Principles	on	Effective	Insolvency	and	Creditor/Debtor	Regimes	
(revised	May	2015).	
54	See	e.g.	O.	Couwenberg,	“Survival	rates	in	bankruptcy	systems:	overlooking	
the	evidence”,	(2001)	European	Journal	of	Law	and	Economics	Nov	1;12(3):253-
73;	and	S.	Claessens	and	L.F.	Klapper,	“Bankruptcy	around	the	world:	Explana-
tions	of	its	relative	use”,	(2005)	American	Law	and	Economics	Review	Mar	
20;7(1):253-83.	
55	Cirmizi	et	al,	supra	note	50	at	6.	
56	Ibid	at	4,	citing	Kray	and	Tawara	(2014).	
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lending	terms,	particularly	terms	used	by	bank	creditors;	and	that	
legislative	reform	regarding	liquidation	led	to	a	decrease	in	inter-
est	 rates,	 although	 reorganization	 reform	 had	 the	 opposite	 ef-
fect.57	Moreover,	a	research	study	for	the	International	Monetary	
Fund	 reports	 that	 six	 years	 since	 the	 global	 financial	 crisis,	 the	
problems	 of	 high	 levels	 of	 corporate	 debt	 and	 nonperforming	
loans	 (“NPLs”)	 persist	 in	 several	 European	 countries.58	It	 found	
that	 SMEs	 in	general	 are	more	 leveraged	and	 reliant	on	bank	 fi-
nancing	 than	 large	 firms	 and	 have	 significantly	 higher	 non-
performing	 loan	(“NPL”)	ratios.	 It	also	 found	that	given	the	 large	
number	of	SMEs,	their	small	size	and	heavy	reliance	on	collateral,	
SME	 loan	 restructuring	 is	more	 costly	 and	 riskier	 for	 large	 firms	
than	 for	 banks,	 and	 current	 frameworks	 are	 ill-suited	 for	 SMEs,	
both	 in	 the	ways	 they	 limit	 restructuring	 options	 and	 how	 they	
prevent	speedy	liquidation	and	exit.59		
C. ONE	SIZE	OR	STRATEGY	FOR	MSME	INSOLVENCY	WILL	NOT	FIT	
ALL		
The	 public	 policy	 in	 many	 jurisdictions	 is	 to	 encourage	 the	 for-
mation	and	growth	of	MSMEs,	yet	that	policy	does	not	necessarily	
align	with	treatment	during	financial	distress.	Insolvency	process-
es	in	many	countries	are	too	expensive	and	unwieldy	for	MSMEs.	
As	noted	previously,	the	broad	range	of	definitions	for	MSMEs	in	
various	 jurisdictions	 is	 highly	problematic	 for	 the	 types	of	 issues	
facing	MSMEs.	One	size	does	not	fit	all.	
Often,	on	MSME	insolvency,	there	are	few	or	no	assets	to	realize.	
Liquidation	 is	 the	 most	 prevalent	 outcome,	 which	 can	 result	 in	
loss	of	value	to	creditors	and	debtors.	Insolvency	regimes	not	de-
signed	to	address	MSME	failure	can	fail	to	distinguish	viable	busi-
nesses	from	non-viable	ones.		
As	noted	above,	 the	owners	of	 small	 businesses	usually	need	 to	
secure	business	loans	with	their	personal	assets	or	personal	guar-
antees,	 creating	 a	 convergence	 and	 blurring	 of	 distinctions	 be-
tween	personal	and	business	 liability	 in	practice,	a	 factor	not	ac-
counted	for	in	most	insolvency	law	regimes	globally.	Researchers	
have	observed	that	while	the	personal	guarantee	of	a	firm’s	own-
																																																						
57	Ibid	at	3.	
58	Wolfgang	Bergthaler,	Kenneth	Kang,	Yan	Liu,	and	Dermot	Monaghan,	Tacking	
Small	and	Medium	Sized	Enterprise	Problem	Loans	in	Europe,	European	De-
partment,	Legal	Department,	and	Monetary	and	Capital	Markets	Department,	
International	Monetary	Fund,	March	2015	at	6.	
59	Ibid.	
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er	 might	 encourage	 a	 level	 of	 financial	 discipline,	 in	 countries	
without	a	personal	bankruptcy	 framework,	a	single	business	 fail-
ure	can	doom	an	owner	to	a	lifetime	of	outstanding	debt;60	effec-
tively	preventing	such	individuals	from	re-entering	the	market	as	
experienced.61	Evidence	 suggests	 that	 exactly	 the	 opposite	 ap-
proach	better	serves	standard	public	policy	objectives.	One	study	
that	 compared	 self-employment	 in	 15	 countries	 in	 Europe	 and	
North	America	from	1990-2005	found	that	the	more	forgiving	the	
personal	 bankruptcy	 laws,	measured	 particularly	 in	 reference	 to	
the	time	a	bankrupt	individual	has	to	wait	to	be	discharged	from	
pre-bankruptcy	debts,	combined	with	ready	access	to	 limited	lia-
bility	 protections,	 the	 more	 entrepreneurial	 activity	 was	 en-
hanced.62	
The	failure	to	recognize	this	convergence	of	personal	and	business	
debt	means	that	debtors	may	have	access	to	effective	liquidation	
or	rehabilitation	schemes	only	if	they	fit	within	very	specific	crite-
ria.	For	example,	in	Canada,	there	is	a	highly-streamlined	mecha-
nism	 for	MSME	 businesses	 under	 Division	 II	 consumer	 proposal	
provisions	of	the	BIA,	which	are	accessible	to	self-employed	indi-
viduals	 and	 sole	 proprietors	 whose	 debts	 are	 less	 than	 250,000	
CAD,	excluding	a	mortgage	or	hypothec	on	the	individual’s	princi-
pal	 residence,	 if	50	percent	or	more	of	 their	debts	are	business-
related.63	But	these	mechanisms	are	not	available	where	the	indi-
vidual	has	incorporated	the	business.		
Nor	are	insolvency	regimes	only	relevant	to	one	end	of	the	MSME	
lifecycle.	Access	to	credit	is	particularly	important	for	MSMEs.	The	
global	MSME	lending	volume	is	estimated	to	be	10	trillion	USD,	of	
which	70	percent	is	in	high-income	OECD	countries.	64	On	average,	
small	and	medium	enterprise	loans	constitute	13	percent	of	gross	
domestic	product	(“GDP”)	in	developed	countries	and	3	percent	in	
developing	countries.65	In	a	survey	of	130,000	firms	 in	135	coun-
tries,	 the	World	Bank	Group	 found	 that	 there	 is	 unmet	 demand	
for	bank	loans	and	lines	of	credit	in	developing	regions,	particular-
																																																						
60	Uttamchandani,	M.	&	Menezes,	A.,	(2010).	Freedom	to	Fail:	Why	Small	Busi-
ness	Insolvency	Regimes	are	Critical	for	Emerging	Markets,	International	Corpo-
rate	Rescue,	No.	4,	Vol.	7.	Chase	Cambria.		
61	Armour	and	Cumming,	supra	note	45.		
62	Ibid,	citing	John	Armour	(2008).	
63	Sarra,	supra	note	2.	
64	Ardic	et	al,	supra,	note	3.		
65	Ibid.	
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ly	Africa.66	The	survey	found	that	while	almost	60	percent	of	busi-
nesses	require	a	loan	at	some	point,	just	over	a	third	of	businesses	
have	 a	 loan	 or	 line	 of	 credit.67	The	 survey	 results	 revealed	 that	
well-designed	insolvency	 laws	are	a	factor	 in	accessing	credit,	di-
rectly	related	to	creditor	confidence	in	the	ability	to	recover.68	In	
turn,	 access	 to	 credit	 can	 assist	with	 fostering	 entrepreneurship	
and	the	creation	of	new	business	activity.	
D. THE	INTERNATIONAL	REGULATORY	AND	POLICY	CONTEXT	
Internationally,	 there	 are	 currently	 insufficient	 tools	 to	 address	
MSME	 insolvency.	 	UNCITRAL,	which	has	 led	 international	policy	
development	in	the	insolvency	area,	only	makes	brief	mention	of	
small	 businesses	 in	 its	 four-part	 Legislative	 Guide	 on	 Insolvency	
Law. 69 	The	 Legislative	 Guide	 is	 aimed	 at	 providing	 a	
comprehensive	 statement	 of	 the	 key	 objectives	 and	 principles	
that	 should	 be	 reflected	 in	 a	 State's	 insolvency	 laws.	 	 While	 it	
provides	 a	 valuable	 reference	 tool	 for	 national	 legislative	
authorities	 in	 reviewing	 the	 adequacy	 of	 their	 laws	 and	
regulations	 or	 enacting	 new	 ones,	 and	 discusses	 the	 obstacles	
facing	small	creditors	in	terms	of	barriers	to	participation,70	there	
is	virtually	no	attention	paid	to	MSME.		Part	one	of	the	Legislative	
Guide	discusses	the	key	objectives	of	an	insolvency	law,	the	types	
of	mechanisms	available	and	the	institutional	framework	required	
to	support	an	effective	insolvency	regime.	It	does	not	address	the	
particular	 challenges	 facing	 MSME	 that	 are	 highlighted	 in	 this	
report,	 aside	 from	brief	 note	 that	 the	 costs	 and	 fees	 associated	
with	 accessing	 insolvency	 proceedings	 may	 be	 of	 particular	 im-
portance	in	the	case	of	small-	and	medium-size	businesses.71			
	
Part	 two	 of	 the	 Legislative	Guide	 deals	with	 core	 features	 of	 an	
effective	 insolvency	 law,	 including	 standardized	 commencement	
																																																						
66	The	World	Bank	Group,	“Debt	Resolution	and	Business	Exit”,	Viewpoint	July	
2014,	www-wds.worldbank.org/.../PDF/907590VIEWPOIN003430Debt0Res	at	
3.	
67	Ibid.	
68	Ibid.	
69	UNCITRAL	 Legislative	 Guide	 on	 Insolvency	 Law,	 Parts	 One	 and	 Two	 (2004,)	
UNCITRAL	 Legislative	 Guide	 on	 Insolvency	 Law,	 Part	 Three	 (2010).	 UNCITRAL	
Legislative	 Guide	 on	 Insolvency	 Law,	 Part	 Four	 (2013).	 The	 Legislative	 Guide,	
together	 with	 the	World	 Bank	 Principles	 on	 Creditor-Debtors	 Regimes	 2015,	
form	the	insolvency	standard.	
70	Ibid	at	25.	
71	Ibid	at	57.	
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criteria,	 stays,	 post-commencement	 finance,	 participation	 of	
creditors,	expedited	reorganization	proceedings,	simplified	claims	
procedures,	conversion	of	reorganization	to	liquidation,	and	clear	
rules	 for	 discharge	 of	 the	 debtor	 and	 closure	 of	 insolvency	
proceedings.	 	 While	 these	 elements	 are	 directly	 relevant	 to	
MSME,	they	assume	that	debtor	companies	have	the	financial	and	
human	resources	to	undertake	the	processes	envisioned,	which	is	
not	the	reality	for	the	vast	majority	of	insolvent	MSME.		The	Guide	
does	make	reference	to	cost	burdens	that	will	deter	creditors	and	
discourage	 commencement	 of	 proceedings,	 “of	 particular	 im-
portance	in	the	case	of	insolvency	of	small	and	medium-size	busi-
nesses”.72		It	does	note	the	issue	of	overlap	of	consumer	and	small	
business	debt	as	follows:	
One	issue	that	may	need	to	be	taken	into	account	in	con-
sidering	 discharge	 of	 natural	 persons	 engaged	 in	 a	 busi-
ness	undertaking	is	the	intersection	of	business	 indebted-
ness	with	consumer	indebtedness.	Recognizing	that	differ-
ent	approaches	are	taken	to	the	insolvency	of	natural	per-
sons	(in	some	States	a	natural	person	cannot	be	declared	
bankrupt	at	all,	while	 in	others	there	is	a	requirement	for	
the	person	to	have	acted	in	the	capacity	of	a	“merchant”)	
and	that	many	States	do	not	have	a	developed	consumer	
insolvency	 system,	 a	 number	 of	 States	 have	 insolvency	
laws	that	seek	to	distinguish	between	those	who	are	simp-
ly	consumer	debtors	and	those	whose	liabilities	arise	from	
small	businesses.	Since	consumer	credit	is	often	used	to	fi-
nance	small	business	either	as	start-up	capital	or	for	oper-
ating	funds,	it	may	not	always	be	possible	to	separate	the	
debts	into	clear	categories.	For	that	reason,	where	a	legal	
system	 recognizes	 both	 consumer	 and	 business	 debt,	 it	
may	not	be	feasible	to	have	rules	on	the	business	debts	of	
natural	 persons	 that	 differ	 from	 the	 rules	 applicable	 to	
consumer	debts.73	
	
Part	 three	 of	 the	 Legislative	 Guide	 addresses	 the	 treatment	 of	
enterprise	 groups	 in	 insolvency,	 both	 nationally	 and	
internationally;	 it	 is	 not	 directly	 applicable	 to	 the	 overwhelming	
majority	of	MSMEs	and	 there	 is	 no	 specific	 reference	 to	 smaller	
debtor	 companies	 in	 this	part.	 Part	 four	of	 the	Legislative	Guide	
focuses	on	the	obligations	that	might	be	imposed	on	the	directors	
																																																						
72	Ibid	at	63,	repeated	at	162.	
73	Ibid	at	284,	6.	
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and	officers	responsible	for	making	decisions	when	an	enterprise	
faces	or	becomes	insolvent.	 	 In	this	part,	the	only	reference	is	to	
family	 members	 and	 senior	 employees	 of	 small	 family-owned	
companies	being	considered	de	 facto	directors,	 some	criteria	 for	
that	assessment,	and	potential	resultant	liability.74		The	UNCITRAL	
Model	 Law	 on	 Cross-Border	 Insolvency	 (1997)	 and	 its	 Guide	 to	
Enactment	make	no	reference	to	MSME.			
	
Hence,	 the	UNCITRAL	 legislative	 guides	 and	other	policies,	while	
comprehensive,	 reflect	 very	much	 how	 insolvency	 systems	 have	
been	 designed	 in	 many	 States.	 	 As	 noted	 earlier	 in	 this	 report,	
such	systems	have	been	designed	with	larger	enterprises	in	mind,	
assuming	an	insolvency	estate	of	significant	worth,	and	the	pres-
ence	of	 creditors	and	other	 stakeholders	with	 sufficient	value	at	
stake	that	they	actively	participate	in	the	workout	process.		
	
In	April	2014,	after	an	extensive	and	thorough	preliminary	analy-
sis,	 UNCITRAL's	 Insolvency	Working	 Group	 V	 declared	 that	 "the	
mechanisms	provided	by	the	Legislative	Guide	were	not	sufficient	
to	address	all	of	the	needs	of	MSMEs;	thorough	treatment	of	the	
issues	would	require	both	a	consideration	of	matters	not	yet	ad-
dressed	 in	 the	 Legislative	 Guide	 as	well	 as	 the	 tailoring	 of	 solu-
tions	 already	 in	 the	 Legislative	 Guide	 to	 specifically	 address	
MSMEs”.75	It	 observed,	 as	 an	 example,	 that	 “the	 application	 of	
elements	of	the	insolvency	law,	such	as	creditor	committees,	the	
central	role	of	the	courts	and	extensive	involvement	of	insolvency	
professionals,	might	not	be	appropriate	for	MSME	regimes”76	
	
The	World	Bank,	while	it	has	dedicated	considerable	resources	to	
the	finance	and	education	of	MSME,	also	does	not	have	a	specific	
approach	 to	MSME	 insolvency	 that	addresses	 some	of	 the	prob-
lems	 identified	 above.	 Its	 extensive	 studies	 acknowledge	 that	
MSME	are	collectively	the	largest	employers	in	many	low-income	
countries,	 facing	 barriers	 in	 access	 to	 capital	 and	 financial	 ser-
vices.	 The	World	 Bank	 has	 developed	 a	 wide	 range	 of	 available	
instruments	to	help	meet	the	challenge	of	MSME	finance,	includ-
ing	 data	 analysis,	 financing,	 risk-sharing,	 technical	 assistance,	 a	
financial	 inclusion	support	 framework,	and	working	globally	with	
																																																						
74	UNCITRAL	Legislative	Guide,	Part	IV,	at	16.	
75 	https://documents-dds-
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76 	https://documents-dds-
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standard-setting	 bodies	 to	 develop	 guidelines,	 standards	 and	
good	practices.77	To	date,	there	has	not	been	the	development	of	
similar	 instruments	 and	policies	 expressly	 aimed	at	MSME	 insol-
vency.	 	The	World	Bank	 Insolvency	and	Creditor/Debtor	Regimes	
Task	Force,	Report	of	the	Working	Group	on	the	Treatment	of	the	
Insolvency	of	Natural	Persons	very	briefly	mentions	small	business	
in	the	context	of	overlap	of	consumer	and	business	credit	in	small	
businesses.	However,	the	World	Bank	will	convene	a	Task	Force	in	
autumn	 2016,	 which	 will	 consider	 developing	 instruments	 and	
approaches	to	MSME	insolvency	that	could	address	the	core	prob-
lems	with	the	current	framework.	
	
																																																						
77	The	World	Bank	Principles	on	Creditor-Debtor	Regimes	2015	 that,	 together	
with	the	UNCITRAL	Legislative	Guide,	supra	note	69,	form	the	insolvency	stand-
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IV. THE	MODULAR	APPROACH:	POLICY	
OBJECTIVES	AND	KEY	COMPONENTS	
	
At	the	highest	 level	of	generality,	 insolvency	 laws	have	four	core	
objectives:	
• Preservation	 and	maximization	of	 value	 in	 the	 insolvency	
estate	
• Distribution	of	that	value	in	a	normatively	defensible	man-
ner	
• Providing	for	accountability	for	any	wrongdoing	connected	
with	the	insolvency,	and	
• Providing	 for	 the	 discharge	 of	 over-indebted	 natural	 per-
sons.	
These	 objectives	 partially	 overlap.	 For	 example,	 the	 manner	 of	
distribution	of	the	insolvency	estate	and	the	form	of	accountabil-
ity	for	timely	commencement	of	the	insolvency	process	may	each	
create	 incentives	more	 or	 less	 conducive	 to	 the	 preservation	 of	
value	in	that	estate.	At	the	same	time,	the	four	objectives	are	es-
sentially	irreducible	one	to	the	other,	and	may	compete	amongst	
themselves.	For	example,	a	part	of	the	insolvency	estate	devoted	
to	investigating	the	circumstances	of	the	insolvency	may	be	lost	to	
the	particular	debtor’s	creditors	and	other	stakeholders.	Similarly,	
creditors	 of	 a	 particular	 insolvent	 natural	 person	 may	 lose	 the	
The	Modular	Approach	aims	at:	
• preservation	and	maximization	of	value	
• fair	and	reasonable	distribution	of	value	
• accountability	for	wrongdoing	
• discharge	where	appropriate	of	over-indebted	natural	persons.	
The	Modular	Approach	seeks	to	incentivize:	
• timely	commencement	of	proceedings	
• rescue	of	viable	businesses	
• liquidation	of	non-viable	businesses	
• devolvement	of	choice	on	stakeholders	with	the	best	information	
and	most	appropriate	incentives	for	value-maximizing	outcomes	
The	Modular	Approach	recognizes	and	addresses	rational	creditor	indiffer-
ence	and	the	need	for	financing	through	the	process.	
The	Modular	Approach	allows	national	policy	makers	to	choose	a	range	of	
available	options	and	the	involvement	of	appropriate	institutions.	
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entire	 value	of	 their	 claims	upon	 that	person’s	 release	 from	 fur-
ther	liabilities,	even	though	such	release	may	be	required	by	fair-
ness	 to	 that	person	and	also	be	 in	 the	broader	 social	 interest	 in	
fostering	entrepreneurial	risk-taking.		
The	Modular	Approach	 has	 several	 key	 components	 that	 enable	
pursuit	of	each	of	these	core	objectives.	It	is	designed	to	respond	
to	 the	 differences	 amongst	 economies,	 legal	 regimes,	 and	 the	
varying	types	of	business	that	comprise	MSMEs.	The	Modular	Ap-
proach	seeks	 to	generate	 incentives	 for	 relevant	parties	 to	bring	
about	 timely	 commencement	 of	 the	 insolvency	 process;	 to	 sift	
through	distressed	businesses	 to	 identify	and	 rescue	viable	ones	
and	liquidate	non-viable	ones,	to	do	so	without	making	unrealistic	
demands	 on	 parties’	 capabilities	 and	 knowledge;	 to	 respond	 to	
the	 rational	 indifference	 to	 the	 process	 of	 creditors	 and	 other	
stakeholders;	to	provide	for	the	funding	of	the	business	undergo-
ing	the	process;	to	provide	for	accountability	for	any	wrongdoing	
related	 to	 the	 insolvency;	 and	 to	 enable	 over-indebted	 natural	
person	entrepreneurs	to	be	discharged.		
A. RESPONDING	TO	THE	DIFFERENCES	AMONGST	ECONOMIES	
AND	LEGAL	SYSTEMS	
The	 Modular	 Approach	 recognizes	 the	 importance	 of	 enabling	
national	 policy-makers	 and	 legislators	 to	 design	 insolvency	 re-
gimes	responsive	to	the	economic,	social	and	legal	specificities	of	
their	country.	It	meets	two	particular	challenges:	to	accommodate	
differences	in	the	scope	of	insolvency	regimes	in	various	jurisdic-
tions,	and	to	offer	options	for	the	allocation	of	management,	ad-
ministrative	and	decision	functions	during	the	process.	
First,	while	the	development	of	a	definition	of	MSMEs	that	could	
be	consistently	applied	is	a	laudable	goal,	a	number	of	efforts	un-
dertaken	 to	 harmonize	 SME	 and	MSME	 definitions	 at	 the	OECD	
and	 elsewhere	 have	 not,	 to	 date,	 produced	 a	 uniform	 result.	78	
Ardic	et	al	observe	that	the	heterogeneity	of	MSMEs	themselves	
and	the	nature	of	the	economy	in	which	they	operate	might	mean	
that	establishing	a	global	definition	is	not	feasible.79	From	the	in-
solvency	 perspective,	 a	 globally	 uniform	 definition	may	 be	 posi-
tively	 undesirable.	 MSMEs	 require	 special	 insolvency	 treatment	
because	 ‘standard’	 insolvency	 proceedings	 are	 self-defeatingly	
resource-	and	time-intensive.	The	question	is	how	to	balance	the	
																																																						
78	See	discussion	in	Part	II.A.	
79	Ardic	et	al,	supra	note	3	at	8.	
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costs	of	features	such	as	extensive	mandatory	creditor,	insolvency	
professional	 and	 court	 involvement	 against	 the	 benefits.	Where	
this	balance	 lies	would	be	highly	 likely	 to	be	 sensitive	 to	 the	at-
tributes	of	the	economy	and	legal	system.	With	that	in	mind,	the	
Modular	Approach	assumes	that	national	authorities	would	draw	
upon	 some	 combination	 of	 the	 above-described	 parameters	 to	
define	the	types	of	enterprise	that	would	be	required	or	permit-
ted	 to	make	use	of	 the	 special	 features	described	 in	 this	 report,	
and	 also	 those	 which	 would	 fall	 beyond	 the	 ambit	 of	 this	 ap-
proach.	
Second,	the	operation	of	any	insolvency	system	requires	the	per-
formance	of	three	types	of	 function.	Someone	must	manage	the	
business	through	the	insolvency	process.	This	management	func-
tion	 includes	 ordinary	 commercial	 decisions,	 commercially	 in-
formed	choices	about	which	of	the	available	legal	tools	to	deploy,	
and	negotiations	with	creditors	and	other	stakeholders	to	obtain	a	
desirable	conclusion	to	the	insolvency	process.	It	is	also	critical	for	
there	to	be	oversight	of	the	process,	to	ensure	that	deadlines	are	
being	met,	notifications	duly	provided,	and	disclosures	duly	made.	
This	oversight	 is	 the	administrative	 function.	 Finally,	 there	 is	 the	
judicial	 function	 of	 ensuring	 that	 the	 law	 has	 been	 correctly	 ap-
plied,	reasonable	findings	of	fact	have	been	reached,	and	that	the	
parties	have	all	been	treated	fairly.		
The	Modular	Approach	enables	national	policy	makers	to	choose	
the	range	of	options	described	in	Part	V.	A.	and	B.	to	make	availa-
ble	to	parties	in	the	individual	case.	One	legal	system	may	require	
certain	decisions	in	every	individual	case	to	be	vested	in	the	court.	
Another	jurisdiction	may,	by	contrast,	allow	court	involvement	to	
be	dispensed	with	altogether	in	the	individual	case,	unless	fraud	is	
suspected	or	a	 critical	party	 is	being	uncooperative.	 Instead,	 the	
judicial	function	might	be	vested	in	an	administrative	agency,	or	in	
a	regulated	insolvency	professional,	in	each	case	acting	in	a	quasi-
judicial	 capacity.	National	 legislators	would	make	 the	decision	 in	
view	 of	 their	 own	 constitutional	 arrangements,	 and	 their	 own	
assessment	of	the	relative	abilities	of	courts,	administrative	bod-
ies,	 and	private	 sector	professionals.	 Similarly,	 a	national	 legisla-
ture	may	decide	to	vest	the	management	function	in	an	adminis-
trative	 agency,	 or	 alternatively,	 permit	 the	 entrepreneur	 to	 re-
main	 in	place.	Finally,	 the	administrative	function	may	be	vested	
in	a	public	body	or	a	private	sector	official.		
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B. RESPONDING	TO	MSME	HETEROGENEITY		
Subject	to	national	authorities’	design	decisions,	the	Modular	Ap-
proach	devolves	choices	about	the	precise	form	of	the	insolvency	
process	 applied	 to	 a	 particular	 business	 to	 those	 stakeholders	
with	the	best	information	about	the	business	and	an	appropriate	
stake	in	a	value-maximizing	outcome.	The	Modular	Approach	pro-
vides	an	essential	‘core’	process	in	each	case,	and	allows	relevant	
stakeholders	 to	 invoke	additional	 tools	or	 ‘modules’	 if	and	when	
the	 benefits	 of	 wielding	 those	 tools	 in	 the	 particular	 case	 out-
weigh	the	costs.	For	example,	the	legislature	may	provide	for	the	
management	function	to	be	performed	by	the	entrepreneur.	In	a	
simple	case,	the	entrepreneur	will	steer	the	business	through	the	
process.	 In	 less	 straightforward	 cases,	 however,	 a	 requisite	 pro-
portion	 of	 stakeholders	may	 express	 their	 distrust	 in	 the	 entre-
preneur’s	competence	or	integrity	by	seeking	to	obtain	the	entre-
preneur’s	removal	and	replacement	by	an	independent	insolvency	
professional.	 Similarly,	 a	 legal	 system	may	 envisage	 no	 court	 in-
volvement	in	the	standard	case,	while	permitting	stakeholders	to	
invoke	the	court’s	help	if	and	as	considered	necessary.	Again,	the	
assumption	is	that	the	stakeholder	would	only	do	so	if	the	dispute	
is	 of	 sufficient	 value	 to	 it	 to	make	 the	 costs	 of	 instructing	 legal	
professionals	 worthwhile.	 A	 description	 of	 these	 stakeholder-
initiated	modules	is	set	out	in	Part	V.	B.	
C. PROVIDING	FOR	TIMELY	COMMENCEMENT	OF	PROCESS		
The	efficacy	of	an	 insolvency	process	may	turn	on	the	timeliness	
with	which	 the	process	 is	 commenced.	Delayed	 commencement	
may	 result	 in	 the	destruction	of	 value	 and	perhaps	 of	 the	 going	
concern,	 as	 the	 debtor’s	 assets	 are	 seized	 by	 secured	 and	 judg-
ment	 creditors	 and/or	 misapplied	 by	 the	 debtor’s	 managers,	 in	
either	case	unimpaired	by	insolvency	moratoria.	Premature	com-
mencement,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 may	 destroy	 the	most	 realistic	
options	 for	 turning	around	 the	distressed	business	by	 ‘stigmatiz-
ing’	it	in	the	eyes	of	its	counterparties,	who	might	assume	that	it	
was	 no	 longer	 viable	 and	might	 therefore	 refuse	 to	 do	 business	
with	it	on	ordinary	commercial	terms	or	at	all.		
In	principle,	 it	 is	the	debtor’s	managers	who	have	the	best	 infor-
mation	 about	 its	 prospects	 and	 solvency,	 since	 they	 are	 dealing	
with	 counterparties	who	might	 threaten	 the	 business’s	 solvency	
by	cancelling	important	contracts	or	toughening	business	terms.	It	
is	 thus	 the	 debtor’s	 managers	 who	 are	 best	 placed	 to	 take	 the	
commencement	 decision	 in	 a	 timely	 manner.	 The	 Modular	 Ap-
proach	 creates	positive	 incentives	 for	 them	by	enabling	 them	 to	
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commence	 the	 process	 without	 necessarily	 having	 to	
prove/declare	insolvency;80	by	presumptively	letting	them	remain	
in	charge	of	the	business	through	the	insolvency	process;	and	by	
giving	them	the	best	opportunity	of	proposing	how	the	insolvency	
should	be	addressed,	such	as	through	determining	the	content	of	
a	 restructuring	plan	 to	be	put	 to	 the	creditors.	The	Modular	Ap-
proach	 also	 generates	 negative	 incentives	 by	 imposing	 personal	
liability	 on	 the	 managers	 of	 corporate	 debtors	 for	 non-timely	
commencement,	 and/or	 by	 delaying	 or	 otherwise	 hardening	 the	
conditions	 on	 which	 the	 natural	 person	 debtor	 may	 obtain	 dis-
charge	of	debts.	These	negative	incentives	are	addressed	in	more	
detail	in	Part	VI.	
D. DETERMINING	VIABILITY	
An	 insolvency	 framework	 should	be	designed	 to	prevent	 further	
loss	of	value	from	the	insolvency	estate.	Such	a	loss	may	occur	in	
two	 scenarios:	 (1)	 a	 viable	 business	 is	 liquidated	 in	 a	 piecemeal	
liquidation,	which	results	 in	the	 loss	of	any	remaining	going	con-
cern	 value;	 (2)	 a	 non-viable	 business	 is	 restructured	 and	 subse-
quently	 fails,	which	 results	 in	 additional	 losses	of	 the	 reinvested	
value	 that	 should	 have	 been	 invested	 in	 viable	 businesses	 in-
stead.81	In	 order	 to	prevent	 both	 types	of	 errors,	 any	 insolvency	
framework	 is	 confronted	 with	 the	 task	 of	 designing	 a	 decision-
making	procedure	that	identifies	viable	business	models	and	facil-
itates	 rescue	of	 viable	businesses	while	ensuring	 that	non-viable	
businesses	are	speedily	wound	up.	
Viability	is	determined	by	vesting	the	decision	whether	to	rehabil-
itate	or	 liquidate	the	business,	and	how	to	do	so,	 in	principle,	 in	
the	parties	who	possess	the	best	information	about	the	business,	
its	management,	 its	 competitors,	 and	 the	 state	of	 the	 economic	
sector	in	which	it	operates.	Such	information	is	likely	to	be	critical	
to	the	assessment	of	the	distressed	enterprise’s	viability.		
																																																						
80	Depending	on	the	modular	approach	adopted.	See	the	discussion	in	Part	V.	
81	See	Robert	G.	Hansen	&	Randall	S.	Thomas,	Auctions	in	Bankruptcy:	Theoret-
ical	Analysis	and	Practical	Guidance,	(1998)	18	Intl	Rev.	L.	&	Econ	159	at	177,	
describing	both	types	of	errors.	The	second	scenario	additionally	involves	a	
transfer	of	value	from	creditors,	whose	legal	rights	are	not	fully	honoured	in	
the	insolvency,	to	other	stakeholders	(particularly	managers,	employees,	and	
perhaps	equity	owners),	none	of	whom	has	legal	rights	to	the	continuation	of	
their	particular	positions	in	the	non-viable	distressed	business,	yet	who	benefit	
from	its	continuation.		
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The	process	may	be	conceptualized	as	consisting	of	two	steps.	The	
first	is	to	propose	the	best	way	in	which	the	value	in	the	insolven-
cy	estate	may	be	maximized.	This	step	includes	not	merely	decid-
ing	whether	to	liquidate	or	to	restructure	the	business,	but	if	the	
latter,	also	identifying	the	optimal	terms	on	which	the	restructur-
ing	may	occur.	The	debtor	and/or	 its	management	often	possess	
private	 information	 as	 to	 the	 business’s	 viability.	 The	 Modular	
Approach	seeks	to	capitalize	on	this	private	information	by	giving	
the	debtor	and/or	its	managers	the	opportunity	of	proposing	how	
the	 insolvency	 should	 be	 addressed,	 while,	 presumptively,	 run-
ning	the	business	and	thus	retaining	the	most	current	information	
about	its	status	and	prospects.		
The	 second	 step	 in	determining	 viability	 is	 to	make	 the	ultimate	
decision	whether	 to	pursue	 rehabilitation	on	 the	basis	of	one	or	
more	proposed	plans,	or	to	consign	the	business	to	liquidation.	In	
general,	 the	business’s	 creditors,	 considered	as	a	 group,	possess	
the	debtor-	and	sector-specific	 information	required	for	this	task	
to	a	greater	degree	 than	any	other	 stakeholder	group.	Creditors	
as	a	group	also	have	legal	rights	to	repayment,	which	are	unlikely	
to	 be	 honoured	 fully	 by	 the	 distressed	 enterprise.	 In	 this	 im-
portant	sense,	they	have	the	residual	claim	against	the	business,	
and	stand	to	gain	from	the	maximization	of	 its	value	and	to	 lose	
out	 if	 a	 chance	 to	maximize	 that	 value	 is	missed.	 Creditors	 as	 a	
group	thus	possess	incentives	to	pick	whichever	option	–	liquidate	
or	 rehabilitate	–	 likely	maximizes	 the	value	of	 the	business.	Cru-
cially,	 however,	 a	 well-designed	 insolvency	 regime	 would	
acknowledge	and	respond	to	the	fact	that	not	all	types	of	creditor	
possess	such	value-maximizing	incentives.82	
Also	in	general,	no	other	stakeholder	group	meets	the	character-
istics	 described	 above.	 Equity	 owners,	 employees	 qua	 employ-
ees,83	and	management	can	be	expected	to	have	a	bias	in	favour	
of	rehabilitation,	which	for	them	is	a	one-sided	bet.	These	groups	
tend	to	have	 little	to	 lose	and	something	to	gain	from	opting	for	
the	continuation	of	the	business	regardless	of	whether	it	remains	
viable.	Courts	and	other	state	authorities	have	no	direct	incentive	
to	choose	the	value-maximizing	option,	and	they,	 like	employees	
																																																						
82	A	well-known	example	is	secured	creditors	whose	collateral	has	sufficient	
value	to	ensure	full	repayment	regardless	of	the	maximization	of	the	overall	
value	of	the	business.		
83	Distinguishable	from	employees	as	creditors,	who	have	all	the	rights	of	credi-
tors	as	set	out	in	the	relevant	insolvency,	employment	and	other	related	legis-
lation.	
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and	many	equity	owners,	may	lack	knowledge	of	the	business,	its	
competitors,	and/or	the	relevant	economic	sector.	Similarly,	man-
agement	 cannot	 be	 expected	 to	make	 a	 credible	 decision	 about	
whether	 it	 bears	 some	 responsibility	 for	 the	 business’s	 distress	
nor	about	their	own	ability	to	turn	around	the	business’s	fortunes.	
Since	there	 is	significant	overlap	between	ownership	and	control	
in	most	MSMEs,	the	same	points	carry	over	to	equity	owners.	Fur-
ther,	 no	 other	 stakeholder	 group	 has	 legal	 rights	 at	 risk	 in	 the	
debtor’s	 insolvency:	 equity	 holders	 are	 not	 entitled	 to	 payment	
from	 the	 business	 unless	 creditors	 are	 paid	 in	 full,	 and	 neither	
management	nor	employees	are	entitled	to	maintain	their	status	
once	they	are	redundant	to	their	employer’s	requirements.	
In	 summary,	 the	decision	whether	 to	attempt	a	 rehabilitation	of	
the	business	or	to	provide	for	its	speedy	liquidation	is,	in	principle,	
best	vested	primarily	in	creditors	as	a	group.	In	the	MSME	context	
in	particular,	however,	most	creditors	are	likely	a	dispersed	group	
with	 small	 individual	 stakes	 in	 the	 outcome.	 MSME	 insolvency	
regimes	must	be	built	on	the	understanding	that	it	would	often	be	
rational	for	such	creditors	not	to	participate	actively	in	their	debt-
or’s	insolvency	proceedings.	Whether	the	debtor	should	be	reha-
bilitated	 should	 not	 be	 allowed	 to	 be	hostage	 to	 such	participa-
tion.	The	Modular	Approach	responds	to	these	considerations	in	a	
number	of	ways,	described	in	Part	V.		
E. REDUCING	THE	BURDENS	ON	PARTIES’	KNOWLEDGE	AND	
CAPABILITIES		
Most	stakeholders	 in	any	 insolvency	process	are	unlikely	to	have	
extensive	 expertise	 in	 restructuring	 or	 liquidation.	 In	 larger	 es-
tates	 where	 significant	 value	 is	 at	 stake,	 the	 debtor	 and	 some	
stakeholders	 can	 address	 such	 deficiencies	 through	 the	 engage-
ment	of	appropriate	expertise.	However,	 such	services	are	often	
prohibitive	financially	for	MSMEs,	and	the	Modular	Approach	re-
sponds	 by	 providing	 for	 ‘off-the-shelf’	 rehabilitation	 and	 liquida-
tion	plans	requiring	minimal	customization	to	be	proposed,	by	the	
debtor	in	the	first	instance,	for	creditors’	consideration.	The	plans	
provide	both	 for	 the	deployment	of	 the	business’s	 assets	with	a	
view	to	value	maximization,	and	for	the	distribution	of	that	value	
to	 those	 entitled	 to	 it.	 The	 creation	 and	 presentation	 of	 these	
plans	 are	 discussed	 in	 Part	 VI.A.2.	 Entitlements	 are	 provided	 for	
by	law,	and	must	be	respected	unless	the	relevant	claimants	have	
agreed	to	different	treatment,	subject	always	to	requirements	 in	
the	 particular	 jurisdiction	 regarding	 majority	 voting,	 class	 cram	
down,	and	deemed	approval,	etc.		
	 	 July	8	2016	version	
37	
F. RESPONDING	TO	CREDITOR	PASSIVITY	
The	 limited	 resources	 in	MSME	 insolvencies	 lead	 to	 very	 limited	
expectations	 for	 unsecured	 creditors	 regarding	 any	 substantial	
distribution	 in	right	of	their	claims.	Thus,	unsecured	creditors	of-
ten	have	 little	 incentive	to	 incur	 further	costs	with	regard	to	the	
insolvent	 debtor	 by	 participating	 actively	 in	 negotiations	 or	 pro-
ceedings	 (e.g.	 travel	 costs,	 communication	 costs,	 investment	 of	
time).	Overall,	 it	 is	often	rational	for	a	creditor	not	to	participate	
unless	 it	has	a	special	 interest	 in	 the	 result	of	 the	proceedings	–	
most	 notably	 because	 it	 is	 personally	 connected	 to	 the	 debtor	
(family,	 employees)	 or,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 secured	 creditors,	 to	 limit	
participation	to	the	enforcement	of	its	collateral.	The	potential	for	
incentivizing	 participation	 is	 discussed	 in	 Parts	 V.A.2.	 a)	 iv)	 and	
VI.B.2.		
G. FUNDING	THE	BUSINESS	THROUGH	THE	INSOLVENCY	PROCESS	
Even	a	business	that	was,	in	principle,	viable	at	the	point	of	com-
mencement	of	the	insolvency	process	may	wither	on	the	vine	un-
less	watered	with	 adequate	 funding.	 The	Modular	 Approach	 re-
sponds	both	by	reducing	the	need	for	financing,	and	by	ensuring	
the	flow	of	value	through	the	insolvency	estate.	The	most	signifi-
cant	drain	on	an	insolvent	entity’s	resources	arises	from	the	fees	
of	 insolvency	and	 legal	professionals.	As	described	 in	Part	V,	 the	
Modular	Approach	dispenses	with	both	to	the	extent	practicable,	
leaving	 it	 to	the	parties	 in	the	given	case	to	seek	 involvement	of	
such	professionals	 if	the	benefits	exceed	the	costs.	As	to	funding	
the	business	undergoing	the	insolvency	process,	the	Modular	Ap-
proach	 invalidates	 counterparties’	 attempts	 to	 terminate	 both	
financial	and	trade	contracts,	so	long	as	their	interests	can	be	ad-
equately	 protected.	 In	 practice,	 this	 prohibition	means	 that	 the	
financial	 lender	or	 trade	 supplier	may	not	exercise	an	 ipso	 facto	
clause	entitling	it	to	terminate	its	relationship	with	the	now	insol-
vent	business	nor	to	demand	higher	‘ransom’	rates	for	its	finance,	
goods,	or	services,	so	long	as	the	insolvent	entity	is	able	to	muster	
sufficient	funds	to	cure	existing	contractual	breaches	and	to	meet	
future	obligations	on	time.	Such	an	approach	gives	 the	 insolvent	
business	the	best	practicable	chance	of	trading	out	of	its	insolven-
cy.	 Further,	 the	Modular	Approach	 includes	mechanisms	 to	pro-
tect	 financing	 provided	 to	 distressed	 businesses,	 differentiating	
the	 different	 stages	 of	 the	 business	 and	 addressing	 both	 out	 of	
court	and	in	court	situations,	discussed	in	Part	VI.B.4.		
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H. PROVIDING	FOR	DUE	ACCOUNTABILITY	
Insolvency,	by	definition,	involves	breach	of	creditors’	rights,	and	
typically	also	results	in	destruction	of	productive	capacity	and	loss	
of	employment.	Cost-effective	investigations	of	the	circumstances	
of	 the	 insolvency	 serve	 both	 private	 and	 public	 interests.	 They	
ensure	that	the	creditors	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	given	case	
recoup	what	 they	are	owed	 to	 the	maximum	extent	practicable.	
They	also	 reinforce	commercial	morality	by	assuring	market	par-
ticipants	that	 legal	processes,	 including	 limited	liability	and	insol-
vency	law	itself,	are	not	being	abused.	
Small	business	insolvency	cases	are	typically	cases	with	few	or	no	
unencumbered	assets,	which	leaves	little	or	no	resources	for	any	
kind	 of	 a	 thorough	 investigation	 from	 an	 outsider.	 At	 the	 same	
time,	 any	 emphasis	 on	 rescuing	 such	 a	 business	 for	 the	 sake	 of	
benefits	to	society,	to	the	debtors	and	their	family,	or	to	employ-
ees	 creates	 a	 debtor-friendly	 regime	 that	may	 incentivize	 entre-
preneurs	 to	 act	 carelessly	 or	 even	 fraudulently	 when	 causing	 a	
business	failure.	More	than	any	other	regime,	a	MSME	insolvency	
framework	 must	 therefore	 ensure	 that	 it	 provides	 an	 effective	
mechanism	 to	 detect	 fraud	 or	 other	 impropriety.	 Dishonest	 or	
reckless	entrepreneurs	do	not	deserve	to	remain	in	business	or	to	
benefit	from	a	quick	discharge,	as	discussed	below.	
The	 limited	 resources	 in	MSME	 cases	 require	 a	mechanism	 that	
unearths	 fraudulent	 or	 reckless	 behaviour	 of	 the	 entrepreneur	
without	a	lengthy	and	costly	public	investigation.	Any	public	agen-
cy	or	trustee	would	be	overburdened	by	the	sheer	number	of	cas-
es	to	work	through,	especially	in	times	of	an	economic	crisis	with	
insolvencies	 mounting	 up.	 	 As	 discussed	 in	 Part	 VI.A.1,	 possible	
options	in	terms	of	who	might	initiate	proceedings	for	misbehav-
iour	 include	creditors,	 insolvency	practitioners	or	other	agencies.	
Part	VI	also	includes	a	discussion	of	challenges	to	access	to	infor-
mation	 and	 funding	 limitations.84		 While	 any	 public	 investigator	
and	any	 court	 investigation	would	 require	efforts	 to	detect	 such	
information,	 such	 cases	 could	 be	 properly	 handled	 by	 a	 frame-
work	 that	allows	and	 incentivizes	all	 those	who	possess	 relevant	
facts	 to	 present	 them	before	 a	 decision	 to	 rescue	 a	 business	 or	
discharge	a	debtor	is	made.	In	addition,	the	decision	to	discharge	
should	 be	 reversible	 for	 a	 period	 of	 time	 if	 such	 information	
emerges	after	proceedings	have	ended.		
																																																						
84	See	Part	VI.A.1.	d).	
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I. PROVIDING	FOR	DISCHARGE	OF	OVER-INDEBTED	NATURAL	
PERSONS	
Opinion	has	changed	as	to	the	treatment	of	natural	person	entre-
preneurs	who	have	taken	risks	and	suffered	insolvency.	Previously	
stigmatized	 and	 excluded	 from	 productive	 activity,	 such	 people	
are	now	increasingly	sought	to	be	incentivized	to	bring	their	expe-
rience	and	expertise	back	to	productive	use.85	Quick	and	predict-
able	debt	relief	is	a	powerful	incentive	for	people	who	run	a	trou-
bled	business	to	do	the	right	thing.	It	provides	for	an	exit	option	in	
a	 distress	 situation,	 which	 allows	 entrepreneurs	 to	 either	 shut	
down	 or	 restructure	 their	 business	 at	 an	 early	 stage	 and,	 thus,	
reduces	the	incentive	to	take	excessive	risks	in	a	final	attempt	to	
turn	 the	business	 around.	Debt	 relief	 is	 a	powerful	 incentive	 for	
informed	entrepreneurs	to	address	the	situation	of	their	business	
early	and	efficiently	(for	more	details	see	Part	VI.C.).	At	the	same	
time,	the	threat	of	denying	debt	relief	works	as	a	powerful	disin-
centive	for	those	entrepreneurs	who	act	 fraudulently	or	attempt	
to	misuse	 the	 regime,	 e.g.	 by	 forging	 or	 concealing	 information	
about	their	business	or	their	assets.	
																																																						
85	See	for	the	latter:	The	combined	UNCITRAL	Legislative	Guide	on	Insolvency	
Law	and	the	World	Bank	Principles	on	Insolvency	and	Creditor-Debtor	Regimes.	
(“Legislative	Guide”),	Part	two	(III,	A.,	para.	32).	See	also	EU	Commission	Rec-
ommendation	on	a	new	approach	to	business	failure	and	insolvency,	Brussels,	
12.3.2014	[“EU	Recommendation”]	(Recitals	3,	20,	Art.	30-33);	The	World	Bank	
Natural	Persons	Report,	at	25-40.	
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V. DESIGNING	A	MODULAR	APPROACH	
The	Modular	Approach	consists	of	a	default	“core”,	complement-
ed	by	a	combination	of	additional	mechanisms	or	“modules”	 se-
lected	in	each	case	by	relevant	stakeholders.		
The	Modular	Approach	unpacks	the	many	tools	traditionally	avail-
able	 under	 workout,	 restructuring	 and	 liquidation	 processes.	
Starting	 from	a	core	of	presumptively	essential	elements,	 it	ena-
bles	parties	to	the	given	case,	acting	with	appropriate	incentives,	
to	 select	 whichever	 combination	 of	 modules	 is	 suitable	 to	 that	
case,	given	the	nature	and	type	of	debtor	and	assets,	the	causes	
of	distress,	and	the	perceived	prospects	for	viability	and	rehabili-
tation	of	the	debtor.		
The	Modular	Approach	is	modular	in	two	aspects.	First,	it	provides	
for	 a	 simple,	 clear	 cut	 default	 process	 to	 liquidate	 or	 rescue	 a	
small	business.	This	process	can	be	altered	wherever	stakeholders	
select	 specific	 modules	 to	 adapt	 the	 process	 to	 their	 specific	
needs.	Second,	the	approach	also	leaves	a	choice	of	modules	and	
their	allocation	 to	 local	 lawmakers.	Based	on	 their	cultural	back-
ground	and	political	agenda,	 legislators	may	choose	not	to	enact	
all	 of	 the	offered	modules.	 They	may	also	make	decisions	about	
the	most	 suitable	venue	 for	 liquidation	or	 rescue	proceedings	 in	
their	 jurisdictions.86	Overall,	 the	Modular	Approach	offers	a	flexi-
ble	 framework	 for	 small	 businesses	 in	 financial	 difficulties	 with	
limited	complexity	and	costs.	
The	following	images	map	the	Modular	Approach	process	by	pre-
senting	a	 visual	outline	of	 the	overall	 approach	 for	both	 liquida-
tion	 and	 rescue	 procedures;	 and	 then	 offering	 an	 illustration	 of	
each	procedure,	 followed	by	a	diagram	of	how	the	various	mod-
ules	interact	with	the	rescue	procedure:	
																																																						
86	The	relevant	factors	influencing	a	legislator’s	decision	on	the	venue	of	pro-
ceedings	have	been	and	will	be	discussed	in	detail	in	Part	IV.A.	and	Part	V.C.2.	
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The	Modular	Approach	-	Overview	
	
A. THE	BASIC	PROCEDURAL	FRAMEWORK	
The	Modular	 Approach	 is	 based	 on	 a	 specific	 procedural	 frame-
work	that	consists	of	two	basic	options:	automatic	liquidation	and	
rescue	proceedings.	
MOTION	TO	FILE	
Liquidation	
MOTION	TO	FILE	A	
RESCUE	PLAN	
DISCHARGE	
of	the	entrepreneur	
DIP	Plan	Proceedings	
PLAN	 CONFIRMATI-
ON	
CREDITOR-INITIATED	MODULES:	
• Mediation	
• Creditor	plan	proposal	
• Debtor	action	moratorium	
• IP	involvement	
• Doomed	failure	
	
CLOSING	
DEBTOR-INITIATED	MODULES:	
• Mediation	
• Creditor	action	moratorium	
	 	 July	8	2016	version	
42	
1. Automatic	liquidation	proceedings	and	statutory	
discharge	
Option	1:	Automatic	Liquidation	Proceedings	-	Overview	
	
a) Function	and	effects	
The	 foundation	 of	 a	 rescue-oriented	 approach	 for	 viable	 busi-
nesses	 is	 a	 cost-efficient	 liquidation	 process	 for	 non-viable	 busi-
nesses.	This	procedural	option	works	as	a	 fallback	or	default	op-
tion.		
• Automatic	 liquidation:	 If	 the	 debtor	 is	 insolvent	 and	 no	
rescue	plan	is	brought	forward	by	either	the	debtor	or	any	
creditor,	or	 if	a	proposed	plan	does	not	obtain	 the	requi-
site	 approvals,	 and	 unless	 the	 appropriate	 authority	 con-
siders	that	a	modified	plan	may	obtain	approval,	the	liqui-
dation	 of	 the	 debtor’s	 business	 remains	 the	 only	 option.	
Here,	the	business	can	be	sold	on	a	going	concern	base	or	
can	be	wound	up	in	a	piecemeal	liquidation.	
• Stay	 if	 requested:	 Liquidation	 proceedings	 are	 only	 pro-
tected	by	a	short	stay	if	such	a	stay	is	requested	with	the	
motion	 to	 commence	 proceedings.	 The	 need	 for	 a	 court	
involvement	 to	 order	 a	 stay	 in	 many	 jurisdictions	 is	 a	
source	 of	 costs	 that	 seems	 unnecessary	 in	 many	 MSME	
cases	where	 a	 lack	of	 unencumbered	assets	would	 cause	
rational	 creditor	 passivity	 due	 to	 the	 probability	 of	 unre-
covered	collection	costs.	
MOTION	TO	FILE	
Liquidation	
DISCHARGE	
of	the	entrepreneur	
CLOSING	
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• Discharge	of	natural	person	debtor:	 In	most	economies,	a	
great	majority	of	micro	and	small	businesses	take	the	form	
of	sole	proprietorships	and	partnerships	with	no	separate	
legal	personality.	The	natural	person	entrepreneurs	at	the	
heart	 of	 such	businesses	 are	personally	 liable	 for	 the	en-
terprise’s	 obligations.	 Fraud	 and	bad	 faith	 apart,87	and	 as	
long	as	 such	debtors	 cooperate	with	 the	bankruptcy	pro-
cess	in	a	timely	manner,	there	are	both	economic	and	fair-
ness-based	 reasons	 for	affording	 them	an	early	discharge	
from	 their	 liabilities.	 Such	 discharge	 is	 a	 core	 element	 of	
the	 Modular	 Approach.	 	 Where	 the	 business	 is	 incorpo-
rated,	 but	 owned	 and	 operated	 by	 one	 individual,	 often	
the	individual	has	guaranteed	the	debt	and	is	likely	to	be-
come	personally	bankrupt	as	a	result	of	the	failure	of	the	
business.	 The	Modular	Approach	allows	 for	 a	mechanism	
to	 link	the	 individual’s	bankruptcy	and	discharge	with	the	
company’s	insolvency,	as	discussed	below	in	part	d.		
b) Motion	
The	debtor,	 as	well	 as	 creditors,	may	be	entitled	 to	 initiate	pro-
ceedings	 according	 to	 the	 relevant	 test	 under	 local	 law.88	Com-
mencement	of	proceedings	presumptively	puts	the	enterprise	on	
the	route	to	liquidation.	In	the	case	of	a	conversion	of	failed	res-
cue	 proceedings,	 liquidation	 proceedings	 would	 be	 initiated	 au-
tomatically.	
c) Decision	on	liquidation		
After	a	motion,	an	automatic	stay	on	all	debtor	and	creditors’	ac-
tions	comes	into	effect	and	the	competent	institution89	may	seize	
the	debtor’s	assets	and	seek	their	value-maximizing	disposal,	as	a	
going	 concern	 if	 possible	 or	 else	 piecemeal.	 Proceeds	 of	 such	 a	
sale	or	auction	would	be	used	to	(a)	cover	administrative	costs	of	
the	 acting	 institution	 and	 subsequently	 (b)	 distribute	 to	 the	 se-
cured	creditor(s).	A	process	of	filing	claims	would	only	be	initiated	
if	a	distribution	to	other	classes	of	creditors	is	possible.		
A	common	problem	in	the	liquidation	of	a	MSME	business	is	that	
a	single	disputed	or	unpaid	claim	is	the	main	asset	of	the	business.	
Litigating	and/or	collecting	the	claim	could	significantly	delay	the	
completion	of	proceedings	and	raise	costs.	If	a	discharge	is	to	de-
pend	 on	 the	 termination	 of	 liquidation	 proceedings,	 such	 dis-
																																																						
87	For	further	discussion,	see	Part	VI.A.1.c)iii).	
88	There	should	be	no	duty	to	file	–	for	a	discussion	see	Part	VI.B.2.	
89	For	a	discussion	again	see	Part	V.C.1.	
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charge	would	also	be	delayed.	The	solution	to	the	latter	problem	
is	 simple:	 the	 order	 to	 discharge	 a	 debtor	 must	 not	 require	 a	
completed	 liquidation	of	all	 assets,	but	 should	be	available	after	
the	 debtor	 turns	 all	 of	 its	 seizable	 assets	 over	 to	 the	 liquidating	
authority.	Several	options	can	be	considered	for	handling	the	dis-
puted	claim:	
• The	most	 natural	 solution	 in	 a	 liquidation	 process	would	
be	to	sell	the	claim,	which	would	probably	mean	accepting	
a	significant	discount	on	the	nominal	value,	provided	that	
there	 is	 a	 buyer	 at	 all,	 but	would	 be	 consistent	with	 the	
idea	of	a	quick	and	low	cost	procedure.	
• 	The	 second	 legislative	 option	 would	 be	 to	 allow	 for	 a	
quick,	and,	if	required	by	constitutional	law	or	culture,	pre-
liminary,	judicial	determination	and	subsequent	collection	
by	the	liquidating	authority.		
• A	 separation	 of	 assets	 would	 be	 the	 third	 option.	 Here,	
pursuit	of	the	disputed	or	unpaid	claim	would	be	assigned	
to	an	insolvency	practitioner	or	agency	or	returned	to	the	
debtor,	which	would	allow	the	termination	of	formal	liqui-
dation	proceedings.	The	assignee	would	afterwards	be	re-
sponsible	 for	 litigating	and	 collecting	 the	 claim	as	well	 as	
for	 the	distribution	of	 received	payments	 to	 creditors	 (or	
the	 liquidating	 authority	 if	 the	 debtor	 collected	 the	 pay-
ment.		
Each	of	these	options	would	allow	for	a	speedy	liquidation	despite	
the	fact	that	the	value	of	the	main	asset	is	uncertain.	It	would	be	
up	to	the	specific	 jurisdiction	to	decide	on	a	preferred	option.	 In	
the	absence	of	a	secondary	market	for	small	claims	and	a	compe-
tence	of	 the	 insolvency	court	 to	decide	on	such	 issues,	 the	 third	
option	would	become	the	default	solution.	
d) Discharge	of	entrepreneur		
The	Modular	 Approach	 creates	 the	 presumption	 that	 an	 honest	
and	 cooperative	 entrepreneur	 would	 be	 personally	 discharged	
from	 liabilities,	 automatically	 and	 without	 the	 need	 for	 judicial	
intervention,	 upon	 lapse	 of	 a	 stipulated	 period	 (e.g.,	 twelve	
months)	from	the	commencement	of	the	insolvency	process.	Dis-
charge	may	 be	 opposed	 by	 the	 institution	 performing	 the	man-
agement	 function.	 In	 jurisdictions	 in	 which	 such	 automatic	 dis-
charge	is	unconstitutional	or	is	considered	undesirable,	the	entre-
preneur	herself	 or	 the	 institutional	 performing	 the	management	
function	may,	 upon	 the	 lapse	 of	 the	 stipulated	 period,	 apply	 to	
the	 judicial	 authority	 for	 discharge.	 In	 either	 case,	 discharge	 oc-
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curs	unless	 the	 judicial	 authority	 finds	 the	entrepreneur	 to	have	
been	fraudulent,	or	to	have	acted	in	bad	faith,	or	to	have	culpably	
made	incomplete	disclosure	or	to	have	been	uncooperative.	
2. Rescue	proceedings	
Option	2:	Rescue	Proceedings	-	Overview	
	
a) Function	and	effects	
If	the	debtor90		(or	a	creditor)	 intends	to	prevent	 liquidation	pro-
ceedings,	they	may	opt	for	rescue	proceedings,	even	before	a	mo-
tion	 for	 liquidation	 proceedings	 is	 filed.	 This	 would	 enable	 the	
debtor	to	remain	in	possession	of	the	assets	and	to	continue	the	
business,	 propose	 and	 enforce	 a	 rescue	 plan	 that	 has	 sufficient	
creditor	support	following	a	process	that	is	cost	efficient	and	cre-
ates	 positive	 incentives	 while	 respecting	 creditors’	 fundamental	
rights.	
i) Debtor	remains	in	possession		
The	debtor	remains	at	the	helm	of	the	business	after	commence-
ment,	making	day-to-day	decisions	about	 the	deployment	of	 the	
																																																						
90	The	‘debtor’	in	these	sections	means	the	natural	person	debtor	or	the	deci-
sion	makers	and/or	equity	holders	of	the	indebted	legal	entity;	see	Part	IV.	
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constitutive	productive	factors.	This	option	has	three	primary	jus-
tifications.		
• First,	 experience	 indicates	 that	 the	 concern	 that	 they	
would	be	displaced	from	the	helm	creates	a	powerful	dis-
incentive	 for	 debtors	 to	 commence	 the	 bankruptcy	 pro-
cess	in	a	timely	manner.		
• Second,	 the	 continuing	 presence	 of	 the	 debtor’s	 pre-
distress	decision-makers	may	be	critical	to	the	MSME’s	vi-
ability,	 because	 of	 private	 information,	 existing	 relation-
ships	with	counterparties,	and/or	the	necessity	of	combin-
ing	the	costs	of	decision-making	and	residual	risk-bearing.		
• Third,	a	significant	reason	that	MSMEs	call	for	a	distinctive	
bankruptcy	 treatment	 is	 that	 the	 value	 at	 stake	 is	 often	
not	 sufficient	 to	 justify	 the	 full	 panoply	 of	 bankruptcy	
mechanisms,	including	an	administrator.		
ii) Plan	for	restructuring	or	sale	
(Rescue	Plan)		
The	core	assumption	of	the	Modular	Approach	is	that	the	debtor	
would	 propose	 a	 plan	 to	 some	 or	 all	 of	 its	 creditors.	 The	 plan’s	
intended	objective	 is	 to	rescue	the	business	and,	by	doing	so,	 to	
maximize	its	value	for	the	benefit	of	all	relevant	stakeholders	as	a	
group.		
• Content:	The	plan	may	propose	ways	of	enabling	the	debt-
or	and/or	its	business	to	trade	out	of	distress	by	providing,	
for	 example,	 for	 the	 deferral	 of	 payment	 obligations,	 a	
write-down	 of	 principal	 and/or	 interest,	 debt	 for	 equity	
swaps,	 asset	 disposals	 or	 other	 downsizing	 measures,	
and/or	 provision	 for	 new	 funding,	 etc.	 Alternatively,	 the	
plan	 may	 simply	 propose	 a	 value-maximizing	 sale	 of	 the	
business,	as	a	going	concern	or	piecemeal.		
• Designing	 the	 plan:	 Based	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	
debtor	 possesses	 private	 information	 about	 its	 business	
state,	 prospects,	 and	 viability,	 a	 rescue	 plan	 should	 be	
drafted	by	the	debtor	him	or	herself.	This	task	may,	how-
ever,	 overstrain	 the	 capacity	 of	many	 individuals	 running	
small	 businesses.	 The	 legal	 framework	 should,	 therefore,	
offer	advice	and	education	on	this	matter.91	Assigning	the	
task	of	plan	design	to	a	third	party	 instead	would	contra-
dict	 the	 objective	 of	 cost-efficiency,	 as	 this	 party	 would	
deserve	 remuneration.	 Instead,	 the	 use	 of	 official	 stand-
																																																						
91	For	further	details,	see	Part	VI.A.2.b).	
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ardized	forms	and	interactive	templates	that	automatically	
generate	a	plan	content	 (e.g.	classes	or	 lists)	 from	the	 in-
formation	entered	offer	a	modern	and	cost-efficient	alter-
native	that	most	MSMEs	should	be	able	to	use	as	they	typ-
ically	 have	 a	 very	 limited	 number	 of	 creditors,	 business	
partners,	employees	and	a	simple	capital	structure.		
• Classes	 of	 creditors	 and	 equity	 holders:	 Where	 creditors	
are	to	be	treated	differently,	the	plan	must	separately	ad-
dress	 and	 explain	 the	 definition	 and	 treatment	 of	 each	
class	of	creditor	whose	interests	it	proposes	to	affect,	plac-
ing	 in	separate	classes	creditors	who	have	different	types	
of	claim	(e.g.	 those	holding	security	 interests	on	par	with	
each	other,	statutory	preferential	creditors,	general	unse-
cured	creditors,	etc.),	as	well	as	those	creditors	holding	the	
same	 type	of	 claim	whom	the	plan	proposes	 to	 treat	dif-
ferentially	 inter	 se.	Mutatis	mutandis	 for	equity	 rights	af-
fected	by	a	plan.		
iii) Minimization	of	costs		
MSME	debtors	and	most	creditors	of	such	entities	are	characteris-
tically	 unable	 to	 spare	 many	 resources	 to	 commence	 the	 insol-
vency	process	and	to	participate	in	it.	In	recognition	of	this	reality,	
the	 Modular	 Approach	 seeks	 to	 minimize	 commencement	 and	
participation	costs.	The	process	is	designed	to	minimize	complexi-
ty,	to	vest	discretion	in	decision	makers	only	where	it	is	conducive	
to	achieving	the	objectives	of	the	Modular	Approach,	and	thereby	
to	maximize	predictability.	
• Administrative	costs	of	the	procedure:	The	process	may	be	
initiated	and	continued	(e.g.	through	voting	on	a	proposed	
plan)	 online	 in	 those	 economies	 in	 which	 an	 Internet-
based	process	is	a	realistic	low-cost	possibility.	Parties	par-
ticipate	 in	 the	 first	 instance	 by	 using	 standard	 forms,	 in-
cluding	a	 standard	 statement	of	affairs	and/or	a	 financial	
statement.		
• Length	 of	 the	 procedure:	 The	 institution	 discharging	 ad-
ministrative	 functions	 for	 the	 rescue	 proceedings	 should	
enforce	strict	brief	timelines.		
iv) Incentivizing	participation		
MSME	insolvency	proceedings	are	prone	to	cause	creditor	apathy.	
The	Modular	Approach	addresses	this	challenge	by	providing	two	
types	of	consequences	if	duly	notified	parties	fail	to	respond:		
• Creditors	 and	 other	 stakeholders	 confronted	 with	 a	
plan	must	check	whether	the	plan	reflects	their	claims	
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or	rights	correctly	and	object	 if	 that	 is	not	the	case.	 If	
no	objection	is	raised	within	the	stipulated	period,	the	
content	of	the	plan	is	presumptively	regarded	as	being	
correct	and	any	creditor	whose	claim	is	not	listed	is	re-
garded	of	having	waived	their	claim	(“scream	or	die”).		
• In	addition,	when	creditors	and	other	stakeholders	are	
invited	to	vote	on	a	plan,	any	creditor	and	stakeholder	
who	 fails	 to	 vote	 within	 the	 stipulated	 period	 is	
deemed	to	have	voted	in	favour	of	the	plan	(“deemed	
approval”).	 Court	 approval	 of	 the	 plan	would	 only	 be	
required	if	the	plan	is	not	accepted	by	all	creditors	and	
shareholders	 according	 to	 their	 actual	 or	 “deemed”	
votes.		
Such	 incentivizing	measures	 respond	 to	 the	 disinterest	 of	 unse-
cured	 creditors	 in	 rescue	 proceedings	 of	MSMEs	 by	 raising	 non-
participation	costs.		
• Where	 the	 debtor	 is	 a	 company,	 private	 information	
about	the	state	of	the	business	prospects,	and	viability	
of	the	business	is	not	only	in	the	hands	of	the	debtor’s	
management	but	may	also	be	with	their	shareholders.	
At	the	same	time,	a	rescue	plan	may	need	shareholder	
support	 because	 the	 rescue	 strategy	 relies	 on	 share-
holders’	 continued	 participation	 or	 investments.	
Shareholders	 are	 relevant	 stakeholders	 and	 should	
therefore	be	allowed	to	participate	actively	in	the	pro-
cess.	 However,	 shareholders	 are	 not	 necessarily	 enti-
tled	to	veto	a	plan	that	has	gained	creditors’	support,	
because,	for	example,	it	provides	for	a	sale	of	the	busi-
ness	 or	 a	 dilution	 of	 shares.	 Here,	 a	 cram	 down	 rule	
must	 balance	 conflicting	 creditors’	 and	 shareholders’	
interests.		
v) Fundamental	rights	
The	 position	 of	 creditors	 and	 equity	 holders	 is	 protected	 under	
fundamental	rights	relating	to	protection	of	property,	due	process	
or	 fair	 trial	 in	most	 jurisdictions.	 Such	 safeguards	need	 to	be	 re-
spected.	
• Involvement	 of	 judicial	 authority:	 The	 infringement	 of	
property	 rights	of	 creditors	does	usually	 require	 the	 con-
sent	of	the	property	owner	or	judicial	 involvement.	These	
safeguards	are	reflected	by	the	Modular	Approach.	Those	
jurisdictions	that	do	not	necessarily	provide	a	right	to	ap-
peal	a	decision	affecting	legal	rights	(e.g.	Germany)	should	
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not	 provide	 for	 an	 appeal	 in	 MSME	 cases	 in	 order	 to	
streamline	the	process	and	limit	the	cost	burden.	For	par-
allel	 reasons,	 jurisdictions	 that	 permit	 an	 appeal	 should	
not	 automatically	 require	 suspension	 of	 the	 insolvency	
process	on	the	launch	of	an	appeal.		
• Publication	 and	 notices:	 Public	 notice	 of	 the	 commence-
ment	of	rescue	proceedings	must	be	given	through	publi-
cation,	as	appropriate,	 in	an	official	gazette,	news	media,	
the	 relevant	 online	 sources	 and	 in	 edicts	 in	 court	 hous-
es/business	 chambers,	 etc.	 In	 addition,	 the	 debtor,	 and	
each	 known	 creditor,	 equity	 holder,	 and	 any	 other	 rele-
vant	stakeholder	must	be	 individually	notified	through	an	
appropriate,	cost-efficient	method	(postal	services	and/or	
electronic	mail)	about	a	rescue	plan	that	impairs	their	legal	
position.	 Notice	 given	 through	 reasonably	 cost-effective	
methods,	 including	 publicly	 and	 (where	 appropriate)	 to	
the	 last	 reasonably	 known	 address	 of	 a	 stakeholder,	
should	 be	 deemed	 to	 have	 been	 received	 by	 that	 stake-
holder.			
b) Motion	
i) Debtor	commences	rescue	proceedings		
The	 debtor,	 in	 principle,	 possesses	 private	 information	 about	 its	
business	 state,	 prospects	 and	 viability.	 The	 Modular	 Approach	
seeks	to	create	positive	and	negative	incentives	for	the	debtor	to	
capitalize	 on	 this	 information	 to	make	 a	 timely	 commencement	
decision.	 Control	 over	 commencement	 timing	 may	 itself	 consti-
tute	a	positive	incentive.		
The	Modular	Approach	allows	jurisdictions	to	consider	two	differ-
ent	thresholds	for	debtors	to	commence	rescue	proceedings.	One	
option	 is	 to	 require	 that	 the	motion	of	 the	debtor	must	be	 sup-
ported	by	 the	proposal	of	a	 rescue	plan,	 in	order	 to	ensure	 that	
initiating	rescue	proceedings	 is	useful	and	not	just	an	attempt	to	
escape	pressure	from	creditors.	 	The	other	approach	 is	to	recog-
nize	that	it	may	be	too	difficult	for	the	MSME	owner	to	draw	up	a	
plausible	 plan	 prior	 to	 commencing	 the	 proceeding,	 and	 the	
MSME	may	need	a	short	“breathing	space”	created	by	a	morato-
rium,	to	work	with	creditors	to	devise	a	rescue	plan.	
ii) Creditor	commencement		
It	may	be	expected	that	some	debtors,	because	of	incompetence	
and/or	 perverse	 incentives,	 may	 not	 commence	 the	 bankruptcy	
process	 in	 a	 timely	 manner.	 The	 possibility	 of	 creditor	 com-
mencement	creates	additional	 incentives	 for	 the	debtors	 to	 take	
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the	initiative,	especially	since	the	commencing	creditor	may	select	
modules	 that	are	costlier	 to	 the	debtor.	Some	creditors,	particu-
larly	institutional	lenders	with	a	significant	stake	in	the	particular	
debtor,	may	also	possess	non-public	information	about	the	debt-
or’s	state	and	prospects,	on	which	this	module	capitalizes	in	aid	of	
timely	commencement.	A	creditor	may	commence	the	procedure	
if:	
• it	has	a	claim	above	a	moderate	threshold	(say,	10	percent	
of	 per	 capita	 GDP,	 with	 this	 threshold	 figure	 explicitly	
specified	by	law	or	regulation),		
• the	claim	has	come	due;		
• the	creditor	has	made	a	demand	for	repayment;	and		
• the	debtor	has	 failed	to	meet	this	demand	within	a	short	
stipulated	period	(e.g.,	10	business	days).		
After	 a	 creditor	 motion	 has	 initiated	 rescue	 proceedings,	 the	
competent	authority	would	give	the	debtor	a	chance	to	present	a	
rescue	plan	within	a	short	timeframe.	If	the	debtor	does	not	pro-
pose	a	plan,	the	authority	may	convert	proceedings	and	initiate	a	
liquidation	unless	a	creditor	files	a	stand-alone	(rescue	or	liquida-
tion)	plan.	
iii) Where	to	file		
The	Modular	Approach	does	not	prescribe	the	specific	venue	for	
rescue	 proceedings.	 Options	 are	 proposed	 for	 consideration	 in	
terms	of	possible	competent	authorities	in	Part	V.C.	
c) Decision	
The	competent	authority	would	need	to	decide	on	(a)	a	motion	to	
initiate	 rescue	 plan	 proceedings,	 and	 (b)	 whether	 to	 confirm	 a	
rescue	plan.	
i) No	requirement	to	declare	or	demonstrate	
insolvency		
Legislators	may	consider	the	removal	of	requirements	to	declare	a	
state	of	insolvency	by	MSME	debtors,	to	incentivize	filing	and	min-
imize	negative	stigma.	To	require	the	debtor	to	declare	insolvency	
as	 a	 precondition	 to	 making	 use	 of	 the	 insolvency	 process	 can	
inflict	 reputational	 harm	 on	 the	 debtor	 and/or	 its	 business,	 and	
may	thus	retard	the	prospects	of	its	rehabilitation	and	create	dis-
incentives	for	the	debtor	to	commence	the	process.	The	rationale	
for	 requiring	 a	declaration	of	 insolvency	 is	 to	minimize	 abuse	of	
the	 bankruptcy	 process,	 but	 this	 objective	 can	 be	 accomplished	
through	better	targeted,	less	harmful	means,	including,	in	particu-
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lar,	the	critical	role	of	creditors,	of	the	judicial	authority,	the	pro-
vision	for	automatic	liquidation,	and	for	the	denial	of	discharge.92	
ii) Rescue	Plan	confirmation		
When	asked	to	confirm	a	Rescue	Plan,	the	judicial	authority	would	
examine	whether	 the	plan	 complies	with	 the	 legal	 requirements	
regarding	plan	 content	and	plan	proceedings,	 especially	with	 re-
spect	to	plan	acceptance	and	cram	down.	
• Accepting	 a	 plan:	 The	 plan	 would	 be	 approved	 upon	
receiving	 actual	 or	 deemed	 consent	 by	 all	 affected	
creditor	and	equity	classes.	
• Majority	 voting	 and	 cram	 down:	 Where	 a	 proposed	
plan	faces	active	opposition,	which	might	not	often	be	
the	case	in	a	MSME	context,	judicial	involvement	is	re-
quired	under	constitutional	law	as	well	as	fundamental	
rights	if	the	plan	seeks	to	bind	dissenting	stakeholders	
against	their	will.	
o Where	 an	 opposing	 stakeholder	 is	 part	 of	 a	
class	 that	 supports	 the	 plan	 by	 a	 majority	 of	
value	 (claims	 or	 shares),	 the	 plan	 should	 be	
confirmed	as	long	as	the	dissenting	stakeholder	
receives	the	same	return	as	others	in	that	class	
(“equal	treatment	within	class”)	and	at	least	as	
much	as	they	could	expect	in	an	alternative	liq-
uidation	 (“no	 creditor	 worse	 off”	 principle	 or	
“best	interest	test”).	In	a	small	business	case,	a	
judge	should	be	able	to	determine	the	outcome	
of	 an	 alternative	 scenario	without	 the	 lengthy	
and	costly	 involvement	of	expert	witness	testi-
mony.	
o Where	a	majority	of	stakeholders	by	value	in	a	
class	rejects	the	plan,	a	cram	down	rule	may	be	
considered	 that	 would	 allow	 the	 confirmation	
of	 the	 plan.	 Here,	 the	 court	 should	 apply	 the	
“equal	treatment	within	class”	and	“no	creditor	
worse	off”	principles,	and	also	ensure	 that	 the	
plan	does	not	overturn	the	relative	priorities,	as	
at	 the	 commencement	 of	 the	 insolvency	 pro-
cess,	of	that	class	and	each	class	junior	to	it.93		
																																																						
92	For	a	more	detailed	discussion	–	see	Part	VI.	
93	For	the	‘new	value	exception’	to	the	absolute	priority	rule	under	US	bank-
ruptcy	law	see	Case	v.	Los	Angeles	Lumber	Co.,	308	U.S.	106,	121	f.	(1939);	
Norwest	Bank	Washington	v.	Ahlers,	485	U.S.	197	(1988)	and	Bank	of	America	
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o The	 judicial	decision	to	approve	a	plan	may	be	
subject	 to	 review	 under	 local	 procedural	 law,	
but	any	appeal	 should	not	 stay	 the	 implemen-
tation	of	the	plan.	
d) Implementation	and	amendment	
The	 implementation	of	 the	plan	basically	means	 that	 the	debtor	
fulfills	 the	 duties	 described	 in	 the	 plan.	 Payments	 are	 made	 as	
they	fall	due;	shares	are	issued	or	transferred.	Claims	that	are	not	
																																																																																																																									
Nat'l	Trust	&	Say.	Ass'n	v.	203	LaSalle	St.	Partnership,	526	U.S.	434	(1996).	
NOTE:	A	later	draft	of	this	report	may	include	a	specific	example,	set	out	in	a	
box	within	the	document.	For	example,	possible	text	is	[left	here	as	a	place-
holder]:	If	there	are,	for	instance,	five	different	classes	of	stakeholders	to	be	
impaired	by	the	plan	(a	secured	creditor;	preferred	creditors	such	as	tax	au-
thorities	or	employees’	salary	claims;	unsecured	creditors;	two	shareholders	–	
one	of	them	the	director	and	entrepreneur	of	the	small	business)	and	the	se-
cured	creditor	actively	opposes	the	plan,	the	plan	could	nevertheless	be	con-
firmed	(crammed	down)	if	the	judge	finds	that	the	secured	creditor	receives	at	
least	what	it	would	receive	in	an	alternative	liquidation,	including	compensa-
tion	for	deferred	payments.	In	relation	to	classes	of	creditors,	the	common	
absolute	priority	rule	would	indicate	a	fair	distribution	of	a	going-concern	val-
ue,	meaning	that	an	opposing	class	of	preferred	creditors	(e.g.	tax	authorities)	
could	veto	a	plan	that	would	pay	them	a	liquidation	value	of	their	claims	while	
distributing	the	rescue	premium	to	unsecured	creditors	only.	There	may,	how-
ever,	be	a	reason	not	to	apply	such	a	strict	rule	to	a	class	of	shareholders	in	an	
MSME	context.	As	a	plan	would	usually	allow	them	to	continue	the	business,	it	
could	be	interpreted	as	a	distribution	to	shareholders,	which,	under	a	‘classic’	
(US	style)	absolute	priority	rule,	would	allow	any	higher	ranked	class	(which	is	
any	creditor	class)	to	veto	the	plan	unless	shareholders	provide	new	value	in	
return.	Instead,	a	plan	should	be	considered	fair	and	equitable	if	it	obtains	the	
actual	support	of	a	majority	of	the	classes	(in	our	example	3	of	5	classes	would	
be	required	to	actually	vote	in	favour	of	the	plan),	if	only	equity	holders’	resid-
ual	rights	(shares)	remain	unimpaired	under	the	plan,	and	if	the	plan	does	not	
provide	for	any	dividend	payments	to	equity	holders	for	as	long	as	the	plan	
provides	for	distributions	to	creditors	(thus,	respecting	the	priority	of	paying	
creditors	ahead	of	shareholders).	If	a	plan,	however,	provides	for	a	transfer	of	
shares	and	meets	opposition	from	the	impaired	class	of	shareholders,	a	“fair	
and	equitable”	test	would	not	only	consider	whether	shareholders	are	worse	
off	under	the	plan	than	in	an	alternative	liquidation	scenario,93	but	also	wheth-
er	the	transfer	or	dilution	of	shares	under	the	plan	was	necessary	for	the	res-
cue	of	the	business	(principle	of	proportionality).	In	most	MSME	cases,	a	plan	
might	suffice	that	bars	shareholders	from	receiving	any	dividends	as	long	as	
payments	to	creditors	are	to	be	made	under	the	plan	(e.g.	for	3	or	5	years),	For	
a	discussion	of	the	merits	of	a	strict	absolute	priority	rule	see	S.	Madaus,	“Re-
considering	the	Shareholder’s	Role	in	Corporate	Reorganizations	under	Insol-
vency	Law”,	(2013)	22	Int.	Insolv.	Rev.	61-73.	
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to	be	paid	are	discharged.	Alternately,	the	plan	may	also	provide	
for	an	auction	mechanism.94	
If	 the	debtor	 is	not	able	 to	meet	 its	obligations	as	 they	 fall	due,	
plan	obligations	can	be	altered	if	the	affected	stakeholders	agree	
to	postpone	or	reduce	the	payment.	Where	this	agreement	is	not	
possible,	the	debtor	may	re-initiate	rescue	proceedings	or	file	for	
liquidation.		
B. THE	MODULES	
This	section	of	the	report	describes	the	various	modules	that	may	
form	part	of	the	MSME	insolvency	regime.	
	
	 	
																																																						
94	The	ACCORD	scheme	provides	an	example.	See	Donald	Hausch	and	S.	Rama-
chandran,	“Systemic	Financial	Distress	and	Auction-based	Bankruptcy	Reorgan-
ization”,	(2009)	18	Int'l	Rev.	Econ	&	Fin.	366	ff.		
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Potential	Debtor-Initiated	and	Creditor-Initiated	Modules	–	An	
Overview	
	
The	effects	and	principles	of	rescue	proceedings	under	the	Modu-
lar	 Approach	 are	 very	 debtor-friendly	 and	 rescue-oriented	 be-
cause	they	work	to	incentivize	early	action	from	the	debtor	in	the	
situation	of	a	deteriorating	business.	 If	 the	debtor	requires	addi-
tional	protection	(e.g.	a	moratorium),	the	Modular	Approach	con-
tains	 additional	 modules.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 Modular	 Ap-
proach	also	reflects	the	procedural	rights	of	creditors	by	providing	
for	optional	modules	that	allow	creditors	to	increase	their	control	
over	the	process.	The	task	of	balancing	these	competing	interests	
would	be	assigned	to	a	competent	authority.	
The	modules	are	optional	for	the	stakeholders	in	a	MSME	rescue	
proceedings.	 In	addition,	 they	are	also	optional	 for	 legislators	as	
they	provide	for	a	menu	of	policy	choices	that	allow	for	the	adap-
tion	of	MSME	rescue	proceedings	to	the	respective	peculiarities	of	
their	socio-economic	environment.		
1. Creditor-initiated	modules	
The	 creditor-friendly	modules	 recognize	 the	 reality	 that	 the	 role	
of	 creditors	 is	 critical.	 Apart	 from	 the	 debtor	 itself,	 its	 creditors	
possess	 the	 best	 information	 about	 its	 business	 and	 prospects.	
Where	 the	 debtor	 is	 distressed,	 its	 creditors,	 rather	 than	 equity	
holders,	presumptively	constitute	the	residual	owners	of	its	busi-
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ness,	 and	 thus	 stand	 to	 gain	 or	 lose	 in	 line	with	 the	 fortunes	of	
that	business.	As	a	group,	they	therefore	also	have	the	best	incen-
tives	 to	 get	 the	 liquidate/restructure	 decision	 right.	 Finally,	 and	
importantly,	creditors	have	legal	claims	that	the	distressed	debtor	
is	 presumptively	 unable	 to	 satisfy.	 In	 recognition	 of	 these	 facts,	
the	Modular	 Approach	 accords	 them	 a	 critical	 role	 in	 the	 insol-
vency	process.	By	way	of	using	their	modules,	creditors,	by	stipu-
lated	value,	may	extend	their	control	over	 the	rescue	process	or	
even	cause	conversion	back	to	a	liquidation.		
Overview:	
	
a) Mediation	
The	mediation	module	is	the	least	intrusive	module	a	creditor	can	
use.	 Resources	 permitting,	 a	 stipulated	 proportion	 (e.g.,	 20%	 by	
value)	of	creditors95	may	seek	mediation	concerning	the	admissi-
bility	or	quantum	of	claims,	 the	 formulation	of	a	plan,	 the	 treat-
ment	 of	 guarantees,	 or	 any	 other	 issue	 in	 dispute	 between	 the	
parties.	 In	 general,	 the	 failure	of	mediation	 should	not	 have	 ad-
verse	 consequences	 to	 any	 party,	 so	 as	 not	 to	 discourage	 their	
participation	in	the	process	in	the	first	place.		
A	mediation	motion	would	be	 available	 anytime	during	 the	pro-
cess.	 Mediation	 would	 be	 ordered	 if	 all	 disputing	 parties	 agree	
and	the	extra	costs	of	a	mediator	are	covered,	either	by	the	estate	
or	by	parties.	
The	parties	should	be	required	to	agree	to	forebear	from	any	fur-
ther	proceedings	during	the	course	of	the	mediation.	To	avoid	the	
risk	of	improper	invocation	of	mediation,	the	parties	should	have	
a	very	 limited	time	to	agree	on	a	mediator.	 If	they	are	unable	to	
do	 so	 quickly,	 a	mediator	 should	 be	 appointed,	 preferably	 by	 a	
mediation	professional	organization	such	as	 the	 International	 In-
stitute	for	Conflict	Prevention	&	Resolution	(US),	the	ADR	Institute	
of	Canada	Inc.	or	a	similar	organization.	Alternatively,	the	media-
																																																						
95	The	mediation	module	is	also	available	for	debtors,	see	debtor-initiated	me-
diation	in	Part	V.B.2.	
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tor	should	be	appointed	from	an	approved	list.	Many	jurisdictions	
have	 credentialing	agencies.	 The	mediator	 should	be	 involved	 in	
decisions	 regarding	 timing	 and	 information	 dissemination	 from	
the	 beginning	 of	 the	 process,	 and	 should	 have	 the	 authority	 to	
terminate	the	process	if,	in	the	mediator’s	opinion,	either	party	is	
not	acting	in	good	faith	with	a	view	to	resolution.	
b) Creditor	plan	proposal	
The	creditor	plan	proposal	module	 simply	 is	 the	 right	of	 a	 single	
creditor,	or	a	stipulated	majority	of	creditors,	 to	propose	a	com-
peting	plan.	Any	creditor	dissatisfied	by	the	credibility	or	viability	
of	 a	 debtor-proposed	 plan	may	 put	 forward	 its	 own	 alternative	
using	 the	 same	 forms	 and	 format.	 An	 important	 scenario	would	
involve	 a	 creditor	 putting	 forward	 a	 liquidation	plan	 in	 competi-
tion	with	a	debtor’s	proposal	for	its	own	rehabilitation.	Both	plans	
may	be	put	to	the	relevant	creditors	for	a	vote,	and	the	plan	that	
obtains	greater	support	will	be	accepted.		
c) Debtor	action	moratorium	
i) Function	and	effects	
The	 debtor	 action	 moratorium	 module	 affects	 the	 right	 of	 the	
debtor	 in	 possession	 to	 administer	 the	 estate	without	 replacing	
him/her.	A	stipulated	proportion	of	the	creditors	would	be	able	to	
veto	the	disposal	of	specific	assets	or	the	incurring	of	specific	lia-
bilities	by	the	debtor	 in	possession.	This	module	responds	to	the	
risk	of	the	destruction	and/or	misapplication	of	value	in	the	debt-
or’s	estate	resulting	from	perverse	debtor	 incentives.	 It	may	also	
incentivize	 creditors	 to	 commence	 bankruptcy	 as	 a	way	 of	 disa-
bling	 the	debtor’s	ability	 to	diminish	or	misapply	 the	value	 in	 its	
own	 estate.	 The	 effect	 of	 the	 module	 may,	 however,	 interfere	
with	the	debtor’s	ability	to	continue	the	business.	It	must	be	han-
dled	with	care.	
An	example	of	 attempting	 to	maintain	 the	balance	between	 the	
debtor’s	 ability	 to	 carry	 on	 the	 business	 and	 preventing	 undue	
diminishment	or	misapplication	of	value	can	be	found	in	Canadian	
model	 interim	 orders	 under	 the	 Companies’	 Creditors	 Arrange-
ment	Act,	R.C.S.	1985,	c.	C-36,	as	amended.96	These	orders	allow	
																																																						
96	e.g.	Restructuring	
10.	The	Applicant	shall	subject	to	such	requirements	as	are	imposed	
by	the	CCAA…have	the	right	to:	
(a)	permanently	or	temporarily	cease,	downsize	or	shut	down	
any	of	its	business	or	operations	and	to	dispose	of	redundant	
or	non-material	assets	not	exceeding	$*	in	any	one	transac-
tion	or	$*	in	the	aggregate,	provided	that	any	sale	that	is	ei-
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the	debtor	 to	pay	necessary	employee	expenses,	 reasonable	ex-
penses	 incurred	 in	 carrying	 on	 business	 in	 the	 ordinary	 course,	
payments	 required	 by	 law	 such	 as	 employment	 insurance	 and	
income	 taxes,	 but	 preclude	 payments	 to	 pre-filing	 creditors	 ex-
cept	 in	 limited	 circumstances	 and	 also	 preclude	 any	 further	 en-
cumbering	of	 assets.	 They	prevent	 the	debtor	 from	disposing	of	
assets	of	 a	 value	above	a	 cap	 tailored	 to	 the	 specific	 day-to-day	
requirements	of	the	business.		
ii) Motion	
Given	 the	possible	 indirect	 costs	of	a	debtor	action	moratorium,	
the	 motion	 should	 only	 be	 available	 to	 creditors	 who	 together	
hold	in	excess	of	a	stipulated	proportion	of	the	claims	against	the	
debtor	(e.g.	20%),	with	this	threshold	figure	explicitly	specified	by	
law	or	regulation.	Where	the	threshold	is	reached,	the	stay	would	
be	 granted	 automatically	 for	 a	 short	 specified	 period,	 with	 the	
ability	 of	 other	 creditors	 or	 the	 debtor	 to	 demonstrate	 to	 the	
competent	authority	that	its	imposition	was	unnecessary.	
iii) Decision	
Where	 the	 threshold	 proportion	 of	 claims	 is	 not	 reached	 or	 the	
other	creditors	or	debtor	objects,	the	competent	authority	would	
only	order	a	debtor	action	moratorium	or	 its	continuation	 if	 it	 is	
necessary	to	protect	the	interest	of	creditors	from	specific	debtor	
action,	 such	as	disposing	of	 assets	under	 value	or	 signing	a	 con-
tract	 that	 could	harm	any	business	 rescue	effort.	 The	 stay	order	
must	be	specific	and	may	be	limited	in	time.	
d) Insolvency	practitioner	involvement	
i) Function	and	effects	
The	 insolvency	 practitioner	 involvement	 module	 (“IP	 module”)	
allows	 creditors	 to	 not	 only	 veto	 specific	 debtor	 actions	 but	 to	
displace	the	debtor’s	pre-distress	decision	makers	(thus	overturn-
ing	the	debtor-in-possession	default).	It	can	also	be	used	to	over-
see	 and	 thus	 give	 credibility	 to	 the	 implementation	 of	 an	 ap-
proved	plan	(supervised	debtor-in-possession).		
Where	 the	 IP	works	as	a	 trustee,	 the	debtor’s	 right	 to	 remain	 in	
possession	of	 the	assets	and	to	run	the	business	ends.	Here,	 the	
module	 removes	 the	 debtor	 from	 the	 process,	 which	 is	 why	 it	
																																																																																																																									
ther	(i)	in	excess	of	the	above	thresholds,	or	(ii)	in	favour	of	a	
person	related	to	the	Applicant…shall	require	authorization	
by	this	Court…;	
Alberta	Template	CCAA	Initial	Orders.	https://albertacourts.ca/docs/default-
source/Court-of-Queen's-Bench/ccaa-initial-order-template-(pdf).pdf?sfvrsn=4		
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goes	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 a	 debtor	 action	 moratorium.	 The	 in-
volvement	of	an	IP	is	common	in	many	jurisdictions,	either	instead	
or	 in	 combination	 with	 a	 debtor-in-possession,	 but,	 due	 to	 the	
costs	of	involving	an	insolvency	practitioner,	it	may	not	a	feasible	
in	the	economic	reality	of	many	MSME	cases.		
ii) Motion	
The	IP’s	 involvement	may,	 in	principle,	be	sought	at	any	stage	of	
the	 process	 by	 any	 creditor	 with	 a	 claim	 above	 a	 significant	
threshold	 (e.g.	25	percent	of	per	capita	GDP,	with	 this	 threshold	
figure	explicitly	specified	by	law	or	regulation)	or	a	group	of	credi-
tors	with	claims	exceeding	the	threshold.	
iii) Decision	
The	competent	authority	will	order	a	replacement	or	supervision	
of	the	debtor	by	an	 IP	only	 if	creditors	holding	claims	of	a	speci-
fied	 value	 (e.g.,	 20%)	 indicate	 their	 desire	 to	 do	 so.	 The	 debtor	
may	 oppose	 the	 appointment	 to	 the	 competent	 authority.	 The	
selection	of	the	IP	should	follow	common	local	insolvency	rules.	
e) Doomed-to-failure	module	
i) Function	and	effects	
The	 doomed-to-failure	module	 is	 the	most	 intrusive	module	 be-
cause	 it	 terminates	debtor-initiated	 rescue	proceedings.	 The	use	
of	 the	module	must,	 therefore,	be	reserved	 for	cases	where	any	
continuation	 of	 rescue	 efforts	 is	 an	 obvious	 waste	 of	 time	 and	
assets	 or	 an	 obvious	misuse	 of	 procedural	 options.	 The	module	
allows	 creditors	 to	 shut	 down	 debtor-initiated	 plan	 proceedings	
very	early	to	save	costs	and	delay	based	on	the	argument	that	the	
debtor’s	plan	is	doomed	to	fail.	
ii) Motion	
The	module	may	in	principle	be	sought	at	any	stage	of	the	process	
by	any	creditor	that	is	able	to	demonstrate	that	the	debtor’s	plan	
is	 doomed	 to	 fail.	 Such	 a	 failure	 is	 obvious	 if	 the	motion	 is	 sup-
ported	by	a	majority	of	creditors	with	claims	large	enough	to	veto	
a	debtor’s	plan.		
iii) Decision	
The	 competent	 authority	 orders	 that	 the	 plan	 proceedings	 con-
vert	to	liquidation	proceedings.	
2. Debtor-initiated	module:	mediation	and	creditor	
action	moratorium	
	
	 DEBTOR-INITIATED	MODULES: 
• Mediation	
• Creditor	action	moratorium	
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a) Mediation	
The	debtor	may	file	for	the	involvement	of	a	mediator	under	the	
mediation	 module	 described	 above.	 The	 issue	 with	 debtor-
initiated	mediation	is	that	a	party	seeking	to	delay	the	bankruptcy	
process	 improperly	 –	 characteristically,	 the	 debtor	 –	 may	 have	
nothing	to	 lose	and	time	to	gain	from	an	 improper	 invocation	of	
mediation.	Thus,	mediation	should	only	be	allowed	as	long	as	the	
conflicting	parties	agree	to	this	type	of	structured	negotiation.	
b) Moratorium	function	and	effects	
The	Modular	Approach	provides	for	debtor-friendly	business	res-
cue	proceedings.	 It	does	not,	however,	provide	 for	an	automatic	
stay.	 Such	 a	 creditor	 action	moratorium	would	 only	 be	 available	
on	 request.97	The	creditor	action	moratorium	would	affect	 credi-
tor	 claim	 enforcement	 as	 well	 as	 ipso	 facto	 clauses	 and	 set-off	
rights.	 It	 is	 a	 critical	 bankruptcy	 tool	 that	 signals	 the	 transition	
from	 the	 individual	 non-bankruptcy	 to	 the	 collective	 bankruptcy	
process,	 and	 creates	 a	 space	 in	which	 rational	 decisions	may	be	
made	about	maximization	of	the	value	of	the	debtor’s	estate	and	
about	 its	 fair	 distribution.	 In	 systems	 with	 an	 effective	 non-
bankruptcy	creditor	claim	enforcement	regime,	the	availability	of	
this	moratorium	 creates	 incentives	 for	 the	 debtor	 to	 commence	
the	 bankruptcy	 process	 in	 response	 to	 initial	 creditor	 pressure,	
and	 thus	 towards	 the	onset	of	distress.	 It	may	be	expected	 that	
most	cases	under	the	Modular	Approach	would	involve	the	mora-
torium.	The	moratorium	does	have	costs,	however,	 including	the	
provision	of	an	adverse	signal	about	the	debtor’s	status	and	pro-
spects,	 the	 impairment	of	 the	debtor’s	 relationships	with	 stayed	
creditors,	and	also	the	potential	for	debtor	abuse	and	thus	of	val-
ue	destruction.	The	Modular	Approach	treats	 the	moratorium	as	
an	 option	 in	 recognition	 that	 incurring	 these	 costs	 may	 not	 be	
necessary	in	all	cases.	
c) Motion	
A	creditor	action	moratorium	would	only	be	available	if	requested	
by	the	debtor.	Where	liquidation	proceedings	had	already	provid-
ed	for	such	a	stay	following	a	creditor’s	motion98,	the	moratorium	
																																																						
97	In	this	aspect,	the	approach	follows	the	EC	Recommendation	of	12.3.2014	
that	also	recommends	a	moratorium	if	requested	by	the	debtor	only;	see	Art.	
10.	
98	See	Part	V.	A.	1.	a).	
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would	only	extend	 to	business	 rescue	proceedings	by	a	debtor’s	
request	 –	 done	 simply	 by	 checking	 the	 box	 on	 the	motion	 tem-
plate	with	the	request	of	a	stay.	Still,	a	non-automatic	stay	leaves	
the	option	 to	continue	 the	business	with	as	 little	 interruption	as	
possible	during	a	restructuring	process	where	no	stay	is	required.	
d) Decision	
The	competent	authority	would	order	a	moratorium	if	it	is	neces-
sary	to	protect	the	decision	making	process	and	if	rights	of	affect-
ed	creditors	are	sufficiently	protected	(e.g.	compensation	for	the	
continued	use	of	collateral	is	guaranteed).	The	moratorium	should	
be	ordered	for	a	limited	time	only.	
C. INSTITUTIONS	
Overview:	
	
The	 efficiency	 of	 any	 liquidation	 or	 rescue	 procedure	 under	 the	
Modular	Approach	depends	on	the	people	assigned	to	run	it.	The	
institutional	 framework	 is	 essential	 and	must	 consider	 two	basic	
principles:		
• Low	 cost	 approach:	MSME	 insolvencies	 are	 characterised	
by	a	lack	of	assets;	no	asset	cases	are	a	regular	phenome-
non.	 Any	 involvement	 of	 additional	 institutions	 must,	
therefore,	 be	 given	 careful	 consideration	 and	 duly	 justi-
fied.	
Management	Functions	
Run	or	liquidate	the	busi-
ness	
Administrative	Functions	
Support	Procedure	
Judicial	Supervision	
Fundamental	rights	JUDGE	 JUDGE	
LIQUIDATION	 RESCUE	
AGENCY	 AGENCY	
Sec.	Cred./IP	 DIP	
Registrar	
Professionals	
association	 Registrar	
Chamber	of	
Commerce	
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• Four-eyes-principle	 for	 key	 decisions:	 The	 Modular	 Ap-
proach	provides	for	means	to	impair	creditor	claims	(plan,	
discharge)	as	well	as	debtors’	assets	(liquidation).	Any	im-
pairment	of	 fundamental	rights	would	usually	require	the	
involvement	of	a	second	 level	of	authority	that	would	re-
view	the	decision	following	on	an	appeal	by	an	interested	
party.	 Often,	 such	 a	 function	 would	 require	 the	 involve-
ment	of	a	judge.	
1. Levels	of	institutional	tasks	
Based	on	 these	principles,	 three	 tasks	or	 functions	are	 to	be	as-
signed	to	institutions	under	the	Modular	Approach.	
a) Management	functions	
The	 first	 and	basic	 level	 is	 characterized	by	 those	measures	 that	
are	 required	 to	manage	 the	debtor’s	business	 through	 the	 insol-
vency	 and	 rescue	 process	 or	 to	 manage	 the	 liquidation	 of	 the	
debtor’s	 business.	 Such	management	 functions	 include	 ordinary	
commercial	 decisions	 but	 also	 commercially	 informed	 choices	
about	which	of	 the	 available	 legal	 tools	 to	deploy.	 It	would	 also	
comprise	 the	 task	 of	 negotiating	 with	 creditors,	 other	 investors	
and	stakeholders	(e.g.	shareholders,	employees,	government	offi-
cials	 like	 tax	 authorities)	 to	 obtain	 a	 desirable	 conclusion	 to	 the	
insolvency	process.		
b) Administrative	functions	
Insolvency	proceedings	are	a	 legal	procedure	 that	 requires	over-
sight	 to	 ensure	 that	motions	 are	 being	 taken	 care	 of,	 deadlines	
and	formalities	are	being	met,	notifications	are	duly	provided,	and	
disclosures	 duly	 made.	 Such	 administrative	 functions	 must	 not	
necessarily	be	assigned	to	a	judge,	but	can	often	also	be	handled	
by	other	institutions.	
c) Judicial	supervision	
Finally,	 there	 is	the	 judicial	 function	of	ensuring	that	the	 law	has	
been	 correctly	 applied,	 reasonable	 findings	 of	 fact	 have	 been	
reached,	and	the	parties	have	all	been	treated	fairly.	
The	 Modular	 Approach	 originates	 from	 existing	 insolvency	 pro-
ceedings	 and	 it	 seems	 an	 obvious	 choice,	 therefore,	 to	 opt	 for	
court	proceedings.	For	MSMEs,	such	a	design	is	debatable.	Courts	
are	 a	 precious	 and	 scarce	 resource.	 Judicial	 processes	 can	 be	
lengthy,	and	recourse	to	them	also	characteristically	requires	the	
involvement	 of	 sometimes	 expensive	 legal	 professionals.	 Given	
the	 significant	 number	 of	 possible	 MSME	 cases,	 the	 scarcity	 of	
court	resources	generally,	and	the	lack	of	both	time	and	value	in	
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many	MSME	 bankruptcies,	 the	Modular	 Approach	would	 favour	
the	recourse	to	courts	only	if	and	to	the	extent	necessary.	Subject	
to	the	jurisdiction’s	constitutional	requirements,	the	Modular	Ap-
proach	recommends	that	anytime	the	liquidation	or	restructuring	
process	 leads	 to	 an	 infringement	 of	 a	 stakeholder’s	 legal	 right	
without	their	consent,	access	to	judicial	review	is	guaranteed.		
Following	 the	 “scream	 or	 die”	 principle,	 this	 approval	 does	 not	
require	 a	 judge	 to	 be	 present	 and	 to	 supervise	 proceedings	 nor	
does	it	indeed	seem	appropriate	to	impose	a	mandatory	sanction-
ing	 hearing	 and	 order	 to	 conclude	 plan	 proceedings.	 Instead,	 a	
hearing	and	decision	by	a	judge	would	only	and	always	be	availa-
ble	where	a	stakeholder	calls	for	the	involvement	of	a	court.	Spe-
cifically,	payment	plans	that	are	consensually	supported	by	active	
creditors	could	thus	be	approved	and	implemented	without	court	
involvement	under	the	“deemed	approval”	of	passive	creditors.	In	
addition,	payment	plans	that	are	rejected	could	be	 implemented	
under	 a	majority	 rule	 or	 cram-down	 rule	without	 court	 involve-
ment	whenever	 the	 rejecting	 creditor	 (possibly	 after	 recognizing	
the	extend	of	support	by	other	creditors)	does	not	file	a	motion	to	
a	 court.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Modular	 Approach	 would	 only	 require	
judicial	action	where	it	is	actually	demanded	by	law	and	by	affect-
ed	stakeholders	in	a	specific	case.	
2. Assigning	the	tasks	
The	functions	at	each	of	the	three	levels	described	above	could	be	
assigned	to:	
• an	IP,	appointed	by	the	debtor,	a	creditor,	a	court	or	stat-
ute,	
• a	private	organization	 (e.g.	professional	 association	of	 in-
solvency	practitioners	99),	
• an	administrative	agency,	
• a	court	official	(registrar),	or	
• a	judge.	
Further,	 the	debtor	or	even	a	 secured	creditor	 could	also	be	as-
signed	with	some	of	these	functions.		
a) Liquidation	proceedings	
Selling	 the	 debtor’s	 assets	 in	 a	 quick	 liquidation	 should	 not	 be	
entrusted	 to	 the	 debtor	 at	 the	 management	 level	 because	 the	
basis	 of	 the	Modular	Approach	 to	 a	MSME	 insolvency	 is	 an	effi-
																																																						
99	An	example	would	be	the	UK´s	R3.		
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cient	 liquidation	 where	 a	 debtor	 is	 insolvent	 and	 not	 willing	 or	
able	to	produce	a	plan	proposal.	
Where	all	or	almost	all	assets	of	the	debtor	are	subject	to	a	lien	of	
a	single	secured	creditor	 (e.g.	based	on	a	 floating-charge-type	of	
agreement	 or	 statutory	 right),	 non-insolvency	 law	 would	 allow	
such	a	creditor	to	enforce	 its	rights.	 In	such	a	case,	there	 is	 little	
need	to	involve	another	institution	at	the	management	level.	
The	secured	lender	solution,	however,	is	not	sufficient	where	such	
a	 secured	 creditor	 is	 either	non-existent	or	not	willing	 to	act,	or	
where	there	are	other	assets	not	subject	to	security	or	subject	to	
the	security	 rights	of	different	creditors.	 In	 such	cases,	 the	man-
agement	task	could	be	assigned	to	an	IP	or	a	public	authority	(e.g.	
a	 specialized	 government	 agency	 or	 a	 court	 registrar)	 or	 self-
regulatory	 organization	 (e.g.	 a	 professional	 insolvency	 associa-
tion).	Preferably,	a	specialist	 (probably	an	 IP)	should	act	 in	these	
cases.	
If	 a	major	 secured	 creditor	 or	 an	 IP	 appointed	 by	 such	 creditor	
acts	at	 the	management	 level,	 supervision	would	only	be	neces-
sary	 where	 a	 stakeholder	 is	 unhappy	 with	 the	 way	 the	 auction	
process	or	any	other	type	of	liquidation	action	is	being	conducted	
by	 the	 secured	 lender	who	may	only	be	 interested	 in	 realizing	a	
sale	 that	 covers	 its	 outstanding	 debt	 but	 not	 the	 best	 price	
achievable.	 A	 motion	 for	 supervision	 would	 be	 directed	 to	 and	
handled	 by	 a	 public	 authority	 (e.g.	 a	 specialized	 government	
agency	or	a	court	registrar)	or	self-regulatory	organization	(e.g.	a	
professional	association)	that	could	supervise	the	auction	process	
but	also	investigate	the	behaviour	of	the	managing	creditor	or	the	
debtor	with	respect	to	a	requested	discharge	(administration	lev-
el).	 Instead	 of	 acting	 on	 its	 own	 behalf,	 the	 public	 or	 self-
regulatory	agency	could	also	entrust	an	IP	with	the	supervision	in	
cases	where	a	creditor	is	in	charge	of	the	auction	or	generally	the	
liquidation	process.	Any	wrongdoing	discovered	would	either	lead	
to	denying	a	discharge	(in	case	of	fraud	by	the	debtor100)	or	claim-
ing	damages	against	the	secured	lender	acting	as	a	liquidator.		
The	 legislative	decision	about	whether	 to	assign	management	or	
administrative	 functions	 either	 to	 an	 IP	 or	 a	 public	 or	 self-
regulatory	authority	should	consider	the	following	arguments:	
																																																						
100	For	a	discussion,	see	Part	VI.A.1.c.iii)	
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i) Insolvency	practitioners’	involvement	
Insolvency	 practitioners	 play	 a	 leading	 role	 in	 most	 insolvency	
systems.	With	 perhaps	 the	 conspicuous	 exception	 of	 the	United	
States,101	the	 appointment	 of	 technically	 qualified,	 independent	
professionals	 is	 commonplace	 in	all	 kinds	of	 insolvency	proceed-
ings.	International	experience	shows	that	MSME	cases	are	no	ex-
ception.	Most	of	the	elements	that	define	a	good	system	of	insol-
vency	representation	are	common	to	proceedings	 irrespective	of	
the	 size	 of	 the	 debtor;	 and	 yet,	 the	 smaller	 cases	 present	 some	
peculiarities	that	would	merit	a	closer	look:	
• On	the	face	of	it,	the	tasks	to	be	performed	by	insolvency	
practitioners	 in	MSME	 cases	 will	 be	 simpler	 –albeit	 rela-
tively	 no	 less	 important-	 than	 in	 the	 larger	 insolvencies.	
The	liquidation	of	a	small	estate	will	involve	the	reception,	
analysis,	treatment	and	provision	of	information	to	a	nor-
mally	 smaller	 crowd	 of	 creditors	 through	 the	 use	 of	 pre-
defined	 templates	 or	 the	 technical	 opinion	 on	 a	 non-
complex	 business	 plan.	 Yet,	 the	 IP´s	 tasks	 will	 often	 be	
complicated	 by	 the	 lack	 of	 sufficient	 or	 of	 adequately	
drafted	information	and	by	the	lack	of	collaboration	of	the	
debtor	and/or	the	management/shareholders.	MSMEs	are	
often	family-run	businesses,	where	not	uncommonly	own-
ers	 and	 directors	 take	 proud,	 non-collaborative	 positions	
all	 through	 the	 process.	 As	 a	 result,	 but	 also	 in	 general,	
mediation	gains	 importance	amongst	the	tasks	to	be	per-
formed	by	the	 insolvency	practitioners	 in	the	smaller	cas-
es.	 Mediation	 in	 its	 most	 strict	 sense	 (relationship	 be-
tween	 the	 debtor/its	 ownership/management	 and	 credi-
tors);	but	also	in	a	more	persuasive,	informative	way,	as	if	
counselling	by	an	independent	specialist	must	be	provided	
to	the	parties	in	a	conflict.	
• Fees	have	to	be	limited.	While,	as	in	any	other	profession,	
a	 market-based	 determination	 of	 fees	 is	 normally	 to	 be	
preferred,	the	 limited	value	of	the	assets,	 the	passivity	of	
creditors	and	the	lack	of	interest	of	the	more	sophisticated	
professionals	may	justify	the	pre-determination	of	the	fee	
in	 MSME	 cases.	 This	 pre-determination	 should	 not	 be	 a	
lump	sum,	but	rather	the	regulation	of	criteria	that	would	
																																																						
101	The	appointment	of	insolvency	representatives	in	the	US	is	rare	in	reorgani-
zation	(Chapter	11)	cases.	However,	even	in	this	system,	trustees	are	necessary	
for	the	liquidation	of	the	business	(Chapters	7	--),	and,	in	the	case	of	individuals	
the	US	Trustee	Office	plays	a	highly	relevant	role.		
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allow	the	 judge/agency	to	determine	the	fee.	The	criteria	
ought	 to	 be	 linked	 with	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 case,	 the	
value	of	assets,	and	should	provide	for	the	increase	of	the	
fee	based	on	successful	events	(approval	of	a	plan,	sale	as	
a	 going	 concern,	 etc.).	 In	many	 jurisdictions,	 a	minimum	
fixed	amount	for	the	insolvency	practitioners	is	also	set	by	
regulation/law.		
• The	 professionalization	 of	 IPs	 active	 in	MSME	 insolvency	
may	be	highly	complicated:	less	economic	gains	can	be	ex-
pected,	no	less	complexity	in	the	personal	relationships	in-
volved	 in	 the	 case,	 and	 often	 straightforward,	 repetitive	
work	from	a	technical	standpoint.	Combined	with	the	nec-
essary	 limitation	 of	 fees,	 these	 factors	 hamper	 the	 crea-
tion	of	a	body	of	professionals	sufficient	in	number	to	ca-
ter	for	the	entire	market.	The	professionalization	must	be	
understood	 in	 a	 non-strict	 sense,	 and	 professionals	must	
be	allowed	to	perform	other	related	professions	if	they	so	
wish.102	Good	practice	would	be	boosted	by	the	existence	
and	implementation	of	codes	of	conduct,	and	control	and	
discipline	by	professional	bodies.	As	an	alternative,	and	in	
those	countries	where	 the	 formation	of	an	adequate	sys-
tem	of	 professional	 IPs	 is	 not	 possible	or	would	 take	 too	
much	 time/cost,	 public	 agencies	 might	 fill	 the	 gap	 in	 a	
number	 of	 ways:	 either	 by	 strengthening	 the	 profession	
via	control	of	access	requirements	and	implementation	of	
correct	 professional	 standards;	 or	 by	providing	 a	 body	of	
public	 –or	 publicly	 trained,	 selected	 and	 funded-
professionals.	Whatever	 the	model	 chosen,	 IPs	 in	 charge	
of	MSME	insolvencies	must	complement	the	general	tech-
nical	 skills	 demanded	 from	 the	 profession	 with	 special	
knowledge	of	mediation,	family	law	and	other	directly	ap-
plicable	disciplines	directly	 related	 to	 the	 issues	 that	may	
arise	 in	these	types	of	cases.	 In	countries	with	an	already	
created,	 robust-enough	profession,	 the	professional	body	
could	 separate	 its	 constituents	 depending	on	 the	 type	of	
cases	 they	 specialize	 and	 are	 licensed	 to	 practice	 in.	 The	
access	 requirements,	 system	 of	 fees,	 code	 of	 conduct,	
need	 for	 insurance	and	 training	would	be	adapted	 to	 the	
different	circumstances	of	the	professional	practice.	
																																																						
102	In	some	jurisdictions,	the	attempt	to	create	a	market	of	insolvency	profes-
sionals	has	led	authorities	to	limit	severely	any	alternative	work	that	the	pro-
fessionals	included	in	a	registry	may	perform.		
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• In	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 systems,	 insolvency	 practitioners	
are	appointed	either	by	the	judge/insolvency	agency	or	by	
creditors.	 There	 are	 pros	 and	 cons	 for	 both	 systems,	 but	
the	direct	selection	by	creditors	in	MSMEs	gives	rise	to	ad-
ditional	 problems	 due	 to	 the	 common	 passivity	 of	 unse-
cured	 creditors	 in	 the	 smaller	 cases.	 An	 appointment	 by	
the	judge	or	an	insolvency	agency	(or,	as	in	some	jurisdic-
tions,	by	notaries	or	registrars)	 is	the	most	common	solu-
tion.	 Even	 if	 the	 decision-maker	 is	 a	 judge	 or	 a	 public	
agency,	the	selection	of	candidates	must	be	based	on	their	
technical	 abilities	 and	 their	 special	 suitability	 to	 a	 given	
case	 (for	example,	because	of	previous	experience	 in	 the	
sector	of	the	debtor´s	activity).	However,	in	smaller	cases,	
a	 system	 that	provides	 for	 the	automatic	 selection	based	
on	 turns	 is	more	 acceptable,	 as	 long	 as	 the	 list	 of	 candi-
dates	only	 includes	 candidates	 generally	 qualified	 for	 the	
job.		
Overall,	 however,	 the	 involvement	 of	 insolvency	 professionals	
may	 not	 add	 net	 value	 in	 some	 cases.	 Experience	 from	 systems	
that	 severely	 constrain	 the	 remuneration	 of	 insolvency	 profes-
sionals103	indicates	that	the	IP’s	involvement	is	in	practice	nominal	
only,	 the	 debtor	 does	 not	 receive	 the	 benefit	 of	 genuine	 inde-
pendent	expertise,	and	the	creditors	do	not	receive	the	benefit	of	
genuine	independent	oversight	of	the	debtor.	By	contrast,	in	sys-
tems	where	 the	 IP	 has	 greater	 control	 over	 their	 remuneration,	
even	 when	 subject	 to	 challenge	 by	 a	 dispersed	 and	 ‘apathetic’	
creditor	 group,	104	perverse	 incentives	 arise	 for	 the	 IP	 to	 inflate	
fees,	engage	 in	value-destructive	collusion	with	 repeat-player	 in-
stitutional	 lenders	 (and	 sometimes	 with	 the	 debtor	 itself),	 and	
shirk	 on	 the	 primary	 responsibility	 to	 find	 the	 value-maximizing	
solution	to	the	insolvency.	Either	the	design	of	a	proper	system	of	
remuneration	 (that	 neither	 pays	 too	 little	 nor	 creates	 perverse	
incentives),	or	 the	 involvement	of	 a	public	 authority	would	miti-
gate	such	incentives.		
In	MSME	insolvency,	the	appointment	of	a	committee	of	creditors	
is	 uncommon,	 which	 leaves	 insolvency	 representatives	 without	
direct	control	by	a	body	of	creditors.	Monitoring	insolvency	repre-
sentatives	 in	 the	 smaller	 cases	 is	 a	 limited	 problem,	 since	 the	
tasks	will	be	relatively	straightforward	and	the	possibility	of	caus-
																																																						
103	e.g.	Turkey.	
104	e.g.	UK.	
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ing	damage	very	limited.	In	any	case,	the	system	ought	to	provide	
for	 control	 mechanisms.	 Insolvency	 practitioners	 may	 be	 con-
trolled	by	a	public	agency	or	the	self-regulatory	organization	(or,	
as	 it	 is	the	case	 in	some	jurisdictions,	by	an	“ombud”105	that	cre-
ates	accountability	within	the	profession).		
ii) Public	or	self-regulatory	
organization	involvement	
While	the	involvement	of	an	agency	is	necessary	for	the	supervi-
sion	of	IPs,	such	an	agency	would	also	be	highly	important	in	cases	
with	no	or	insufficient	assets	to	cover	for	the	costs	of	proceedings.	
This	 situation	 is	 very	 common	 in	 developing	 economies	 and	 in	
jurisdictions	 where	 there	 is	 a	 weak	 insolvency	 culture	 (i.e.,	 the	
insolvency	 carries	 a	 strong	 stigma	and/or	 the	 system	 is	 not	 per-
ceived	 as	 a	 proper	 instrument	 to	 handle	 business	 financial	 dis-
tress):	 insolvency	is	declared	too	late,	when	there	are	hardly	any	
assets	 left.	 This	 scenario	 is	 even	more	 common	 in	MSME	 cases.	
The	problem	can	be	tackled	by	the	direct	intervention	of	a	public	
agency.	The	agency	would	provide	the	specialists	that	take	charge	
of	the	 liquidation	of	the	 insolvent	business	and	 look	 into	the	be-
haviour	of	the	debtor	and	its	management.	The	UK	system	of	offi-
cial	receivers	could	be	a	model	of	this	approach.	The	public	agen-
cy	could	also	simply	fund	the	execution	of	the	said	–limited-	tasks	
by	professional	IPs,	a	solution	that	would	prevent	the	jurisdiction	
from	having	to	create	a	body	of	public	employees.	But	this	situa-
tion	 can	 also	 be	 solved	 by	 resorting	 to	market	mechanisms.	 For	
example,	 IPs	appointed	for	these	cases	would	be	guaranteed	the	
payment	 of	 a	 minimum	 amount	 out	 of	 a	 fund	 nurtured	 with	 a	
percentage	withheld	 from	the	 fees	of	ordinary	cases	or	with	 the	
fees	of	entry	to	the	professional	body.	This	form	of	mutualization	
could	 be	 appeased	 by	 the	 introduction	 of	 other	 sources	 to	 the	
fund:	a	percentage	of	 the	 fees	paid	to	the	register	of	companies	
for	 the	use	of	 the	registry	or	a	percentage	of	 the	money	paid	to	
notarize	 commercial	 documents	 (i.e.,	 loans),	 could	 be	 possible	
examples.	The	payment	of	public	money	into	this	fund	would	be	a	
way	in	between	directly	paying	the	fees	by	the	public	agency	and	
letting	the	costs	be	fully	borne	by	market	participants.		
Finally,	 a	 third	 alternative	might	 also	 be	 considered.	 In	 jurisdic-
tions	 with	 a	 strong	 culture	 of	 public	 intervention	 in	 insolvency	
																																																						
105	An	“ombud”	or	“public	advocate”	is	a	professional,	often	appointed	by	gov-
ernment	or	a	professional	entity,	with	a	significant	degree	of	independence,	
who	is	charged	with	representing	the	interests	of	the	public	by	investigating	
and	addressing	complaints.	
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proceedings,	with	a	scarce	use	of	the	insolvency	system	and	with	
insufficient	 level	of	 formality,	consideration	 is	being	given	to	 the	
creation	of	a	strong	mixed	private/public	agency	(hosted,	though,	
by	a	Ministry)	that	plays	the	following	roles:		
• The	 agency	 receives	 notifications	 by	 the	 debtor/related	
parties	 (managers,	 partners	with	 a	 certain	 percentage	 of	
the	 capital),	 all	 public	 administrations	 (tax/social	 securi-
ty/registrars/etc.)	 and	 professional	 lenders	 of	 a	 debtor´s	
early	situation	of	distress	(for	example,	when	a	debtor	de-
posits	 accounts	 at	 the	 registrar	 with	 losses	 that	 account	
for	¾	of	the	share	capital);		
• It	 is	 staffed	 with	 highly	 qualified	 specialists,	 both	 in	 the	
fields	of	insolvency	and	in	business	valuation;		
• It	will	start	an	insolvency	procedure,	preferably	one	aimed	
at	the	rehabilitation	of	the	business;	
• It	shall	 inform	the	court	whenever	asked	to	do	so	on	spe-
cific	topics	 (valuation	of	plan	proposals,	etc.).	This	agency	
would	aim	to	solve	the	problems	of	 late	 filings,	of	 lack	of	
information	 and	 lack	 of	 technical	 independent	 advice	 to	
decision	makers	within	 proceedings.	 This	 solution	 has	 its	
set	backs;	 it	may	be	costly	and	not	always	easy	 to	create	
and	staff	adequately.		
b) Business	rescue	proceedings	
Rescue	 or	 plan	 proceedings	 under	 the	 Modular	 Approach	 are	
principally	debtor-in-possession	proceedings.	As	they	would	basi-
cally	 comprise	negotiations	and	vote	casting	on	a	proposed	pay-
ment	plan,	there	is	little	need	for	additional	administrative	struc-
ture	or	costs	on	the	management	level.	
The	requirement	of	notice	of	the	debtor’s	motion	or	plan	proposal	
and	disclosure	of	information	about	the	debtor	and	their	business	
(mostly	by	the	debtor)	would	suggest,	however,	that	a	supporting	
structure	at	the	administration	level	be	established	that	provides	
for	online	 templates	 for	plan	proposals,	 information	on	 the	pro-
cedure	 and	 available	 advisors.	 Such	 an	 institution	 could	 also	 be	
entrusted	 with	 verifying	 the	 completeness	 of	 the	 information	
supplied,	 following	 up	 where	 necessary	 to	 obtain	 further	 input,	
ensuring	 the	provision	of	 appropriate	 notices,	 and	 certifying	 the	
completion	of	each	procedural	stage.	Being	independent	from	the	
debtor,	the	institution	would	also	receive	motions	to	add	a	mod-
ule	and	decide	about	the	necessary	involvement	of	a	court.		
The	 administrative	 task	 of	 a	 supportive	 institution	 could	 be	 as-
signed	to	a	public	agency,	which	could	be	part	of	a	court	organiza-
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tion,	e.g.	judicial	clerks	or	registrars,	but	also	an	independent	gov-
ernment	agency	 instead,	or,	depending	on	the	 institutional	envi-
ronment	 in	 a	 jurisdiction,	 an	 independent	 private	 organization	
(e.g.	 a	 part	 of	 a	 Chamber	 of	 Commerce).	 Three	 considerations	
combine	to	motivate	the	default	choice	of	a	government	entity	to	
discharge	this	function.		
• First,	 there	 is	 a	 public	 interest	 in	 effective	 pursuit	 of	 the	
restructuring	process,	both	to	enable	suitable	investigation	
of	the	circumstances	of	the	bankruptcy	to	ensure	that	any	
wrongdoing	 is	detected	and	wrongdoers	held	 to	account,	
and	subject	to	this,	to	permit	any	indebted	natural	persons	
to	be	discharged.	
• Second,	many	MSME	bankruptcies	are	 ‘no	asset’	 cases	 in	
the	sense	that	their	estates	do	not	contain	sufficient	value	
to	fund	their	own	winding	up.	Taken	together,	these	con-
siderations	justify	the	allocation	of	public	funds	to	address	
MSME	bankruptcy.		
• Third,	in	a	proportion	of	those	MSME	bankruptcies	where	
the	estate	can	fund	its	winding	up,	there	might	neverthe-
less	be	insufficient	value	to	make	it	worth	independent	IPs	
taking	 responsibility	 for	 overseeing	 the	 process.	 In	 such	
cases,	 a	 not-for-profit	 process	 may	 maximise	 returns	 to	
stakeholders	as	a	group.	
These	 considerations	 suggest	 that,	 as	 a	 default,	 a	 government	
entity	 may	 be	 best	 placed	 to	 oversee	 the	 process.	 This	 agency	
may	be	funded,	explicitly	or	through	an	implicit	premium	in	busi-
ness	 taxes	 or	 rates,	 by	 a	 levy	 on	 all	 or	 a	 subset	 of	 solvent	 busi-
nesses.	This	approach	would	also	more	effectively	cause	business	
to	internalize	the	costs	imposed	by	them	on	society.	
The	 involvement	 of	 a	 judge	 would	 only	 be	 required	 where	 it	 is	
actually	demanded	by	law	and	by	affected	stakeholders	in	a	spe-
cific	case.	
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VI. IMPLEMENTATION	OF	THE	MODULAR	
APPROACH	–	THE	POSITION	OF	THE	
STAKEHOLDERS	
This	part	of	the	report	deals	with	the	regulatory	and	implementa-
tion	 challenges	 that	 insolvency	 systems	may	 face	when	applying	
the	 Modular	 Approach,	 particularly	 its	 usage	 by	 the	 different	
stakeholders	involved.	Problems	may	arise	with	regard	to	the	ob-
ligations	of	the	debtor	subject	of	the	MSME	regime;	the	 involve-
ment	of	 the	 creditors	 in	 the	process;	 the	position	of	 connected-
persons/guarantors,	 and	 the	 position	 of	 the	 workers	 of	 the	
MSME.	The	separate	issues	that	may	arise	with	regard	to	each	of	
these	stakeholders	are	discussed	below.	This	part	identifies	possi-
ble	barriers	to	the	successful	implementation	of	the	MSME	insol-
vency	 system	 and	 proposes	 certain	 solutions	 to	 address	 these	
barriers.	 Solutions	 may	 require	 tailoring	 to	 the	 specific	 circum-
stances	of	different	legal	systems,	and	therefore,	in	relevant	plac-
es,	 alternative	 solutions	 are	 provided	 to	 reflect	 different	 policy	
choices.	
A. THE	DEBTOR’S	POSITION,	ROLE	AND	OBLIGATIONS	IN	MSME	
INSOLVENCIES	
In	many	countries,	the	insolvency	system	is	infrequently	used,	and	
in	 the	 cases	 where	 it	 is	 used,	 cases	 are	 often	 limited	 to	 value-
destructive	piecemeal	 liquidation	or	even	 to	no-asset	cases.	This	
tendency	generates	a	negative	reputation	for	the	 insolvency	sys-
tem,	which	is	perceived	by	the	market	as	an	inefficient	tool,	to	be	
avoided	at	all	 costs.	A	country	with	a	non-functional	market	exit	
system	sees	its	credit	affected	and	its	economy	grows—if	at	all—	
at	a	rate	under	its	potential.	The	legislator	needs	to	break	the	vi-
cious	circle	by	active	measures	that	modernize	the	system	and	by	
creating	 incentives	 for	 market	 stakeholders	 to	 start	 using	 insol-
vency	as	a	tool	to	heal	sick	but	viable	businesses,	not	as	an	inef-
fective	way	to	bury	dead	ones.	In	the	field	of	MSMEs,	where	often	
individuals—and	families—are	involved,	the	legislator	must	often	
consider	social	problems,	such	as	reputational	damage	or	the	 in-
volvement	of	the	entire	household	in	the	entrepreneurial	project.	
These	circumstances	act	as	an	additional	barrier	to	the	use	of	the	
system.	
The	 absence	 of	 a	 rescue	 culture	 and	 the	 aforementioned	 social	
constraints	 requires	a	double	system	of	 sanctions	and	 incentives	
to	ensure	the	use	of	the	system	at	adequate	levels,	as	illustrated	
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by	 the	 incentives	 discussed	 above.	 Yet,	 experience	 shows	 that	
incentives	are	often	not	enough.	More	drastic	measures	have	 to	
be	 implemented	 in	 the	 form	of	 sanctions	 and	 compensation	 for	
damages	when	certain	circumstances	accrue.	In	this	section,	these	
sanctions	 are	 analyzed	 in	 some	 detail,	 with	 particular	 regard	 to	
wrongful	 trading/duty	 to	 file	 rules,	which	 serve	 the	 double	 pur-
pose	of	ensuring	an	early	filing	of	insolvency	and	protecting	credi-
tors	 from	 a	management	 of	 the	 business	 that	 undermines	 their	
legitimate	expectations	to	the	benefit	of	shareholders.	
The	problems,	however,	do	not	only	lie	with	the	lack	of	use	of	the	
insolvency	system.	If	and	when	the	lack	of	rescue	culture,	the	so-
cial	stigma,	and	poor	market	perception	are	overcome,	problems	
may	 nonetheless	 arise	 concerning	 the	manner	 in	which	 debtors	
utilize	the	MSME	insolvency	regime.	If	not	properly	designed	and	
implemented,	 the	 specifically	 MSME-tailored	 insolvency	 system	
may	 be	 prone	 to	 misuse	 and/or	 abuse,	 particularly	 where	 a	
Modular	 Approach	 is	 implemented	 that	 allows	 for	 a	 significant	
degree	of	choice	and	flexibility.	Thus,	insolvent	debtors	may	have	
the	incentive	to	opt	for	“modules”	that	protect	their	own	interest	
to	 the	detriment	of	 creditors	or	 the	 long-term	health	of	 the	en-
terprise.	 Further,	 in	 the	 realm	 of	MSMEs,	 the	 inadequacy	 of	 in-
formation	on	the	debtor´s	affairs	and	financial	situation	and	a	low	
level	of	interest	by	creditors	may	pave	the	way	for	debtor	misbe-
haviour.	 This	 section	considers	ways	 to	 tackle	debtor	moral	haz-
ard	 issues,	 without	 undermining	 the	 benefits	 of	 a	 Modular	 Ap-
proach	for	MSME	insolvency.		
1. MSME	obligations	at	times	approaching	insolvency	
In	the	design	of	the	Modular	Approach	for	MSMEs,	a	critical	point	
in	time	to	consider	is	when	the	MSME	is	approaching	insolvency,	
but	 is	not	necessarily	 already	 in	a	 state	of	 actual	 insolvency	and	
has	 not	 yet	 entered	 formal	 insolvency	 proceedings	 of	 any	 sort.	
Addressing	irresponsible	behaviour	by	debtors	and	misuse	of	the	
system	 requires	 that	 the	 Modular	 Approach	 is	 supported	 by	 a	
well-designed	regime	concerning	the	obligations	of	debtors	at	this	
“twilight	zone”	period	of	imminent	insolvency.	
Indeed,	when	insolvency	is	imminent,	debtors	should	have	great-
er	regard	to	the	 interests	of	creditors	and	should	attempt	to	ad-
dress	the	distress	situation.	Yet,	at	that	time,	small	entity	debtors	
may	be	very	reluctant	to	access	the	insolvency	system,	concerned	
about	stigma,	about	losing	their	business,	which	is	likely	their	only	
source	of	income,	and	being	overly	optimistic	about	the	business’	
prospects.	 Debtors	 may	 also	 be	 prone	 to	 adopt	 more	 high-risk	
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strategies,	attempting	to	avoid	at	all	costs	losing	their	business	or	
the	 business’	 assets.	 They	 may	 be	 inclined	 to	 collaborate	 with	
related	persons	or	powerful	 creditors,	 hide	or	dispose	of	 assets.	
The	 problem	 is	 particularly	 acute	where	 debtors	 use	 the	 corpo-
rate	 form	 for	 their	MSMEs.	 Incorporated	MSME	managers,	who	
are	likely	to	also	be	the	business	owners,	may	consider	that	they	
are	safe	from	the	outcomes	of	insolvency	as	they	are	protected	by	
limited	liability.	Small	debtors	are	also	likely	to	be	less	concerned	
about	 returning	 to	 the	managerial	 labour	market	and	 thus	more	
prone	 to	act	 self-servingly.	Unincorporated	MSMEs	may	 take	ex-
cessive	risks	if	they	consider	that	they	will	be	released	from	liabili-
ties	through	an	insolvency	discharge.	
A	 regime	 that	 focuses	 on	 the	 period	 of	 imminent	 insolvency	 is	
particularly	important	for	encouraging	action	at	an	early	stage	and	
for	facilitating	rescues	of	viable	businesses,	aspects	that	are	criti-
cal	 to	 the	 procedural	 framework	 contemplated	 for	MSME	 insol-
vencies.	 Therefore,	 a	 regime	 for	 pre-insolvency	 obligations	 can	
complement	 the	 procedural	 framework	 and	 enhance	 it.	 It	 can	
provide	an	educational	tool	for	MSMEs	with	regard	to	the	proper	
means	 for	 addressing	 the	 situation	 of	 financial	 distress	 and	 the	
proper	use	of	the	module	options.		
A	 regime	 that	 addresses	 the	 obligations	 of	 debtors	 at	 times	 ap-
proaching	 insolvency	 can	 respond	 to	 such	 concerns	 as	 debtor	
moral	hazard.	 It	can	deter	 irresponsible	behaviour	at	 times	of	 fi-
nancial	 distress	 and	 provide	 guidance	 to	 debtors	with	 regard	 to	
the	appropriate	actions	they	should	take.	
a) A	balanced	regime		
The	 regime	 for	MSME	debtors’	 obligations	 at	 times	 approaching	
insolvency	should	carefully	balance	the	need	to	protect	creditors	
from	 debtors’	 mismanagement	 and	 irresponsible	 behaviour	 on	
the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 need	 to	 incentivize	 entrepreneurship	 as	
well	as	the	rescue	of	distressed	businesses,	on	the	other.	An	over-
ly	 draconian	 regime	 of	 pre-insolvency	 obligations	would	 run	 the	
risk	that	debtors	will	be	deterred	from	running	businesses;	debt-
ors	 will	 avoid	 accessing	 the	 insolvency	 system;	 or	 alternatively,	
being	concerned	with	a	personal	liability	regime,	debtors	might	be	
fast	to	close	down	their	business	prematurely.	A	regime	based	on	
severe	punishment	of	debtors	is	also	likely	to	be	less	effective	and	
to	be	invoked	very	rarely.	Imposing	sanctions	may	be	perceived	as	
a	 criminal	 or	 pseudo-criminal,	 rather	 than	 an	 insolvency	matter,	
and	it	might	require	a	very	high	level	of	proof	that	liquidators	may	
rarely	be	able	to	establish.		
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Thus,	the	key	remedy	for	addressing	mismanagement	in	the	vicin-
ity	of	 insolvency	should	generally	be	a	civil	sanction	for	wrongful	
behaviour.	The	regime	should	provide	for	possible	recovery	of	the	
damage	or	loss	from	persons	who	did	not	have	due	regard	to	the	
interests	of	 creditors	and	other	 stakeholders	at	 the	 time	 leading	
up	to	insolvency,	or	impose	other	sanctions	in	cases	of	unincorpo-
rated	entities.	 Importantly,	the	focus	of	the	provisions	should	be	
on	providing	a	clear	exposition	of	the	debtors’	duties	at	the	time	
leading	up	to	insolvency	and	the	manner	in	which	the	obligations	
can	be	complied	with	effectively	and	swiftly.	The	regime	for	debt-
or	obligations	 should	also	match	 the	procedural	 framework	pro-
posed	for	MSME	insolvency.	Thus,	it	should	provide	protection	to	
debtors	 from	 any	 personal	 liability	 in	 circumstances	where	 they	
attempted	in	good	faith	any	of	procedures	in	the	module,	includ-
ing	 informal	 negotiations.	 The	 regime	 should	 also	 complement	
and	 be	 supported	 by	 an	 adequate	 institutional	 framework,	 and	
debtors	should	be	incentivised	to	take	full	advantage	of	the	insti-
tutional	 framework	 that	 the	 system	 provides	 for	MSMEs	 in	 dis-
tress.		
b) A	regime	based	on	“wrongful	trading”		
Many	 insolvency	 systems	 recognize	 that	 the	 focus	 of	 the	 man-
agement	obligations	 regime	shifts	 to	prioritizing	value	maximiza-
tion	 and	 preservation	 of	 the	 estate,	 primarily	 for	 the	 benefit	 of	
the	creditors	as	a	whole,	once	insolvency	proceedings	commence.	
However,	 there	 is	 greater	 diversity	 regarding	 the	 governance	 of	
debtors	when	the	debtor	experiences	financial	distress	but	is	not	
yet	in	insolvency	proceedings.106		
Some	 regimes	 impose	 a	 duty	on	managers	 to	 initiate	 insolvency	
proceedings	within	a	 short	period	after	 the	occurrence	of	 an	 in-
solvency	event.107	Other	systems	adopt	“wrongful	trading”	provi-
sions	 that	 essentially	 impose	a	duty	on	directors	 to	 give	due	 re-
gard	to	the	interests	of	creditors	when	they	realize	that	insolvent	
liquidation	 (or	 administration)	 is	 inevitable.	 Some	 laws	 provide	
additional	remedies	aimed	at	compensating	creditors	 for	 fraudu-
lent	behaviour	or	at	deterring	mismanagement.108		
																																																						
106	Legislative	Guide,	supra	note	69.	
107	This	is	a	common	approach	in	civil	law	jurisdictions.	See,	for	Germany,	e.g.	
Insolvenzordnung	§	15a,	or,	for	Spain,	art.	5	of	the	Insolvency	Law	(Ley	Concur-
sal).		
108	Legislative	Guide,	supra	note	69,	Part	IV,	I(7).	
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The	approach	adopted	in	the	insolvency	standard109	is	akin	to	the	
wrongful	trading	regimes,	albeit	not	 identical	to	any	of	the	exist-
ing	domestic	laws.	This	standard	is	prescribed	in	a	recent	addition	
to	the	UNCITRAL	Legislative	Guide	on	Insolvency	Law	(Part	IV	from	
2013)	 and	 recent	 amendments	 of	 the	World	 Bank	 Principles	 on	
Creditor-Debtor	Regimes	 (amendments	 from	2015).110	The	 Legis-
lative	Guide	states	that:	
“[T]he	rationale	of	such	provisions	is	to	create	appropriate	
incentives	for	early	action	through	the	use	of	restructuring	
negotiations	or	 reorganization	and	 to	 stop	directors	 from	
externalizing	 the	costs	of	 the	company’s	 financial	difficul-
ties	and	placing	all	risks	of	further	trading	on	creditors.”111		
The	standard	focuses	on	tackling	mismanagement	that	falls	short	
of	fraud	in	the	period	approaching	insolvency,	while	acknowledg-
ing	 that	 legal	 regimes	may	 impose	 additional	measures	 to	deter	
misconduct.	 It	 favours	 flexibility	 and	 deference	 to	 directors’	
judgment	 over	 the	 more	 restrictive	 approaches.	 It	 aims	 to	 en-
courage	 directors	 to	 consider	 rescue	 possibilities	 in	 times	 of	 fi-
nancial	 crisis,	 while	 providing	 a	 regime	 that	 mitigates	 directors’	
concerns	about	the	risks	that	accompany	attempts	to	rescue	the	
business.	 It	 further	 states	 that	 provisions	 addressing	 the	 obliga-
tion	of	directors	and	remedies	for	breach	of	duties	should	be	im-
plemented	 in	a	way	that	does	not	adversely	affect	successful	 re-
organization,	 does	 not	 discourage	 participation	 in	 the	 manage-
ment	of	companies,	and	does	not	prevent	the	exercise	of	reason-
able	 business	 judgment	 or	 the	 taking	 of	 reasonable	 commercial	
risk.	At	the	same	time,	the	standard	acknowledges	that	creditors	
may	be	at	 risk	 in	 the	period	 leading	up	 to	 insolvency	and	 there-
fore	that	directors	must	consider	creditors’	interests	when	making	
decisions	during	this	time.112	
The	 insolvency	standard	 thus	 recommends	 that	when	 insolvency	
is	 imminent	or	unavoidable,	 the	 legitimate	 interests	of	creditors,	
as	well	 as	 those	of	 other	 stakeholders,	 should	be	protected	and	
that	appropriate	remedies	for	breach	of	duties	to	consider	these	
interests	should	be	provided.	Specifically,	it	is	recommended	that	
directors	 take	 reasonable	 steps	 to	 avoid	 insolvency,	 or	minimize	
																																																						
109	Ibid.	
110	Ibid,	Part	IV;	Principle	B2	of	the	World	Bank	Principles.	
111	Ibid,	Part	IV,	Section	I(7).	
112Ibid,	Part	IV,	Purpose	of	Legislative	Provisions.	
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its	extent	when	it	is	unavoidable.113	A	range	of	steps	may	be	rea-
sonable	in	the	relevant	circumstances.	These	steps	might	include	
the	 initiation	 of	 formal	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 However,	 the	
standard	does	not	suggest	that	directors	should	be	obliged	to	file	
for	 insolvency	within	a	 specific	period	of	 time.	 Furthermore,	 the	
time	at	which	the	obligations	arise	is	not	defined	in	precise	terms.	
Rather,	 it	 generally	 corresponds	 to	 a	 state	 of	 factual	 insolvency,	
actual	 or	 imminent,	 before	 insolvency	 proceedings	 have	 begun.	
The	 obligation	 to	 take	 steps	 to	 avoid	 insolvency	 or	minimize	 its	
effect	 arises	 when	 directors,	 defined	 broadly,114	knew	 or	 ought	
reasonably	to	have	known	that	 insolvency	was	 imminent	or	una-
voidable.115	The	 steps	 that	 should	 be	 taken	 by	 directors	 are	 not	
prescriptive	and	they	may	vary	depending	on	the	circumstances,	
though	the	standard	usefully	provides	a	list	of	possible	reasonable	
steps.116		
Where	 creditors	 have	 suffered	 loss	 or	 damage	 because	 of	 a	
breach	of	the	obligations,	the	person	owing	the	obligation	may	be	
liable	 subject	 to	 possible	 defences,	 including	 that	 the	 director	
took	 reasonable	 steps	 to	 avoid	 or	minimize	 the	 extent	 of	 insol-
vency.	 Liability	 should	 be	 limited	 to	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	
breach	 caused	 loss	 or	 damage.117	Yet,	 the	 law	may	 specify	 addi-
tional	remedies	to	deter	wrongful	or	fraudulent	behaviour.118		
A	similar	nuanced	approach	that	 incentivizes	appropriate	actions	
at	times	of	financial	distress,	including	through	rescue	options	and	
not	necessarily	through	filing,	would	be	appropriate	in	the	MSME	
context.	 It	will	 ensure	 consistency	 and	 compliance	with	 interna-
tional	 standards	 that	 apply	 to	business	 entities.	 Furthermore,	 as	
noted	 above,	 an	 effective	 regime	 for	 MSMEs	 should	 be	 largely	
based	 on	 quick	 actions	 taken	 by	 debtors.	 A	 debtor	 obligations	
regime	 that	 similarly	 incentivizes	 early	 action	 and	 rescue,	 even	
before	 the	debtor	 is	 in	 actual	 insolvency,	 is	 therefore	most	 ade-
quate	 in	 the	MSME	 context.	 A	 duty	 to	 file	 regime,	 on	 the	other	
hand,	 is	overly	narrow.	It	might	not	 inform	MSME	debtors	about	
																																																						
113	Ibid,	Part	IV,	recommendation	256.	
114	Persons,	subject	to	the	obligation	regime,	include	any	person	formally	ap-
pointed	as	a	directors	and	any	other	person	exercising	factual	control	and	per-
forming	the	functions	of	a	director	(Legislative	Guide,	Part	IV,	Recommendation	
258),	see	further	below.	
115	Legislative	Guide,	supra	note	69,	Part	IV,	recommendation	257.	
116	Ibid,	Part	IV,	recommendation	256.	
117	Ibid,	Part	IV,	recommendations	259	and	260.	
118	Ibid,	Part	IV,	recommendation	266;	World	Bank	Principle	B2.3.	
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their	 general	 obligations	 at	 times	 of	 financial	 distress	 and	 may	
also	 drive	 debtors	 to	 commence	 insolvency	 proceedings	 prema-
turely.		
Legal	 systems	 that	adopt	 this	 type	of	debtor	obligations	 (akin	 to	
wrongful	 trading	 systems	and	 to	 the	 insolvency	 standard)	would	
ensure	that	debtors	are	not	deterred	from	entering	negotiations,	
not	penalized	 for	doing	so,	and	are	encouraged	and	expected	to	
take	such	steps.	If,	however,	the	legal	system	prefers	to	nonethe-
less	follow	the	“duty	to	file”	approach,	it	is	particularly	important	
that	it	includes	a	“safe	harbour”	that	protects	debtors	from	liabil-
ity	where	they	engage	in	negotiations	with	creditors	in	good	faith.	
c) Tailoring	the	standard	to	MSMEs	circumstances	
The	 insolvency	standard	 regarding	directors’	obligations	at	 times	
approaching	 insolvency,	 although	 generally	 appropriate	 for	
MSMEs,	may	be	modified	to	better	reflect	MSMEs’	circumstances.	
The	 standard	 has	 been	 designed	 for	 companies	 and	 their	 direc-
tors,	while	MSMEs	may	operate	as	unincorporated	entities.	Gen-
erally,	 the	 standard	 provides	 a	 relatively	 sophisticated	 regime,	
and	 therefore	 may	 require	 simplification	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 re-
gime	is	not	too	cumbersome	for	MSMEs;	that	it	is	clear;	and	that	
it	 does	 not	 require	 seeking	 sophisticated	 and	 expensive	 profes-
sional	advice.		
Additionally,	although	the	 insolvency	standard	 is	balanced	and	 is	
primarily	focused	on	civil	 liability	for	(limited)	compensation,	 it	 is	
important	 to	 ensure	 that	 the	 regime	 does	 not	 deter	 starting	 up	
small	 businesses	 or	 addressing	 MSMEs’	 financial	 distress.	 Small	
debtors	should	not	be	overly	concerned	about	the	consequences	
of	failure.	Thus,	the	regime	may	require	some	relaxation	in	terms	
of	 the	expectations	 from	small	debtors,	at	 times	approaching	 in-
solvency.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 potential	 application	 of	 the	 re-
gime	to	persons	other	than	the	debtors,	lenders	in	particular,	who	
might	have	been	party	to	reckless	trading	or	fraud,	may	be	further	
enhanced	to	support	responsible	behaviour	by	lenders	of	MSMEs.		
i) The	obligation	and	the	steps	to	discharge	it	
The	 delineations	 of	 the	 obligation	 and	 the	 steps	 to	 discharge	 it	
should	be	 simplified,	 removing	 such	steps	 that	may	be	 less	 rele-
vant	in	MSME	cases.	As	noted	above,	the	insolvency	standard	use-
fully	provides	specific	details	on	the	steps	that	management	may	
take	 at	 times	 approaching	 insolvency	 in	order	 to	discharge	 their	
obligations.	However,	the	list	of	steps	is	extensive:	
“…	Reasonable	steps	might	include:	(a)	Evaluating	the	cur-
rent	financial	situation	of	the	company	and	ensuring	prop-
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er	accounts	are	being	maintained	and	that	they	are	up-to-
date;	being	independently	informed	as	to	the	current	and	
ongoing	financial	situation	of	the	company;	holding	regular	
board	meetings	 to	monitor	 the	 situation;	 seeking	 profes-
sional	advice,	 including	insolvency	or	legal	advice;	holding	
discussions	 with	 auditors;	 calling	 a	 shareholder	 meeting;	
modifying	 management	 practices	 to	 take	 account	 of	 the	
interests	 of	 creditors	 and	 other	 stakeholders;	 protecting	
the	 assets	 of	 the	 company	 so	 as	 to	 maximize	 value	 and	
avoid	 loss	 of	 key	 assets;	 considering	 the	 structure	 and	
functions	of	 the	business	 to	examine	viability	and	 reduce	
expenditure;	not	committing	the	company	to	the	types	of	
transaction	 that	 might	 be	 subject	 to	 avoidance	 unless	
there	is	an	appropriate	business	justification;	continuing	to	
trade	in	circumstances	where	it	is	appropriate	to	do	so	to	
maximize	 going	 concern	 value;	 holding	 negotiations	with	
creditors	or	commencing	other	 informal	procedures,	such	
as	 voluntary	 restructuring	 negotiations;	 (b)	 Commencing	
or	 requesting	 the	 commencement	 of	 formal	 reorganiza-
tion	or	liquidation	proceedings.”119	
In	the	MSME	context,	some	of	the	measures	may	be	less	relevant.	
Specifically,	“holding	regular	board	meetings	to	monitor	the	situa-
tion;	 seeking	 professional	 advice,	 including	 insolvency	 or	 legal	
advice;	 holding	 discussions	 with	 auditors;	 calling	 a	 shareholder	
meeting”	are	likely	to	be	steps	that	are	either	too	cumbersome	or	
irrelevant	in	an	MSME	context.		
The	regime	for	MSMEs	may	provide	simply	and	straightforwardly	
that	at	 times	approaching	 insolvency,	 the	debtor	should	operate	
in	the	interests	of	the	general	body	of	the	business’	stakeholders,	
and	 actively	 attempt	 to	 avoid	 insolvency	 or	 minimize	 its	 effect.	
The	 manner	 to	 discharge	 the	 obligation	 is,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	
through	proper	consideration	of	the	alternative	solutions	(media-
tion,	 debtor-in-possession,	 supervised	 rescue	 process	 etc.)	 pro-
vided	in	the	MSME	insolvency	framework	and,	on	the	other	hand,	
avoidance	 of	 use	 of	 the	MSME’s	 resources	 in	 a	 way	 that	 is	 not	
beneficial	for	the	general	body	of	creditors.	The	regime	may	speci-
fy	typical	important	examples	of	misconduct,	including	the	use	of	
employee	wages	to	subsidize	the	running	of	the	business	at	times	
of	 distress	 or	 in	 order	 to	 pay	 the	 bank	 or	 another	 creditor.	 It	
should	also	provide	assurance	to	debtors	that	there	 is	no	obliga-
																																																						
119	Ibid,	Part	IV,	recommendation	256.	
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tion	to	file	in	circumstances	where	other	routes	are	explored	such	
as	 a	workout,	 and	 the	 debtor	may	 be	 liable	 only	 if	 the	workout	
attempt	was	abusive.	
To	 the	 extent	 that	 the	 debtor	 requires	 assistance,	 in	 order,	 for	
example,	 to	 be	 able	 to	 enter	 negotiations	 with	 creditors	 or	 to	
produce	 a	 rescue	 plan,	 he/she	 should	 seek	 such	 assistance	 pro-
vided	 by	 relevant	 institutions,	 such	 as	 mediators	 or	 counselling	
services.120	In	 other	 words,	 the	 regime	 for	 debtor	 obligations	 in	
the	vicinity	of	insolvency,	in	particular	the	delineation	of	the	obli-
gation	 and	 the	 steps	 to	 discharge	 it,	 should	 correspond	 and	 be	
complementary	to	the	MSME	insolvency	procedures	and	the	sup-
porting	institutional	framework.	
ii) Knowledge	of	imminent	
insolvency	
The	obligation	 to	 take	 the	 steps	 to	avoid	 insolvency	or	minimize	
its	effect	should	arise	when	the	debtor	knows	or	ought	reasonably	
to	have	known	about	the	financial	distress,	in	accordance	with	the	
insolvency	 standard	 for	 directors’	 obligations.	 However,	 the	 tai-
lored	regime	for	MSMEs	may	further	clarify	how	such	knowledge	
will	be	established.	Thus,	small	debtors	should	be	expected	to	be	
informed	 about	 their	 financial	 situation	 through	 monitoring	 of	
their	accounts,	which	should	be	properly	maintained	and	be	up	to	
date.	No	other	sophisticated	knowledge	or	special	skills	expected	
from	directors	of	 larger	enterprises	should	be	anticipated	by	the	
regime.121	The	 institutional	 framework	 should	 support	 this	 re-
quirement	through	the	setting	up	of	debt	counselling	services	and	
through	proper	campaigns	about	means	to	address	MSME	finan-
cial	distress.122	
iii) Consequences	of	breach	
The	emphasis	of	the	regime	for	MSMEs’	obligations	should	be	on	
civil	 remedies	 in	 the	 form	 of	 compensation	 to	 creditors	 for	 the	
losses	they	suffered,	in	accordance	with	the	insolvency	standard.	
																																																						
120	See	Section	Part	V.B.1.a)	
121	See	e.g.	how	the	wrongful	trading	regime	is	applied	in	the	U.K.	with	regard	
to	small	companies	(“much	less	extensive	in	a	small	company	in	a	modest	way	
of	business,	with	simple	accounting	procedures	and	equipment,	than	it	will	be	
in	a	large	company	with	sophisticated	procedures…	Nevertheless,	certain	min-
imum	standards	are	to	be	attained.	Notably	there	is	an	obligation	laid	on	com-
panies	to	cause	accounting	records	to	be	kept	which	are	such	as	to	disclose	
with	reasonable	accuracy	at	any	time	the	financial	position	of	the	company	at	
that	time…”;	Re	Produce	Marketing	Consortium	Ltd	(No	2)	[1989]	BCLC	520).	
122	See	Part	VI.A.2.	
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The	 regime	 should	 specify	 this	 primary	 consequence	 clearly,	 en-
suring	 that	 small,	 incorporated,	 debtors	 are	 aware	 that	 the	pro-
tection	of	 limited	 liability	might	be	 removed	 in	 circumstances	of	
breach.	
It	should	be	further	explained	that	more	severe	sanctions	may	be	
imposed	 in	more	 serious	cases	of	misbehaviour.	As	noted	 in	 the	
insolvency	 standard,	 the	 liability	 to	 compensate	 creditors	 for	
damage	caused	due	to	the	breach	of	the	obligation	does	not	pre-
clude	 imposing	 other	 remedies	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 payment	 of	
compensation,	for	example	the	disqualification	of	a	director	from	
acting	as	company	director	 for	a	specified	period	of	 time.	 It	also	
does	 not	 preclude	 holding	 directors	 accountable	 for	 fraudulent	
activities,	 including	 through	taking	criminal	actions	against	direc-
tors.123		
The	 regime	 should	 also	 accommodate	 the	 cases	 of	 unincorpo-
rated	 entities,	 by	 including	 the	 bankruptcy-related	 restrictions	
discussed	later	in	this	Part,124	within	the	regime	for	debtor	obliga-
tions	at	times	of	distress.	Measures	such	as	disqualification	from	
taking	 directorship	 roles	 in	 the	 future,	 restrictions	 on	borrowing	
and	 inclusion	of	 negative	 information	 in	 the	 credit	 history	 agen-
cies	could	be	imposed	in	relevant	circumstances	of	breach	of	the	
debtor	pre-insolvency	obligations.	 In	 relevant	 circumstances,	 the	
debtor	may	 remain	undischarged	 for	a	 longer	period	of	 time,	or	
he/she	may	not	be	allowed	to	stay	in	possession.125	
iv) Lender’s	liability	
The	regime	should	also	specify	clearly	the	possible	obligations	by	
persons	other	than	the	debtor	and	its	appointed	managers.	In	the	
MSME	context,	often	the	managers	and	owners	will	be	the	same	
persons.	It	is	also	often	the	case,	though,	that	MSMEs	have	close	
relations	with	a	single	or	a	few	major	lenders.	Such	creditors	may	
have	 perverse	 incentives	 to	 pressurize	 the	 debtor	 to	 pay	 their	
debts	 (and	 the	debtor	may	have	 incentives	 to	 cooperate)	 at	 the	
expense	of	other	creditors.	Lenders	may	also	put	pressure	on	the	
debtor	to	opt	for	insolvency	solutions	that	may	be	effective	from	
the	 lender’s	perspective	(e.g.	piecemeal	 liquidation)	but	may	not	
																																																						
123	World	Bank	Principles,	Principle	B2.3.	See	e.g.	in	the	UK,	s.	213	of	the	Insol-
vency	Act	(civil	liability	for	fraudulent	trading)	and	s.	993	of	the	Companies	Act	
(criminal	liability	for	fraudulent	trading).	
124	See	Part	VI.A.2.	
125	See	Part	VI.A.2.	
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be	the	most	beneficial	solution	for	the	general	body	of	stakehold-
ers.		
This	 risk	 of	 lenders’	 self-serving	 behaviour	 can	 be	 mitigated	 by	
applying	the	MSMEs-tailored	debtor	obligations	regime	to	lenders	
and	by	specifying	their	obligations	at	times	approaching	the	insol-
vency	of	MSMEs.		
The	insolvency	standard	also	captures	persons	other	than	the	ap-
pointed	directors	within	the	regime.	Thus,	it	applies	to:	“any	per-
son	formally	appointed	as	a	director	and	any	other	person	exercis-
ing	factual	control	and	performing	the	functions	of	a	director.”126	
It	is	thus	possible	that	lenders	will	be	subject	to	the	obligations	in	
circumstances	where	 they	have	exercised	pervasive	 control	over	
the	business.		
However,	 lenders	are	not	mentioned	specifically	 in	the	standard.	
It	might	also	prove	difficult	to	establish	the	required	level	of	con-
trol	by	lenders	if	the	regime	indicates	some	reluctance	to	expand	
the	obligations	beyond	the	debtor’s	own	management.127	Indeed,	
commentary	 to	 the	 insolvency	 standard	notes	 the:	 “…	 increased	
risk	of	 unexpected	 liabilities	 for	banks	 and	others	who	might	be	
deemed	 to	be	directors	by	 reason	of	 their	 involvement	with	 the	
company,	particularly	at	the	time	of	the	insolvency.”	It	then	states	
that:	“[I]t	is	desirable	that	relevant	legislation	provide	due	protec-
tion	for	such	parties	when	they	are	acting	in	good	faith,	at	arm’s	
length	 to	 the	 debtor	 and	 in	 a	 commercially	 reasonable	 man-
ner.”128		
Indeed,	the	regime	should	be	well	balanced.	It	is	important	not	to	
deter	the	granting	of	credit	to	MSMEs.	At	the	same	time,	there	is	
room,	in	the	MSME	context,	to	apply	the	regime	more	robustly	to	
lenders.	Thus,	the	regime	may	specify	that	lenders	of	MSMEs	may	
be	liable	if	they	took	part	in	actions	detrimental	to	the	stakehold-
ers	as	a	whole	at	times	approaching	the	MSME	insolvency.	Lend-
ers	may	be	mentioned	explicitly	 in	the	 law	on	debtor	obligations	
and	lenders	should	be	aware	that	at	times	approaching	insolven-
cy,	 the	obligation	of	 the	debtor	 is	 to	 the	 general	 body	of	 stake-
holders.		
																																																						
126	Legislative	Guide,	supra,	note	69	Part	IV,	recommendation	258.	
127	See	in	the	U.K.	the	difficulty	of	applying	the	“shadow	director”	concept	to	
lenders;	Re	PFTZM	Ltd	[1995]	2	B.C.L.C.	354.	
128	See	Legislative	Guide,	supra,	note	69	Part	IV	I(10).	
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d) Enforcement	
A	key	weakness	of	existing	regimes	that	regulate	the	behaviour	of	
directors	 on	 the	 eve	 of	 insolvency	 is	 their	 limited	 effectiveness.	
Provisions	on	debtors’	obligations	at	times	approaching	insolven-
cy	are	enforced	quite	sparingly,	 largely	due	to	problems	of	fund-
ing	such	litigation.129	In	small	entities	proceedings,	the	problem	of	
funding	 is	even	more	pronounced	since	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 there	will	
be	 insufficient	funds	available	 in	the	estate	to	pursue	the	debtor	
or	other	persons.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	particularly	 important	 that	 the	
regime	considers	ways	to	address	funding	issues.		
The	 insolvency	 standard	 on	 directors’	 obligations	 at	 times	 ap-
proaching	 insolvency	 delineates	 certain	 means	 for	 obtaining	 al-
ternative	funding,	in	particular	the	assignment	of	claims	for	value	
to	 a	 third	 party.130	It	 also	 recommends	 that	 the	 law	 specify	 that	
the	costs	of	an	action	against	the	person	owing	the	obligations	be	
paid	 as	 administrative	 expenses.131	This	 approach,	 in	 the	 case	of	
liability	for	wrongful	trading	or	for	the	breach	of	a	duty	to	file,	 is	
the	solution	in	jurisdictions	where	an	insolvency	representative	is	
a	mandatory	figure.	The	representative	has	the	duty	to	execute	its	
functions	to	the	best	 interest	of	creditors.	 If	 it	 is	 in	such	 interest	
that	 directors	 be	 made	 liable	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	 insolvency	
estate,	the	representatives	must	start	the	actions.	The	problem	of	
the	 cost	 of	 pursuing	 these	 actions	 is	 part	 of	 the	 general	 cost	 of	
funding	insolvency	proceedings	where	there	are	few	or	no	assets	
to	cover	for	the	cost	of	proceedings.132		
To	expand	the	possibility	that	the	duties	will	be	enforced,	the	re-
gime	may	allow	invoking	the	provisions	in	the	course	of	processes	
other	 than	 formal	 liquidation	 proceedings	 and	may	 also	 expand	
the	right	to	invoke	the	regime	to	agencies	other	than	just	the	in-
solvency	representative,	to	include,	for	example,	the	court	taking	
																																																						
129	Ibid,	Part	IV,	para.	43.	In	the	U.K.,	this	realization	led	to	amendments	intro-
duced	to	the	Insolvency	Act	in	2015	aimed	at	broadening	funding	possibilities	
of	actions	against	directors	(see	s.	246ZD	of	the	Insolvency	Act).	
130	Ibid,	Part	IV,	para.	44.	
131	Ibid,	Part	IV,	recommendation	264.	
132	There	are	different	ways	to	tackle	this	problem.	Some	systems	do	not	open	
proceedings	when	there	does	not	appear	to	be	enough	assets	to	cover	for	the	
cost	of	proceedings.	In	those	systems	where	proceedings	are	nevertheless	
opened	with	a	view	to	perhaps	swell	the	estate	by	means	of	liability/avoidance	
actions	and	ultimately	expel	the	business	from	the	market,	funding	may	come	
from	public	agencies	(that	pay	a	professional	or	appoint	a	public	receiver)	or	
through	setting	up	of	a	fund	to	pay	the	remuneration	of	the	insolvency	repre-
sentative.		
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action	on	its	own	motion.	The	regime	may	also	permit	the	credi-
tors	to	bring	such	actions,	in	the	collective	interest	of	creditors.		
Importantly,	 the	 regime	 should	 be	 viewed	 and	 be	 utilized	 as	 an	
educational	 tool,	 complementing	 the	 general	 framework	 for	
MSME	insolvency	and	ensuring	that	debtors	make	full	and	proper	
use	of	 the	 regime.	 It	 is	 crucial	 that	 reform	 in	 the	area	of	MSME	
insolvency	 include	training	and	education	programs,	 in	particular	
in	regimes	less	familiar	with	the	concept	of	wrongful	trading	and	
the	nuanced	approach	it	entails	regarding	the	obligations	of	debt-
ors	at	times	approaching	insolvency.133	
e) Alternative	approaches	based	on	a	duty	to	file	
While	 the	wrongful	 trading	approach	 is	 the	preferred	approach	where	
there	 is	 sufficient	 level	of	 information,	 a	developed	market	and,	espe-
cially,	a	technically	prepared	judiciary,	other	alternatives	might	be	more	
suitable	to	the	circumstances	in	jurisdictions	that	lack	such	features.	The	
main	 alternative	 approach	would	 be	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 duty	 to	
file.	 Poor	 corporate	 governance	 and	 insufficiently	 trained	 and	 skilled	
directors,	 a	 rather	 widespread	 phenomenon	 in	 the	 MSME	 context,	
might	require	a	clear-cut,	and	even	easier	 to	apprehend	rule	on	which	
to	base	the	liability	of	directors.	Indeed,	the	insufficiency	and	inadequa-
cy	 of	 accounting	 information,	 particularly	 common	 in	 the	 context	 of	
MSME,	makes	 it	 difficult	 to	 judge	 retrospectively	what	 the	 correct	 be-
haviour	of	the	director	should	have	been,	and	when	it	should	have	been	
executed.	Judges	in	jurisdictions	with	little	practice	of	holding	directors	
liable	 for	misbehaviour,	again,	a	not	uncommon	situation,	could	find	 it	
difficult	to	conduct	an	assessment,	on	the	merits,	of	the	actions	of	the	
debtor´s	management	on	 the	eve	of	 insolvency.	While	more	 rigid,	 the	
duty	to	file	constitutes	a	somewhat	clearer	rule	that	works	as	a	stricter	
ex	 ante	 corporate	 governance	 incentive,	 although	 the	 experience	 in	
systems	 that	 subscribe	 to	 the	duty	 to	 file	 regime	 (e.g.	Germany)	 show	
that	 uncertainty	 still	 exists	with	 regard	 to	 the	 point	 in	 time	when	 the	
duty	 arises.	 When	 opting	 for	 one	 system	 or	 the	 other,	 the	 legislator	
would	do	well	to	take	all	considerations	into	account.134			
Duty	to	file	systems	have	different	designs:		
• In	 some	 countries,	 the	 breach	 of	 the	 duty	 to	 file	 is	
treated	as	 a	 criminal	 offence	 (e.g.	Germany,	Poland).	
While	this	approach	would	seem	like	a	very	powerful	
incentive,	practice	shows	that	it	does	not	always	work	
effectively.	 In	Germany,	 the	 involvement	of	 a	 district	
attorney	 introduces	 complexity	 to	 insolvency	 cases	
																																																						
133	See	further	Part	VI.A.4.	on	education	and	advice	to	debtors.	
134	See	also	the	regime	in	Germany,	where	the	duty	only	extends	to	directors	of	
limited	liability	companies.	
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that	might	hinder	the	insolvency	professional	pursuing	
the	civil	 liability	 following	a	breach	of	 the	duty,	 since	
relevant	 documents	 are	 seized	 by	 law	 enforcement	
agencies	 and	 not	 available	 for	 the	 insolvency	 profes-
sional	for	a	significant	period	of	time.	In	other	jurisdic-
tions,	the	rule	might	not	be	implemented	because	the	
criminal	offence	requires	a	more	stringent	test	(crimi-
nal	 liability	 usually	 carries	 a	 higher	 burden	 of	 proof	
than	civil	liability),	and	hence	the	system	backfires.	In-
effectiveness	 of	 criminal	 law	 based	 regimes	 is	 also	
possibly	 linked	with	 the	 fact	 that	 this	 type	of	offence	
does	not	often	bring	about	a	duty	to	compensate	the	
damage	 caused,	 and	 hence	 there	 is	 not	 sufficient	 in-
centives	 for	 the	parties	 to	 act	 (i.e.,	 inform	 the	public	
prosecutor,	or	request	the	judge	to	do	so).		
• When	 the	 breach	 of	 a	 duty	 to	 file	 brings	 about	 the	
need	 to	 compensate	 and	 pay	 damages,	 there	 are	
again	 different	 approaches	 in	 disparate	 systems.	 In	
some	jurisdictions	(e.g.	Germany135),	the	debtor	or	the	
directors	in	breach	may	be	made	accountable	only	for	
the	damage	caused	by	the	delay,	while,	in	other	cases,	
defaulting	parties	may	be	made	 liable	to	compensate	
creditors	 for	 the	amount	 they	did	not	 receive	 follow-
ing	 the	 liquidation	 of	 the	 business.	 This	 latter	 ap-
proach	 constitutes	 a	 civil	 sanction	 and	 is	 therefore	
more	akin	to	the	criminal	law	based	solution.		
• Systems	 also	 vary	 with	 regard	 to	 the	 legal	 effect	 of	
breaching	the	obligations.	While	 in	some	jurisdictions	
the	mere	breach	of	the	duty	to	file	is	sufficient	to	trig-
ger	the	liability	or	the	sanctions,	in	other	systems	(e.g.	
Germany136),	 the	 breach	 only	 creates	 a	 presumption	
of	“negligence”,	that	the	debtor,	or	directors,	may	re-
but	if	they	proved	that	their	behaviour	was	objectively	
conducted	 with	 a	 view	 to	 minimize	 the	 damage	 to	
creditors.137	This	approach	may	also	be	used	to	foster	
adequate	 corporate	 governance,	 by	 linking	 the	 pre-
sumptions	to	certain	misbehaviour,	such	as	not	having	
fully	complied	with	the	accounting	duties	or	any	other	
corporate	law	rule	aimed	at	protecting	the	market	and	
																																																						
135	GmbH-Gesetz	§	64,	but	also	BGB	§	823(2)	in	connection	with	InsO	§	15a.	
136	Ibid.	
137	Articles	164-162	and	172	of	Spain´s	Insolvency	Act.		
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market	participants.	In	these	systems,	the	party	in	de-
fault	may	also	prove	that	the	delay	caused	no	damage	
to	 creditors	 or	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	 business.	 This	 ap-
proach,	 while	 more	 balanced,	 might	 be	 difficult	 to	
handle	 for	 courts	 and	 stakeholders,	 and	 again	would	
require	sophisticated	legal	professionals	and	an	effec-
tive	legal	system.	
2. Addressing	debtor	moral	hazard	and	lack	of	
information	
The	Modular	Approach	provides	tools	for	debtors	to	address	their	
financial	distress	at	 an	early	 stage.	 In	 the	usual	 case,	 the	debtor	
may	be	able	to	remain	in	control	over	the	process	and	resolve	the	
distress	 situation	 with	minimal	 or	 no	 involvement	 of	 insolvency	
professionals	and	minimal	or	no	court	intervention.	This	situation	
is	 the	 default	 position	 of	 the	 regime.	 This	 way,	 costs	 are	 mini-
mized,	 the	 debtor	 expertise	 and	 valuable	 private	 information	 is	
not	lost	and	the	debtor	is	able	to	recover	from	the	distress	situa-
tion	 more	 smoothly. 138 	In	 particular,	 the	 debtor-in-possession	
approach	 provides	 an	 important	 incentive	 that	 can	 encourage	
debtors	 to	 utilize	 the	MSME	 framework	 and	possibly	 rescue	 the	
business	if	it	is	still	viable.	For	natural	persons,	the	framework	also	
offers	a	discharge	releasing	the	individual	from	his/her	debts	and	
from	 bankruptcy	 restrictions.	 The	 discharge	 also	 incentivizes	
debtors	 to	 utilize	 the	 system	 and	 provides	 an	 opportunity	 of	 a	
“fresh	start”.	
However,	as	noted	above,	there	is	some	risk	that	the	system	will	
be	abused	or	misused	by	debtors	and	that	it	will	drive	debtors	to	
act	irresponsibly	with	regard	to	their	debts	and	their	creditors.	In	
particular:	
• Debtors	may	be	overly	 incentivized	 to	access	a	 “friendly”	
regime,	at	the	expense	of	the	creditors.	They	may	opt	for	a	
rescue	 process	 that	 allows	 them	 to	 stay	 in	 control	 even	
where	 they	 lack	 the	skill	 to	address	 the	 financial	distress.	
Although	 in	 the	usual	MSME	case,	 the	small	business	will	
be	 managed	 by	 a	 single	 or	 a	 handful	 of	 individual	 own-
er/managers	 whose	 expertise	 is	 crucial	 for	 the	 business,	
																																																						
138	The	Legislative	Guide,	supra	note	69	considers	in	commentary	a	range	of	
important	advantages	in	the	debtor’s	continued	involvement	in	the	process,	in	
particular	noting	the	debtor’s	immediate	and	intimate	knowledge	of	the	busi-
ness	especially	in	the	case	of	sole	traders	and	small	partnerships	(see	the	Legis-
lative	Guide,	Part	two,	III,	A.,	para.	5).	
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these	 individuals	may	not	have	the	means	to	address	the	
situation	of	distress.	Small	businesses	might	not	be	able	to	
afford	 the	 services	 of	 professional	 advisers	 to	 assist	 in	
making	appropriate	decisions	at	times	of	financial	difficul-
ties.	 They	 may,	 therefore,	 make	 decisions	 regarding	 the	
relevant	 insolvency	 solution	 (the	 options	 available	 under	
the	Modular	Approach)	that	could	be	detrimental	to	credi-
tors.	 The	 doomed-to-failure	 module	 discussed	 above139	
addresses	this	risk	by	allowing	a	majority	of	creditors	with	
claims	 large	enough	 to	 veto	a	debtor’s	plan	 to	 terminate	
debtor-initiated	rescue	proceedings.		
• Generally,	 debtors	 may	 have	 a	 strong	 incentive	 to	 file	 if	
they	 know	 that	 they	 remain	 in	 control.	 ‘Wishful	 thinking’	
may	 drive	 debtors	 to	 attempt	 a	 reorganization	 path,	 in	
particular,	 if	 they	 know	 that	 they	 remain	 in	 possession,	
and	even	if	it	is	not	a	viable	solution	in	the	circumstances,	
where	 it	 might	 merely	 prolong	 an	 inevitable	 liquidation	
outcome.		
• In	other	circumstances,	creditors	may	have	close	relation-
ship	 with	 one	 creditor,	 likely	 the	 main	 lender,	 and	 may	
seek	a	process	that	is	to	that	creditor’s	benefit,	neglecting	
the	interests	of	the	creditors	as	a	group.	
• MSMEs	may	 attempt	 to	 exploit	 the	 benefits	 of	 the	 insol-
vency	 framework,	 the	 discharge	 in	 particular,	 without	
providing	sufficient	information	on	their	affairs	and	activi-
ties.	Generally,	MSMEs	are	prone	to	operating	with	limited	
transparency	and	 limited	monitoring	of	 the	accounts	 and	
financial	affairs	in	their	ordinary	course	of	business	due	to	
restricted	 resources	 and	 laxer	 disclosure	 regulation.	 They	
may	 also	 deliberately	 conceal	 information	 or	 engage	 in	
other	type	of	abusive	or	fraudulent	behaviour,	such	as	hid-
ing	assets	from	creditors	or	lying	about	their	financial	situ-
ation.140		
• Individual	 debtors	 may	 also	 be	 driven	 to	 incur	 excessive	
debt	at	the	expense	of	creditors,	knowing	that	they	can	be	
discharged	 in	 insolvency.	 Incorporated	 entities	 may	 also	
																																																						
139	See	Part	V.B.1.e),	“doomed-to-failure-module”.	
140	Although,	as	noted	in	the	World	Bank,	Report	on	the	Treatment	of	the	Insol-
vency	of	Natural	Persons	[“the	World	Bank	Natural	Persons	Report”]:	“one	
should	not	overemphasize	the	danger	that	such	fraud	represents.	Empirical	
observation	of	many	existing	insolvency	systems	has	confirmed	repeatedly	that	
the	instances	of	real	fraud	are	vanishingly	low”	[para.	118].	
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take	 excessive	 risks	 on	 the	 assumption	 that	 they	 will	 be	
protected	by	limited	liability	in	the	event	of	insolvency.	
All	of	the	above	represent	typical	situations	of	debtor	moral	haz-
ard	in	cases	of	MSME	insolvency.	The	next	section	addresses	the-
se	 issues	 and	proposes	 solutions	 to	enhance	 the	 governance	 re-
gime	 of	 the	 insolvency	 process,	 address	 information	 gaps	 and	
consider	enforcement	and	sanctions.	
a) Effective	governance	regime:	oversight	of	the	
insolvency	options	
A	 robust	 governance	 regime	 that	 can	 mitigate	 the	 risks	 noted	
above	is	critical	for	the	proper	functioning	of	the	MSME	insolven-
cy	 regime.	 In	 the	 absence	 of	 an	 effective	 governance	 regime,	
creditors	may	have	 limited	trust	 in	debtor-led	solutions	and	may	
be	quick	to	request	displacement	of	the	debtor	and	supervision	by	
professionals,	which	might	eventually	lead	to	an	increase	of	costs.	
The	 insolvency	 standard	 stresses	 the	 importance	 of	 an	 effective	
governance	 regime	 in	 the	 course	 of	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 In	
this	 respect,	 a	 system	 that	 is	 perceived	 too	 debtor-friendly	may	
result	 in	 creditor	 apathetic	 behaviour	 and	 lack	of	 interest	 in	 the	
process.141	
In	 this	 regard,	 it	 should	 first	be	acknowledged	 that	although	 the	
proposed	approach	for	MSME	insolvency	contains	some	degree	of	
granularity,	 it	 leaves	 room	 for	 jurisdictions	 to	 adopt	 different	
forms	of	debtor-led	processes,	 in	particular,	 in	terms	of	the	level	
of	court	involvement,	to	address	specific	challenges	in	the	system.	
It	 is	 important	 that	 jurisdictions	 consider	 the	manner	 in	which	a	
debtor-in-possession	procedure	might	 be	 implemented	 and	how	
it	is	integrated	with	other	aspects	of	the	system.		
Additionally,	while	 the	debtor-in-possession	process	 is,	 in	 princi-
ple,	 the	 preferred	 default	 approach,	 the	 framework	 for	 MSMEs	
should	also	contemplate	means	to	address	the	risks	it	entails.	The	
flexibility	 of	 the	 Modular	 Approach	 should	 be	 accompanied	 by	
measures	 to	 counter	 reckless	 or	 otherwise	 improper	 choices	 by	
the	debtor.	
Indeed,	inherent	to	the	Modular	Approach	is	the	fact	that	it	con-
tains	a	range	of	tools	to	achieve	full	or	partial	rescue	or	liquidation	
in	 the	 relevant	 circumstances.	 The	 choice	 between	 the	 proce-
dures	is	primarily	in	the	hands	of	the	debtor,	yet	it	is	intended	to	
be	monitored	by	the	creditors.	Thus,	even	where,	as	contemplat-
																																																						
141	See	Legislative	Guide,	supra	note	69	Part	two	(II.A.,	para.	7).	
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ed	 by	 the	 modular	 framework,	 debtors	 will	 have	 the	 option	 of	
staying	in	possession,	the	regime	would	also	allow	the	creditors	to	
object	to	such	approach.	Creditors	should	be	able	to:		
• require	that	the	debtor	rescue	process	is	monitored	or	su-
pervised;		
• seek	the	involvement	of	the	court	in	the	process;		
• require	that	the	debtor	is	displaced.		
In	addition	to	these	three	measures,	the	law—or,	in	some	jurisdic-
tions,	a	court	decision—should	limit	the	debtor´s	scope	of	admin-
istration	of	 the	business	 for	 the	period	the	procedure	 is	ongoing	
and	a	decision	 is	 to	be	adopted	on	 the	 final	exit	 to	 the	business	
crisis.	 Typically,	 this	 limitation,	 which	 will	 apply	 to	 the	 different	
typology	of	the	debtor-in-possession	situations,	will	not	allow	the	
debtor	 to	 enter	 into	 transactions	 outside	 the	ordinary	 course	of	
its	business	activity.	In	other	words,	until	the	destiny	of	the	busi-
ness	 is	decided,	 the	debtor	must	observe	a	 low	risk	profile	 in	 its	
activity.	In	cases	where	an	extraordinary	act	of	disposition	is	nec-
essary,	 it	 should	 only	 be	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 authorization	 of	
the	court	or	the	relevant	insolvency	agency.		
b) Addressing	information	gaps	
One	 of	 the	 main	 obstacles	 to	 the	 proper	 implementation	 of	 a	
MSME	 system,	 and	 a	major	 contributing	 cause	of	 debtor	misbe-
haviour	 is	 the	absence	of	adequate	 information	 in	the	MSME	 in-
solvency	 process.	 An	 effective	 MSME	 insolvency	 system	 would	
work	 substantially	 better	 if	 the	 debtor	 provides	 the	 necessary	
information	and	is	willing	and	available	to	collaborate	throughout	
the	 entire	 procedure.	 In	 some	 cases,	 and	 in	 some	 jurisdictions,	
however,	 particularly	 in	 the	 less	 developed	 economies,	 the	 very	
existence	 of	 the	 information	 cannot	 be	 taken	 for	 granted.	 This	
section	discusses	both	 the	 issue	of	 the	debtor	obligations	 to	 co-
operate	and	provide	information	and	the	issue	of	absence	of	such	
information,	 suggesting	means	 to	 enhance	 the	 availability	 of	 in-
formation,	 including	 through	 the	 involvement	 of	 third	 parties	 in	
information	gathering.	
i) 	Information	and	collaboration	duties	of	the	
debtor	
	The	MSME	insolvency	regime	should	clearly	prescribe	the	obliga-
tions	 of	MSME	debtors	 and	properly	match	 these	 obligations	 to	
the	 different	 types	 of	 procedures	 contemplated	 by	 the	Modular	
Approach.	 Importantly,	 the	regime	should	be	premised	on	coop-
eration	 in	 good	 faith	 between	 the	debtor	 and	 the	 creditors,	 the	
insolvency	 professional	 or	 the	 court	 (depending	 on	 the	 type	 of	
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process	 taking	place),	and	the	provision	of	complete	and	correct	
information	 regarding	 the	debtor’s	 finances	 and	activities	 to	 the	
extent	and	in	the	measure	designed	by	the	jurisdiction.		
As	noted	above,	the	insolvency	standard	stresses	the	importance	
of	 a	 robust	 governance	 regime	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	 insolvency	
proceedings.	 The	 standard	 further	 delineates	 the	 recommended	
debtor’s	 obligations,	 to	 the	 insolvency	 representative,	 the	 court	
or	the	creditors,	after	the	commencement	of	and	throughout	the	
insolvency	 process.	 These	 obligations	 are	 relevant	 in	 the	MSME	
context	as	well	and	would	include:	assisting	the	representative	to	
perform	 its	 duties;	 providing	 accurate,	 reliable	 and	 complete	 in-
formation	 regarding	 the	 financial	 position	 and	 business	 affairs;	
cooperation	to	enable	the	representative	to	take	effective	control	
of	 the	 estate	 and	 to	 facilitate	 or	 cooperate	 the	 recovery	 by	 the	
representative	 of	 the	 assets;	 and	 notifying	 the	 court	 about	 any	
intention	 to	 leave	 the	 habitual	 residence	 or	 move	 the	 debtor’s	
headquarters.142	
In	 particular,	 the	 standard	 stresses	 that	 a	 reorganization	 option	
should	 be	 conditioned	 on	 the	 continuing	 obligation	 to	 provide	
adequate	 information	about	 the	debtor’s	business	and	affairs.143	
To	 the	extent	 that	 the	MSME	debtor	 lacks	 the	means	 to	comply	
with	 this	 obligation,	 he/she	 should	 seek	 the	 appointment	 of	 an	
adviser	who	 could	 assist	 in	 the	 process.	 The	 institutional	 frame-
work	 for	MSME	 insolvency	 should	 support	 and	 complement	 this	
obligation	through	the	setting	up	of	debt	counselling	services	and	
through	 requirements	 imposed	 on	 relevant	 agencies	 to	 provide	
information	 about	 troubled	 businesses,	 as	 further	 discussed	 be-
low.	
Requirements	concerning	transparency,	good	faith	and	full	disclo-
sure	 should	 be	 embedded	 in	 all	 the	 procedures	 in	 the	Modular	
Approach,	 including	 business	 rescue	 proceedings. 144 	Workout	
guidelines	designed	for	the	MSME	cases	should	also	include	prin-
ciples	concerning	the	debtor’s	duties	and	obligations.	Such	guide-
lines	should	provide	that	negotiations	between	the	creditors	and	
the	debtors	 should	 take	place	 in	 good	 faith	 and	 that	 the	debtor	
must	 communicate	 and	 provide	 information	 to	 the	 creditors	 re-
																																																						
142	Ibid,	Part	two,	recommendation	110.	
143	Ibid,	Part	two	(III.A.,	24).	Under	the	US	Chapter	11	Bankruptcy	Code	process	
for	SMEs,	the	small	business	debtor	must	file	periodic	financial	and	other	re-
ports	regarding	its	cash	flow	and	its	profitability.	
144	See	Part	V.A.	
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garding	any	relevant	aspect	of	the	restructuring.	The	communica-
tion	 should	be	honest	 and	 the	debtor	 should	be	obliged	 to	pro-
vide	all	requested	information	in	a	timely	and	accurate	manner.145		
ii) Financial	information	in	
MSME	insolvency	
Financial	information	is	a	key	element	in	the	mechanics	of	a	mar-
ket	 economy.	 Without	 proper,	 reliable,	 comparable	 financial	
statements,	 stakeholders	 cannot	make	 investment	decisions	and	
the	ex	post	control	of	the	behaviour	of	market	agents	is	not	possi-
ble.	This	risk	exists	for	all	market	participants,	including	–and	in	no	
less	degree-	MSMEs.		
Experience	shows	that	information	problems	are	more	important	
the	 smaller	 the	 business	 is.	 Especially	 in	 developing	 economies,	
the	 level	 of	 informality	 is	 high:	 sometimes	 entrepreneurs	 and	
small	entities	do	not	have	a	legal	duty	to	file	proper	accounts,	or	
the	duty	is	only	rarely	enforced;	owners	and	managers	have	little	
or	no	knowledge	of	account	drafting;	and	public	training	courses	
and	 awareness	 campaigns	 are	 very	 scarce.146 	MSMEs	 conduct	
their	 activity	 “the	 way	 it’s	 always	 been”,	 with,	 at	 best,	 home-
based	accounting	practices.	This	situation	is	incompatible	with	the	
proper	 development	 of	 the	 MSME	 sector,	 and,	 hence,	 of	 the	
economy	 of	 a	 given	 jurisdiction.	 An	 adequate	 level	 of	 formality	
and,	more	precisely,	sufficient	financial	 information,	are	key	to	a	
workable	system	to	tackle	MSME	insolvency.	Without	it,	access	to	
finance	 is	 limited,	 risk	 seems	 higher,	 and	 therefore	 the	 price	 of	
financing	 is	 also	more	 expensive.	 In	 case	 of	 financial	 difficulties,	
out	of	court	agreements	are	hindered,	many	insolvency	tools	are	
useless	 (liability	 of	 directors,	 avoidance	 actions,	 etc.),	 and	 there	
are	perverse	 incentives	 to	destroy	value	by	owners	of	distressed	
MSMEs.	 The	 entire	 system	 to	 tackle	 business	 distress	 might	 be	
thwarted.	Even	in	those	countries	where	there	is	a	proper	system	
of	debt	discharge,	the	fresh	start	of	the	debtor	is	hampered	by	the	
impossibility	of	making	a	proper	assessment	of	the	discharge	test,	
given	the	lack	of	information,	at	least	in	those	systems	where	the	
discharge	 is	 based	 on	 an	ad	 hoc	 analysis	 of	 the	 debtor’s	 behav-
iour.		
																																																						
145	Requirements	concerning	honest	communication	of	relevant	information	
should	also	be	imposed	on	the	creditors,	party	to	the	negotiations.		
146	A	good	indication	of	the	level	of	formality	of	developing	economies	can	be	
found	in	the	database	of	the	Accounting	and	Auditing	Report	on	the	Ob-
servance	of	Standards	and	Codes	of	the	World	Bank,	available	at	
http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/rosc_aa.html.		
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iii) The	need	to	strike	a	balance	
when	imposing	accounting	
duties	
Despite	 its	 importance,	 there	 is	 a	 downside	 to	 the	 implementa-
tion	 of	 a	 fully-fledged	 system	 of	 accounting	 and	 financial	 infor-
mation:	it	is	expensive.	The	smaller	the	business,	the	less	reason-
able	it	 is	to	impose	excessive	accounting	duties.	These	objectives	
can	 act	 as	 access	 barriers,	 as	 well	 as	 demand	 an	 investment	 of	
time	and	training	that	the	smaller	economic	units	may	not	be	able	
to	afford.	Too	much	across	 the	board	 increase	 in	 the	accounting	
duties	of	MSMEs	may	place	an	excessive	burden	on	some	of	these	
businesses	and	be	counterproductive.	 It	 is	necessary	 to	design	a	
system	 of	 financial	 information	 that	 maximizes	 the	 amount	 of	
information	while	minimizing	additional	costs;	one	that	identifies	
the	 key	 information	 to	 be	 provided,	 makes	 it	 compulsory,	 and	
leaves	 other	 information	 as	 optional;	 a	 system	 that	 is	 able	 to	
properly	 segment	 the	 spectrum	 of	 businesses	 into	 different	
groups	with	duties	of	diverse	intensity.		
This	 approach	 is	well	 consolidated	 in	 the	 accounting	 profession.	
The	International	Financial	Reporting	Standards	(“IFRS”)	take	into	
consideration	 the	 size	 and	 complexity	 of	 the	 business	 to	 gauge	
the	accounting	needs,147	and	most	countries	with	well-developed	
systems	include	lower	information	standards	for	the	smaller	mar-
ket	 participants.	 However,	 the	 differences	 reflected	 in	 IFRS	 and	
international	 practice	 do	 not	 always	 cover	 the	 specifics	 of	 the	
smaller	 businesses	 (often,	 the	 vast	 majority),	 and,	 in	 any	 case,	
their	level	of	effective	implementation	is	often	weak.	In	addition,	
problems	do	not	always	come	from	the	type	of	 information	that	
needs	to	be	included,	but	from	the	costs	that	are	incurred	in	gen-
erating	and	sustaining	the	information	documentation.		
iv) Possible	solutions	to	the	
problem	of	insufficient	
information	
The	 solution	 of	 this	 wide-spread	 problem	 concerning	 lack	 of	 in-
formation	 in	 MSME	 cases	 may	 come	 from	 the	 combination	 of	
																																																						
147	The	International	Accounting	Standards	Board	has	published	a	specific	doc-
ument	for	the	accounting	of	SMEs:	IFRS	for	Small	and	Medium-Sized	Enterpris-
es	(http://www.iasplus.com/en/standards/other/ifrs-for-smes).	Some	of	the	
simplifications	of	the	IFRS	for	SMEs	are	the	following:	the	elements	of	the	full	
IFRS	that	are	not	relevant	to	typical	SMEs	are	removed;	some	accounting	policy	
options	are	not	available	to	the	smaller	businesses;	many	of	the	recognition	
and	measurement	principles	are	simplified;	there	are	substantially	fewer	dis-
closures	required;	and	redrafting	duties	are	reduced.		
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measures	 that	 involve	 the	 debtor,	 the	 creditors	 and	 the	 institu-
tional	 framework	generally.	 Furthermore,	 the	measures	may	not	
only	 stem	 from	 the	 insolvency	or	pre-insolvency	 framework,	but	
also	involve	a	number	of	general	corporate	and	commercial	 laws	
and	the	institutions	in	charge	of	implementing	them.	
In	 particular,	 the	 information-enhancing	 system	 needs	 to	 be	
cheap,	 efficient	 and	 have	 the	 capacity	 of	 offering	 bespoke	 solu-
tions	 to	different	businesses,	depending	on	 size	and	 the	 level	of	
complexity.	The	following	are	possible	solutions	to	be	considered	
in	this	respect:	
• The	use	of	templates	and	other	mechanisms	of	simpli-
fication.	 These	 templates	 could	 be	 prepared	 by	 the	
agency	 in	 charge	of	 the	 implementation	of	 the	 insol-
vency	 system,	 but	 it	 would	 be	 more	 efficient	 if	 the	
pre-defined	 information	models	 are	prepared	 for	 the	
general	 accounting	 requirements	 of	 businesses,	 not	
just	 for	 the	 preparation	 of	 an	 insolvency	 petition.	
Templates	should	be	free	of	cost	and	be	openly	avail-
able—downloadable—	from	the	relevant	website.	The	
business/companies	 registrar	 is	 a	 clear	 candidate	 for	
the	 provision	 of	 the	 templates.	 Digitalization	 and	 on	
line	solutions,	even	for	delivery	of	the	accounts,	would	
also	 reduce	 costs	 and	 increase	 the	 flow	 of	 infor-
mation.148	While	implementation	may	pose	difficulties	
in	the	short/mid-term	for	most	developing	nations,	 it	
is	also	true	that	assistance	from	donors	in	this	regard	
is	easier	to	channel	and	implement.	In	order	to	bridge	
the	gap	between	on-line	technology	and	the	reality	of	
certain	 jurisdictions,	specialized	agencies/government	
bodies	could	provide	physical	copies	of	the	templates	
																																																						
148	A	number	of	associations	of	the	banking	and	financial	services	industry	of	
the	UK	have	developed	an	interesting	model	called	the	Common	Financial	
Statement	(CFA),	which	provides	standardised,	simplified	accounting	and	budg-
eting	models.	The	organization	collects	information	about	spending	patterns	
and	average	living	expenditures	that	help	debtors	plan	and	creditors	assess	and	
negotiate.	The	CFS	has	two	parts.	The	first	part	is	a	detailed	budget	sheet	that	
includes	details	of	a	client’s	income,	assets,	spending	and	debts;	and	the	se-
cond	part	is	a	summary	financial	statement	containing	a	condensed	overview	
of	the	client’s	financial	situation.	This	system	is	actually	aimed	at	advice	agen-
cies,	debt	management	companies,	creditors	and	debt	collection	agencies.	
Although	it	is	conceived	for	household	and	consumer	activity,	the	model	could	
be	emulated	to	cover	the	ordinary	activities	of	the	smaller	businesses	in	the	
market.	It	includes	also	codes	of	good	practice	that	affect	creditors.	For	more	
information:	http://www.cfs.moneyadvicetrust.org.		
	 	 July	8	2016	version	
92	
and	assist	 in	their	compilation.	The	utilization	of	tem-
plates	could	also	be	enhanced	by	creating	the	duty	to	
inform	of	their	existence	and	the	need	to	utilize	them	
at	the	time	of	granting	the	credit	by	banks	and	finan-
cial	institutions,	or	at	the	starting	up	stage	of	the	busi-
ness	(business	register).		
• Legal	 requirements	 of	 financial	 information	 may	 be	
subdivided	 into	more	 groups	 of	 businesses	 based	 on	
their	 size	 and	 complexity.	 Instead	 of	 having	 just	 two	
types	of	legal	requirements,	as	is	the	case	in	many	ju-
risdictions:	general	and	abbreviated	financial	account-
ing	 duties	 depending	 on	 size,	 having	 more	 divisions	
would	 allow	 for	 a	 more	 bespoke	 solution	 and	 may	
help	 maximize	 the	 equation	 referred	 to	 above.	 This	
granulation	would	 be	 especially	 relevant	 for	MSMEs,	
the	smallest	part	of	the	business	spectrum.	Legal	obli-
gations	 and	 templates	 would	 be	 designed	 for	 these	
businesses.	 In	 order	 to	 mirror	 banking	 practice	 with	
non-performing	loans,	segmentation	of	debtors	would	
also	 favour	 restructuring	 options	 and	 bespoke	 solu-
tions.		
• In	any	case,	the	main	elements	of	financial	accounting	
of	 MSMEs	 should	 be	 public	 and	 openly	 accessible.	
Most	commonly,	business/company	registries	are	the	
places	tasked	with	this	duty.	At	least	yearly,	a	full	bal-
ance	sheet	and	the	year´s	financial	results	ought	to	be	
made	public,	having	been	previously	deposited	in	the	
registry	or	any	other	public	agency	entrusted	with	the	
task.	 Non-compliance	 with	 this	 duty	 ought	 to	 bring	
about	 sanctions	 and	 other	 consequences	 in	 case	 of	
business	failure,	as	discussed	below.	
v) The	involvement	of	third	
parties	in	information	
gathering	
The	 existence	 of	 sufficient	 and	 adequate	 financial	 information	
should	not	only	lay	on	the	shoulders	of	debtors.	The	active	partic-
ipation	of	other	stakeholders,	directly	 involved	with	the	business	
life	of	debtors,	 is	paramount	 in	 this	 regard.	 Information	on	trou-
bled	businesses	needs	 to	 flow	 from	the	places	where	 it	will	nor-
mally	exist:		
• Financial	institutions:	Banks	and	other	lending	institu-
tions	are	responsible	for	the	 inception	of	a	good	por-
tion	of	MSME	credit.	When	the	debtor	approaches	its	
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bank/financial	 institution,	 the	 risk	 assessment	 should	
be	based	on	the	provision	of	sufficient	information	by	
the	 debtor.	 Further,	 financial	 institutions	 have	 the	
ability	to	contractually	 impose	reinforced	 information	
duties	on	debtors	during	the	life	of	the	loan/financing	
instrument.	They	can	also	track	performance	and	low-
er	 debtor	 moral	 hazard	 using	 financing	 instruments	
that	 are	 periodically	 renewed	 against	 good	 business	
behaviour,	 or	 by	 the	 use	 of	 banks’	 current	 accounts	
and	 other	 financial	 products	 that	 allow	 for	 the	 daily	
monitoring	 of	 financial	 positions.	 The	 inclusion	 of	
“early	warning”	signs	 in	their	tracking	of	the	debtor´s	
performance	 constitutes	 a	 very	 useful	 tool	 to	 avoid	
value	destruction	and	late	insolvency	filings.	Their	risk	
management	 practices	 could,	 therefore,	 if	 properly	
designed	and	 implemented,	 contribute	 greatly	 to	en-
hancing	 the	 financial	 information	 of	 the	 debtor.	
Hence,	 banking	 supervisors	 have	 the	 key	 to	 contrib-
uting	to	the	market	system	by	ensuring	adequate	risk	
management	 and	monitoring	 practices.	 Often	 banks,	
especially	in	the	MSME	and	retail	sectors,	have	granu-
lar	 information	 about	 the	 debtor´s	 assets	 and	 addi-
tional	liabilities.	However,	this	information	is	privately	
kept	and	there	are	often	no	mechanisms	envisaged	for	
sharing	it	with	the	appropriate	insolvency	institutions.	
Further,	bank	secrecy	is	often	used	to	deny	collabora-
tion	with	 insolvency	 representatives,	 public	 agencies,	
other	 creditors	or	 even	 insolvency	 courts.	 The	estab-
lishment	of	appropriate	exceptions	to	bank	secrecy	in	
certain	 cases	and	under	adequate	controls	 should	be	
explored.		
• Financial	 information	 systems:149	Credit	 history	 con-
tained	 in	 credit	 information	 systems	 is	 not	 only	 im-
portant	 for	 the	 moment	 of	 credit	 origination.	 It	 can	
constitute	a	key	informational	tool	when	the	business	
reaches	 a	 state	 of	 distress,	 either	 to	 allow	 for	 its	 re-
structuring	 or	 for	 the	 retroactive	 assessment	 of	mal-
																																																						
149	See	the	World	Bank´s	General	Principles	for	Credit	Reporting	(2011)	and,	
especially,	the	more	recent	and	SME	referenced	Facilitating	SME	financing	
through	improved	credit	reporting,	available	at	
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTFINANCIALSECTOR/Resources/282884-
1395933501015/Facilitating_SME_financing_through_CR_public_comments_w
eb.pdf.		
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practices.	 A	 comprehensive	 credit	 report	 would	 in-
clude	 trading	 references,	 public	 record	 filings	 (court	
actions,	suits,	etc.),	banking	and	other	financing	refer-
ences,	or	significant	elements	that	may	have	impacted	
the	performance	of	the	business.	 It	 is	not	uncommon	
that	 the	 information	 recorded	 in	 credit	 information	
systems	 is	 kept	 within	 the	 circle	 of	 financial	 institu-
tions.	 The	 information,	 or	 some	 of	 it,	 could	 benefit	
other	 credit	 providers,	 including	 suppliers	 and	 other	
operational	 creditors.	 These	 information	 registers	
should	include	information	on	utilities	and	other	liabil-
ities	different	from	financial	liabilities.	As	a	result,	the	
amount	of	information	in	the	system	would	be	greatly	
enhanced.		
• Tax	authorities:	Tax	agencies	often	have	substantial	in-
formation	 about	 the	 debtor´s	 business.	 Goods	 and	
services	 and	 value-added	 taxes	 and	 corporate	 taxes	
should	 provide	 indications	 and	 warning	 signs	 of	 the	
state	 of	 a	 debtor´s	 business.	 Even	 the	 lack	 of	 infor-
mation	 (i.e.,	 delays	 in	 filing	 tax	 returns)	 is,	 in	 itself,	 a	
very	useful	warning	sign	of	trouble.	In	some	countries,	
yearly	declaration	of	 the	value	of	certain	assets	 is	 re-
quired,	and	even,	from	time	to	time,	a	mandatory	uni-
versal	declaration	of	goods.	The	existence	of	investiga-
tion	 concerning	 misbehaviour	 (untaxed	 services	 ren-
dered,	untaxed	payments,	etc.)	 is	 also	 relevant	 infor-
mation	 for	 the	 insolvency	 of	 the	 debtor	 and	 the	 as-
sessment	of	 the	behaviour	of	 its	directors	or	control-
ling	shareholders.		
• Other	 government	 entities:	 In	 those	 countries	where	
there	 is	 a	 public	 system	 of	 social	 security,	 all	 infor-
mation	 concerning	 compliance	with	 the	 debtor´s	 du-
ties	 in	 this	 regard	 can	 be	 substantial.	 It	 should	 also	
serve	 as	 an	 early	 warning	 sign	 of	 business	 trouble.	
Other	 entities	 that	 hold	 relevant	 information	 are	
those	 public	 registries	 where	 security	 rights	 over	 as-
sets	of	the	debtor	are	registered.		
• Financial	 and	 governance	 education:	 Finally,	 govern-
ment	agencies	can	play	a	key	role	by	ensuring	there	is	
a	 proper	 system	 of	 financial	 education	 to	 the	MSME	
sector,	 including	 training	 of	 entrepreneurs	 and	 com-
pany	directors	on	good	corporate	governance,	briefing	
on	financial	accounting	duties	and	where	and	how	to	
obtain	 valuable	 resources,	 awareness	 creation	 cam-
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paigns,	 etc.	 This	 type	 of	 action	 and	 campaigns	 could	
be	also	run	by	chambers	of	commerce	and	other	col-
lective	organizations	in	the	private	sector.		
Thus,	even	 in	the	most	extreme	cases	where	 it	seems	that	no	fi-
nancial	information	exists	for	the	relevant	MSME,	it	is	likely	that,	
through	 the	 channels	 described	 above,	 some	 important	 infor-
mation	can	actually	be	obtained.	The	main	problem	is	locating	the	
information,	collating	it	and	centralizing	it	in	the	right	institution.	
There	 is	 a	 need	 to	 devise	 a	 system	 that	 allows	 for	 the	 relevant	
information	 to	 flow	 and	 be	 shared.	 Mechanisms	 should	 be	 de-
signed	 to	 ensure	 that	 information	 from	public	 agencies	 (e.g.	 tax	
authorities),	 registries,	 credit	 information	 systems	and	 the	bank-
ing	sector	are	made	available	to	the	insolvency	court	in	insolvency	
cases,	or	even,	under	adequate	control,	 to	 the	parties	 in	out-of-
court	 solutions.	 These	 mechanisms	 will	 require,	 among	 other	
changes,	the	inclusion	of	exceptions	to	bank	secrecy	and	personal	
data	sharing	rules.		
Adequate	 financial	 information	ought	to	be	available	throughout	
the	business	life	of	the	debtor.	The	inclusion	of	strict	information	
requirements	 to	 access	 insolvency	 or	 hybrid	 pre-insolvency	 pro-
ceedings	may	have	counterproductive	effects.	If	a	debtor	has	not	
been	producing	 the	 financial	 accounts	on	a	 regular	basis,	having	
to	reconstruct	his/her	accounting	profile	dating	years	back	might	
constitute	an	obstacle	that	could	have	the	perverse	effect	of	de-
laying	the	opening	of	insolvency	proceedings	and	the	destruction	
of	 the	 business	 as	 a	 consequence.	 Further,	 during	 formal	 bank-
ruptcy	 proceedings,	 the	 debtor´s	 effort	 to	 produce	 adequate	 fi-
nancial	information	could	arguably	be	less	necessary,	where	there	
is	 an	 insolvency	 representative	whose	 task	 is,	 precisely,	 to	work	
on	the	debtor´s	 inventory,	creditors	and	business	history.	Conse-
quently,	the	legislator	must	be	aware	of	the	need	to	amend	com-
pany	and	business	laws	to	ensure	adequate	financial	 information	
as	 an	 ordinary	 requirement	 of	 business	 activity,	 rather	 than	 re-
solving	such	issues	through	insolvency	law.	
3. Sanctions	for	misconduct	during	the	insolvency	
process	
The	 risk	 that	 debtors	 will	 exploit	 the	MSME	 framework	 and	 act	
self-servingly,	 recklessly	 or	 with	 insufficient	 skill	 should	 be	 ad-
dressed	 primarily	 through	 the	 proper	 design	 of	 the	 procedural	
framework.	As	discussed	above,	the	regime	should	prescribe	strict	
timeframes,	duties	 to	cooperate	and	 to	provide	 information	and	
opportunities	 for	 creditors	 to	object	 to	 the	process	proposed	by	
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the	debtor	or	to	the	manner	in	which	the	process	is	administered.	
Through	the	enforcement	of	deadlines	and	other	conditions,	and	
through	 creditor	monitoring,	 the	debtor	will	 not	be	 able	 to	pro-
long	 the	 procedures	 and	 creditors	will	 be	 able	 to	 address	 prob-
lems	of	mismanagement.	
Yet,	 the	 system	 should	 also	 include	 sanctions	 that	 may	 be	 im-
posed	on	the	debtor	in	order	to	ensure	compliance	with	the	pre-
scribed	duties,	 to	address	 instances	of	misuse	of	 the	framework,	
deter	certain	type	of	misconduct	and	protect	the	public	from	re-
peat	abuse.150	Sanctions	may	be	 imposed	on	the	 individuals	con-
trolling	 an	 incorporated	MSME,	 including	 directors	 and	manage-
ment.	In	cases	of	unincorporated	MSMEs	(i.e.	MSMEs	not	operat-
ing	through	a	 legal	entity),	sanctions	will	be	imposed	on	the	sole	
trader	or	partners	in	a	partnership.151	
Sanctions	should	not	be	overly	draconian,	though,	and	should	be	
well-tailored	to	the	type	of	misconduct	and	circumstances	of	the	
case,	to	ensure	that	the	sanctions	can	achieve	their	aims	and	that	
they	do	not	prevent	asset	maximization.	For	example,	a	failure	of	
the	debtor	 to	deliver	on	projections	concerning	a	 rescue	plan	or	
his/her	lack	of	cooperation	during	the	process	may	result	 in	con-
version	 to	 liquidation.	 Yet,	 in	 relevant	 circumstances,	 creditors	
may	prefer	to	proceed	with	a	reorganization	to	extract	more	value	
from	 the	business,	notwithstanding	 the	breach	of	debtor	duties,	
though	creditors	may	require	that	the	process	is	administered	by	
a	professional	and	that	the	debtor	is	displaced.152		
In	cases	of	misconduct	and	abuse	of	the	system,	additional	sanc-
tions	may	be	imposed	in	the	form	of	restrictions,	personal	liabili-
ties	or	even	criminal	sanctions.	In	particular,	forging	and	conceal-
ing	information	should	be	punished	with	severity,	given	the	diffi-
culties	to	access	reliable	information.		
As	 a	 general	 rule,	 though,	 the	 system	 should	 strive	 to	provide	a	
“fresh	 start”	 to	 insolvent	debtors.	 The	 focus	of	 the	MSME	 insol-
vency	 regime	should	be	on	debtor	 rehabilitation,	 rather	 than	on	
																																																						
150	The	inclusion	of	sanctions	for	breach	of	debtors’	obligations	is	consistent	
with	the	general	insolvency	standard	that	recommends	that:	“the	insolvency	
law	should	permit	the	imposition	of	sanctions	for	the	debtor’s	failure	to	comply	
with	its	obligations	under	the	insolvency	law.”	see	Legislative	Guide,	supra,	
note	69	Part	two	(III,	A.,	para.	33).	
151	Ibid.	
152	Ibid,	Part	two	(VI,	A.,	para.	1).	
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punishment	for	failure.153	The	regime	should	encourage	entrepre-
neurial	 activity	 and	 risk-taking	 and	 combat	 the	 negative	 stigma	
associated	with	 bankruptcy.	At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 sanctions	 in-
cluded	in	the	regime	should	be	imposed	in	a	robust	manner	in	the	
appropriate	circumstances,	and	should	not	be	mere	“dead	letters”	
in	 the	 law.	The	court	 should	be	able	 to	compel	debtors	 to	meet	
their	 obligations	 and	 effectively	 address	 circumstances	 of	 irre-
sponsible,	reckless	or	dishonest	behaviour.		
As	noted	previously,	one	of	the	key	incentives	of	the	MSME	pro-
cedural	framework	as	it	applies	to	individuals	is	the	provision	of	a	
discharge.	Yet,	the	availability	of	the	discharge	should	be	restrict-
ed	in	circumstances	of	misconduct,154	as	also	contemplated	in	the	
insolvency	 standard.155	Thus,	 the	 discharge	 may	 be	 refused	 or	
suspended	 in	 circumstances	 of	 breach	 of	 accounting	 duties.156	
Furthermore,	certain	categories	of	debts	may	not	be	released	on	
discharge,	 including	debts	 incurred	by	 fraud.157	However,	exclud-
ed	debts	should	be	kept	to	the	minimum.158		
																																																						
153	Ibid,	Part	two	(III,	A.,	para.	32).	See	also	EU	Commission	Recommendation	
on	a	new	approach	to	business	failure	and	insolvency,	Brussels,	12.3.2014	[“EU	
Recommendation”]	(one	of	the	key	objectives	of	the	recommendation	is	to	give	
honest	bankrupt	entrepreneurs	a	second	chance	across	the	Union);	The	World	
Bank	Natural	Persons	Report,	at.	25-40	(delineating	the	host	of	benefits	to	
debtors	and	to	society	from	providing	relief	to	honest	but	unfortunate	debt-
ors).	
154	Supra	note	105,	notes	that	all	laws	that	provide	for	a	discharge,	restrict	its	
availability	in	various	circumstances	of	misconduct	(see	Part	two,	IV.A,	para.	6).	
155	Ibid,	recommendation	194.	
156	In	this	regard,	legal	regimes	may	consider	different	policy	options,	depend-
ing	on	the	extent	to	which	good	accounting	practices	have	become	the	norm	in	
the	system.	Thus,	for	example,	where	an	entrepreneur	sought	a	discharge	for	
the	first	time	with	inadequate	or	no	accounts,	the	system	may	allow	granting	
the	discharge	if	there	were	no	allegations	of	fraud	or	bad	faith	and	subject	to	
the	condition	that	a	second	discharge	would	be	suspended	or	refused	where	
the	accounts	were	non-existent	or	clearly	inadequate,	even	in	the	absence	of	
fraud	or	bad	faith.	In	this	way,	the	MSME	insolvency	regime	can	incentivize	
good	behaviour	and	educate	entrepreneurs,	albeit	on	the	basis	of	threatened	
sanctions.	At	the	same	time,	such	an	approach	can	avoid	a	blanket	sanction	
that	might	result,	at	least	in	certain	systems,	in	denying	discharges	to	most	
debtors.		
157	See	the	Legislative	Guide,	supra,	note	69	Part	two,	IV,	A.	para.	7	listing:	
debts	arising	from	tort	claims;	maintenance	agreements;	fraud;	penalties	and	
taxes.	The	EU	Recommendation	provides	that	Member	States	may	exclude	
specific	categories	of	debt,	such	as	those	rising	out	of	tortious	liability,	from	the	
rule	of	full	discharge	(EU	Recommendation,	para.	33).	
158	Ibid,	Part	two,	IV,	A.	para.	7.	
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Where	the	debtor	does	not	comply	with	the	requirements	of	the	
MSME	framework	and	breaches	his/her	duties	during	the	process,	
the	discharge	may	be	suspended	and	the	debtor	may	remain	un-
discharged	for	a	longer	period	of	time.	Such	sanction	may	be	ap-
propriate	 in	 circumstances	 where	 debtor	 conduct	 adversely	 af-
fects	the	proceedings	(e.g.	where	the	debtor	fails	to	deliver	prop-
erty	 or	 to	 provide	 information)	 and	 the	 discharge	 may	 be	 sus-
pended	 for	 an	 undefined	 period	 until	 the	 debtor	 fulfils	 certain	
conditions	 (but	 not	 indefinitely).159	Regard	 may	 be	 given	 to	 cir-
cumstances	where	it	is	clear	that	the	debtor	is	not	in	a	position	to	
provide	 the	 information	or	property,	or	where	 it	 is	not	cost	effi-
cient	to	further	delay	the	discharge.160	
Further	 restrictions	 may	 be	 imposed	 on	 the	 debtor	 during	 the	
process,	 as	 well	 as	 post-discharge,	 for	 a	 certain	 period	 of	 time,	
where	 the	 debtor	 acted	 dishonestly	 or	 is	 blameworthy	 in	 some	
other	way.161		
Restrictions	may	include:162	
Restrictions	on	obtaining	new	credit:	 The	debtor	may	not	
obtain	 credit	 of	more	 than	 a	 prescribed	 amount	without	
disclosing	his/her	status	as	a	person	subject	to	bankruptcy	
restrictions	to	the	credit	provider,	or	without	obtaining	the	
																																																						
159	The	EU	Recommendation,	supra,	note	85,	states	that:	“a	full	discharge	after	
a	short	period	of	time	is	not	appropriate	in	all	circumstances	and	that	Member	
States	should	be	able	to	maintain	or	introduce	more	stringent	provisions	which	
are	necessary	to:	(a)	discourage	entrepreneurs	who	have	acted	dishonestly	or	
in	bad	faith,	either	before	or	after	the	bankruptcy	proceedings	were	opened;	
(b)	discourage	entrepreneurs	who	do	not	adhere	to	a	repayment	plan	or	to	any	
other	legal	obligation	aimed	at	safeguarding	the	interests	of	creditors;	or	(c)	
safeguard	the	livelihood	of	the	entrepreneur	and	his	family	by	allowing	the	
entrepreneur	to	keep	certain	assets.”	(EU	Recommendation,	para.	32).	
160	See	also	the	World	Bank	Natural	Persons	Report	that	notes	that:	“[A]n	over-
arching	goal	of	any	insolvency	system	is	striking	a	careful	balance	between	two	
competing	considerations:	first,	demanding	much	of	those	who	incur	obliga-
tions;	but	second,	not	demanding	more	than	can	be	reasonably	borne	by	the	
victims	of	economic	volatility	and	other	common	dangers	of	life.”	(para.	115).	
161	For	example,	in	England	and	Wales,	a	bankruptcy	restrictions	order	(BRO)	
may	be	imposed	on	debtors	for	a	period	of	2-15	years	after	the	order	is	made.	
Alternatively,	the	debtor	may	be	subject	to	a	bankruptcy	restrictions	undertak-
ing	(BRU)	where	he/she	agrees	to	be	subject	to	certain	restrictions	until	a	speci-
fied	date.	
162	The	restrictions	may	be	wide	ranging	and	may	also	include	restrictions	on	
leaving	the	country,	practice	the	debtor’	profession	for	a	period	of	time	etc.	
There	may	also	be	a	limitation	on	the	number	of	times	a	debtor	can	be	dis-
charged	(see	also	Legislative	Guide,	supra,	note	69,	Part	two,	IV,	A.	para.	8).	
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approval	 of	 the	 court	 or	 of	 another	 relevant	 agency	 or	
quasi-judicial	authority.163		
Restrictions	 on	 taking	 part	 in	 company	 management:	
Debtors	 (individual	 sole	 traders	 or	 managers	 of	 incorpo-
rated	MSMEs)	may	be	 restricted	or	disqualified	 from	act-
ing	as	directors	of	companies	or	 from	taking	part	 in	com-
pany	 promotion,	 formation	 or	 management,	 for	 a	 speci-
fied	period	of	time.164	As	noted	in	the	insolvency	standard,	
it	is	desirable	that	such	a	restriction	is	not	too	broad,	pro-
hibiting	the	debtor	generally	from	engaging	in	business	ac-
tivity,	so	that	it	does	not	defeat	the	concept	of	providing	a	
fresh	start.165	
Information	 in	 credit	 history	 records:	 Information	 about	
the	debtor	insolvency	may	be	kept	for	a	specified	period	of	
time	 in	 the	 records	 at	 credit	 history	 bureaus.	 Credit	 bu-
reaus	can	also	have	a	major	impact	on	the	debtor’s	ability	
to	 start	 afresh,	 and	 therefore,	 the	 restriction	 should	 be	
imposed	carefully,	in	circumstances	of	misconduct.		
The	system	should	further	include,	either	within	the	MSME	insol-
vency	 legislation	 or	 in	 criminal	 legislation,	 criminal	 sanctions	 for	
insolvency	offences	for	which	the	punishment	may	be	a	fine,	or	in	
some	 instances,	 imprisonment	 for	 up	 to	 a	 certain	 number	 of	
years.	Such	sanctions	may	be	imposed	in	circumstances	of	serious	
offences	such	as	falsification	of	documents	in	a	material	manner,	
serious	 contraventions	 of	 bankruptcy	 restrictions	 and	 conceal-
ment	of	property.166	It	is	important	that	such	offences	are	drafted	
																																																						
163	Under	the	bankruptcy	regime	applicable	in	England	and	Wales,	debtors	may	
be	required	to	disclose	the	fact	that	they	are	subject	to	bankruptcy	restrictions	
when	attempting	to	borrow	£500	or	more.	
164	See	e.g.,	the	UK	company	directors’	disqualification	regime.	Under	this	re-
gime,	disqualifications	of	between	two	and	15	years	may	be	ordered	where	the	
individual	is	found	to	be	“unfit”	to	act	as	a	director	(including	because	of	
breach	of	a	fiduciary	duty,	misapplication	of	moneys,	making	misleading	finan-
cial	and	non-financial	statements	or	failure	to	keep	proper	accounts).	See	also	
the	Legislative	Guide,	supra,	note	69,	Part	IV,	paras.	34-35.		
165	Ibid,	Part	two,	VI.A,	para.	10.	
166	Under	the	regime	of	England	and	Wales,	any	person	guilty	of	a	bankruptcy	
offence	is	liable	to	imprisonment,	a	fine	or	both.	A	sentence	of	up	to	seven	
years	can	be	made	in	some	instances.	
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with	 precision	 and	 specificity	 and	 are	 limited	 to	 severe	miscon-
duct.167	
The	 court	 should	 also	 have	 the	 power	 to	 address	 reckless	 and	
fraudulent	behaviour	of	the	debtor	at	the	time	approaching	insol-
vency,168	and	 to	 undo	 transactions	 entered	 into	 by	 the	 MSME	
with	a	view	to	dissipating	or	reducing	the	value	of	its	assets	in	the	
period	 before	 insolvency.169	Insolvency	 law	 could	 include	 a	 pre-
sumption	of	misconduct	 or	 a	 presumption	 that	 the	 debtor´s	 be-
haviour	has	contributed	to	the	aggravation	of	insolvency	in	cases	
where	 the	 accounting	duties	were	not	 complied	with.	Note	 that	
this	rule	would	not	affect	all	cases	of	insolvency,	but	only	those	in	
which	the	debtor’s	behaviour	is	to	be	analyzed	with	a	view	to	es-
tablishing	liability	or	disqualification	in	accordance	with	a	jurisdic-
tion’s	legislation	or	regulation	concerning	directors	and/or	share-
holders.	Consequently,	this	rule	would	not	discourage	a	filing	for	
insolvency	in	those	cases	where	there	has	not	been	misbehaviour,	
and,	at	the	same	time,	it	constitutes	a	powerful	ex	ante	incentive	
for	 company	 directors	 to	 comply	 with	 their	 accounting	 obliga-
tions.		
4. Education	and	advice	to	debtors	
Entrepreneurs	 are	 typically	 people	 with	 a	 certain	 mindset	 and	
spirit.	 They	 do	 not	 always,	 however,	 possess	 the	 education	 and	
skills	 to	monitor	 the	 financial	 situation	 of	 their	 business	 and	 to	
react	 accordingly.	 With	 regard	 to	 the	 MSME	 framework,	 they	
would	usually	not	be	 capable	of	designing	a	proper	 rescue	plan.	
They	might	not	even	be	aware	that	there	is	a	chance	to	turn	their	
business	around	by	using	mechanisms	under	insolvency	law.	In	all	
these	 areas,	 education	 is	 a	 useful,	 although	 certainly	 not	 exclu-
sive,	remedy.	Specific	knowledge	in	 insolvency	 law	or	accounting	
cannot	be	 taught	 to	every	small	entrepreneur.	 Instead,	a	combi-
nation	 of	 affordable	 educational	 counselling	 and	 legal	 advice	
should	be	established.		
																																																						
167	Forging/concealing	information	should	be	punished	with	severity.	Many	
jurisdictions	have	rules	that	punish	misbehaviour,	but	they	are	often	not	en-
forced.	Enforcement	should	be	encouraged	if	the	system	is	to	work	effectively.	
The	duty	to	ensure	enforcement	could	be	assigned	to	the	insolvency	repre-
sentative	or,	in	some	cases	–those	involving	criminal	liability-	to	the	public	
prosecutor	(notified	of	the	case	by	the	insolvency	representative,	the	insolven-
cy	judge	or	the	insolvency	agency,	as	the	case	may	be).		
168	See	Part	VI.A.1.	
169	See	Legislative	Guide,	supra	note	69,	Part	two	(II.F).	
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On	the	educational	side,	every	entrepreneur	must	be	made	aware	
of	 the	mechanisms	available	to	rescue	a	viable	business	 in	times	
of	crises.	Here,	 local	business	clubs	or	boards	appear	well-suited	
to	spread	the	news	by	organizing	presentations,	or	disseminating	
emails	and	brochures.	TV	ads	and	shows	have	proven	to	be	quite	
effective	 in	 presenting	 ways	 to	 rescue	 a	 troubled	 business	 to	 a	
broad	audience	as	well,	at	 least	 in	Germany.	In	those	developing	
nations	where	cell	phone	penetration	is	quite	broad,	using	social	
media	or	text	campaigns	through	the	cell	phone	service	provider	
might	be	useful.		
Company	law	could	be	drafted	to	include	minimum	requirements	
for	 director	 qualification	with	 regards	 to	 basic	 knowledge	 in	 ac-
counting,	 risk	 management	 and	 rescue	 options.	 For	 sole	 entre-
preneurs,	proper	 financial	and	 legal	education	could	be	 incentiv-
ized	by	tax	deductibility	of	educational	efforts.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 the	 educational	 framework	 should	 encourage	
any	entrepreneur	to	seek	expert	advice	in	times	of	trouble	or	cri-
sis.	Such	advice	must	be	easily	accessible	and	affordable	to	a	small	
business	owner	(free	if	possible).	Private	business	clubs	or	public	
agencies	could	provide	for	experts	or,	at	least,	establish	a	connec-
tion	to	possible	experts.	They	should	also	disseminate	brochures	
and	online	 information	about	available	options	under	the	frame-
work’s	Modular	Approach.170		
B. CREDITORS	AND	MSME	FINANCIAL	DISTRESS	
The	Modular	Approach	and	its	supplementary	governance	regime	
puts	great	focus	on	the	position	of	the	debtor.	Indeed,	the	success	
of	the	MSME	insolvency	system	is	 largely	based	on	 its	early,	vol-
untary	use	by	the	debtors	themselves.	However,	both	the	 incep-
tion	and	the	ensuing	solution	for	the	business	in	distress	might	be	
heavily	 influenced	 by	 the	 behaviour	 of	 creditors,	with	 particular	
regard	 to	 financial	 creditors,	 which,	 in	 most	 cases	 of	 MSME	 fi-
nancing,	will	be	only	one	or	 two	 institutions.171	The	Modular	Ap-
																																																						
170	See	e.g.	Germany	where	several	local	Chambers	of	Commerce	and	Cham-
bers	of	Crafts	provide	online	information	and	individual	consultations	about	
how	to	handle	the	insolvency	of	a	business.	There	is	mixed	evidence	about	the	
efficacy	of	adult	financial	literacy	education;	see	e.g.	J.M.	Collins,	C.M.	
O’Rourke,	“Financial	education	and	counseling—Still	holding	promise”	(2010)	
Journal	of	Consumer	Affairs	1;44(3):483-98;	and	A.	Lusardi	and	O.S.	Mitchell,	
“The	economic	importance	of	financial	literacy:	Theory	and	evidence”	(2014)	
Journal	of	Economic	Literature	Mar	1;52(1):5-44.		
171	Unlike	medium-sized	businesses,	some	of	which	may	feel	attracted	by	the	
prospect	of	seeking	competing	forms	of	financing	from	a	plurality	of	banks,	
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proach	takes	account	of	and	aims	to	protect	the	interests	of	credi-
tors	 through	 the	 design	 of	 its	 options.172	Yet,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	
operation	 of	 the	modular	 framework,	 consideration	 should	 also	
be	given	to	creditor	behaviour	and	the	influence	of	their	practices	
on	the	ability	of	the	MSME	system	to	function	properly.	
Experience	 in	 recent	 crises	 shows	 that	 creditors,	 particularly	 fi-
nancial	 creditors,	 do	 not	 always	 observe	 good	 risk	management	
practices	when	granting	credit.	Reckless	lending,	at	one	extreme,	
or	overcollateralization,	at	the	other,	have	contributed	significant-
ly	to	the	amplification	of	the	crisis	of	the	non-financial	economy,	
with	severe	social	consequences.		
In	addition,	the	behaviour	of	financial	institutions	ex	post,	namely	
when	the	debtor	is	already	financially	distressed,	requires	specific	
attention.	Often,	banks	 show	 little	 interest	 in	getting	 involved	 in	
the	rescue	of	a	 failing	business.	 Indeed,	creditor	passivity	consti-
tutes	one	of	 the	main	problems	of	any	 system	to	 tackle	 the	dis-
tress	of	MSMEs.	One	strategy	to	address	this	apathy,	discussed	in	
part	3	below,	is	to	devise	new	tax	incentives.		
Third,	and	also	affecting	creditors,	albeit	from	a	different	perspec-
tive,	 it	 is	often	the	case	that	MSMEs	find	 it	extremely	difficult	to	
obtain	financing	when	they	are	in	a	situation	of	financial	distress,	
be	it	outside	or	inside	formal	insolvency	proceedings.	Without	the	
support	of	creditors,	viable	businesses	are	not	able	to	survive	and	
value	is	unnecessarily	lost	for	the	economy.	
These	 problems	 of	 creditor	 lending	 practices,	 creditor	 passivity,	
tax	 disincentives	 and	 creditor	 financing	 are	 considered	 below,	
noting	the	specific	problems	arising	in	this	respect	for	MSMEs	and	
considering	ways	to	address	these	issues	with	a	view	of	enhancing	
the	effectiveness	of	the	MSME	insolvency	regime.	
																																																																																																																									
virtually	all	micro	and	small	businesses	will	work	with	one	bank	only.	Further-
more,	even	in	those	rare	cases	where	a	business	belonging	to	the	MSME	field	is	
a	non-sporadic	customer	of	several	banks,	there	will	still	be	a	privileged	rela-
tionship	with	one	of	them,	called	to	play	a	leading	role	vis-a-vis	the	others:	it	
may	thus	be	safely	stated	that	most	MSMEs	fall	either	within	the	scope	of	the	
one-bank	relationship	model	or	within	the	scope	of	the	leading-bank	relation-
ship	model.	Hence,	the	sole	bank	or	the	leading	bank,	together	with	the	debtor,	
are,	in	the	field	of	MSMEs,	optimal	addressees	of	the	law	reform	suggestions	
that	are	considered	by	this	paper	to	have,	if	implemented,	the	best	chances	to	
minimize	the	negative	social	impact	of	MSME	insolvencies.	
172	See	Part	V,	on	the	procedural	framework	and	the	governance	regime.	
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1. Creditor	lending	practices		
In	 a	 standard	 case,	 a	MSME	will	 have	 commercial	 creditors,	 “le-
gal”	creditors	(i.e.,	those	creditors	whose	claims	arise	as	a	conse-
quence	of	the	law	such	as	tax	authorities	and	social	security	obli-
gations)	 and	 one—sometimes	 more—financial	 creditors.	 Com-
mercial	 creditors	 provide	 credit	 to	 MSMEs	 by	 supplying	 goods	
that	will	be	repaid	within	a	relative	short	period	of	time.	The	es-
sence	 of	 commercial	 credit	 is	 that	 it	 should	 be	 repaid	 with	 the	
revenues	generated	by	the	operation	of	the	business,	so	that	the	
existence	of	this	type	of	credit	should	be	a	sign	of	the	viability	of	
the	business.	At	the	same	time,	keeping	this	line	of	credit	open	is	
a	 precondition	 of	 the	 rescue	 of	 viable	 businesses.	 Because	 this	
credit	 is	normally	unsecured	(or	secured	with	collateral	 linked	to	
the	operation	of	the	business),	it	is	directly	linked	with	trust	in	the	
continuation	of	the	activity,	and,	therefore,	based	on	reputation.	
Few	or	no	 recommendations	 in	 this	 report	 relate	 to	 commercial	
creditors.	They	should	be	allowed	to	operate	under	the	ordinary	
rules	of	the	market	and	manage	their	risk	as	they	see	fit.	It	would	
not	make	 sense	 for	 a	 legislator	 to	 impose	 certain	behaviours	on	
commercial	 creditors,	 whose	 very	 existence	may	 often	 be	 jeop-
ardized	by	the	financial	distress	of	one	of	their	debtors.		
The	situation	is	different	with	respect	to	financial	creditors.	Their	
size,	their	degree	of	sophistication,	their	type	of	activity,	and	their	
often	privileged	legal	position	puts	them	in	a	situation	where	they	
may	be	able	to	destroy	value	for	the	economy	if	they	act	inappro-
priately.	Thus,	it	may	be	prudent	for	the	legislator	or	the	banking	
supervisor	 to	 ensure	 good	 practices.	 The	 following	 are	 areas	
where	 financial	 creditors´	 behaviour	 may	 impede	 the	 rescue	 of	
distressed	but	viable	businesses.173		
The	structure	of	 lending:	Good	banking	practice	stipulates	
that	the	decision	to	 lend	a	business	ought	to	be	primarily	
based	 on	 the	 viability	 of	 the	 business	 project.174	Often	 in	
respect	 to	 MSMEs,	 this	 practice	 is	 not	 strictly	 observed.	
Banks	may	lend	only	where	the	debtor	provides	collateral	
and/or	 personal	 guarantees.	 However,	 often	 MSMEs	 do	
not	have	sufficient	collateral	to	finance	their	activity,	both	
at	 inception	or	during	 the	 life	of	 the	business.	Unsecured	
lending	 is	 scarce	and	expensive.	 It	 is	not	uncommon	 that	
																																																						
173	The	problem	of	the	lack	of	financing	to	distressed	MSMEs	is	treated	sepa-
rately	in	Part	VI.B.4.		
174	Bank	Lending	to	Business,	Canadian	Banker’s	Association,	available	at	
http://www.cba.ca/contents/files/backgrounders/bkg_banklending_en.pdf	.	
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shortage	of	affordable	credit	exists	even	for	good	business	
projects.	This	 situation	 is	 sometimes	exacerbated	by	poli-
cies	imposed	by	supervisors.		
The	problem	of	shortage	of	affordable	credit	not	only	aris-
es	at	the	time	of	granting	credit,	 it	also	 influences	behav-
iour	 at	 the	 time	 of	 distress	 of	 the	 borrower.	 Thus,	 the	
higher	the	proportion	of	the	loan	covered	by	the	value	of	
the	collateral,	 the	 fewer	 incentives	banks	have	 to	engage	
in	a	restructuring	of	the	business.	The	type	of	security	also	
matters:	 floating	 charges	 and	 any	 other	 type	 of	 security	
where	economic	value	 is	 linked	with	the	operation	of	the	
business	(and	not	of	a	particular	asset)	align	the	 interests	
of	lenders	and	the	debtor,	creating	incentives	to	rescue	vi-
able	businesses.	However,	many	loans	involve	fixed	charg-
es.	 One	 way	 to	 improve	 this	 situation	 is	 by	 enacting	 a	
workable	system	of	security	over	movable	assets,	increas-
ing	 the	 types	 of	 security	 (an	 issue	 which	 is	 beyond	 the	
scope	of	this	report).		
The	regulatory	framework:	Banking	regulations,	especially	
those	 aimed	 at	 strengthening	 the	 position	 of	 banks	 as	
debtors,	may	 exert	 a	 strong	 influence	 on	 banking	 behav-
iour	 towards	distressed	 loans.	The	provisioning	 rules	of	a	
country	constitute	the	point	where	the	two	sides	of	banks,	
as	debtors	and	creditors,	most	clearly	collide.	A	very	strict	
application	of	provisioning	rules	may	undermine	the	incen-
tive	of	banks	to	restructure,	while,	on	the	other	hand,	ex-
cessive	 regulatory	 forbearance	 could	 favour	 the	 implica-
tion	of	banks	in	restructuring	operations	at	the	cost	of	en-
dangering	 the	 credibility	 of	 the	 banks’	 balance	 sheet.	 A	
balance	 needs	 to	 be	 struck	 in	 this	 regard,	 a	 balance	 that	
will	necessarily	 lay	with	a	segmented,	granular	analysis	of	
distressed	 loans,	 followed	by	an	active	 involvement	 in	re-
structuring	of	viable	businesses.	In	line	with	this	approach,	
for	example,	a	country	may	include	rules	that	allow	for	the	
reclassification	 of	 loans	 following	 the	 approval	 of	 a	 re-
structuring	 agreement,	 so	 long	 as	 it	 is	 a	 credible	 agree-
ment,	 and	 evidence	 has	 been	 provided	 by,	 for	 example,	
the	successful	implementation	of	the	plan	for	a	given	peri-
od	of	time.		
• Banking	passivity	and	reckless	lending/enforcement:	A	no-
table	 problem	 for	 distressed	MSMEs	 is	 where	 there	 is	 a	
lack	of	interest	by	banks	in	engaging	in	negotiations	with	a	
view	to	reaching	an	agreement	that	could	rescue	the	busi-
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ness	where	 it	 is	viable.	At	times,	 the	amount	of	exposure	
or	 the	 over-collateralization	 of	 a	 loan	 will	 deter	 a	 bank	
from	 engaging	 actively	 in	 the	 restructuring,	 even	 where	
the	business	 is	viable.	The	following	section	of	this	report	
further	elaborates	on	the	general	problem	of	creditor	be-
havior	at	times	where	the	MSME	debtor	is	in	distress.	
2. Creditor	passivity	and	reckless	behaviour		
Limited	 resources	 in	MSME	 insolvencies	 lead	 to	 very	 limited	 ex-
pectations	 for	unsecured	 creditors	 regarding	any	 substantial	dis-
tribution	 in	respect	of	their	claims.	Thus,	unsecured	creditors	of-
ten	have	 little	 incentive	 to	 incur	 further	 costs	 (e.g.,	 travel	 costs,	
communication	costs,	 investment	of	 time)	with	 regard	 to	 the	 in-
solvent	 debtor	 by	 participating	 actively	 in	 negotiations	 or	 pro-
ceedings.	 Overall,	 it	 is	 rational	 for	 a	 creditor	 not	 to	 participate	
unless	 it	has	a	special	 interest	 in	 the	 result	of	 the	proceedings	–	
most	notably	because	it	is	personally	connected	to	the	debtor	(by	
family	 ties,	 or	 as	 an	 employee),	 or	 where	 it	 appears	 that	 some	
value	may	be	recoverable.		
Secured	 creditors,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 are	 interested	 in	 the	 en-
forcement	of	 their	security,	which	usually	occurs	 through	sale	of	
the	debtor’s	assets.	This	interest	may	result	in	the	liquidation	and	
winding	 up	 of	 the	 debtor’s	 business.	 This	 type	 of	 enforcement	
often	 does	 not	 require	 any	 court	 proceedings	 or	 supervision;	 it	
could	as	well	be	done	using	out	of	court	auctions	or	transactions.	
Aiming	at	saving	the	cost	and	delay	of	court	hearings,	it	is	rational	
for	secured	creditors	to	argue	in	favour	of	quick	out–of-court	auc-
tions.	
The	Modular	 Approach	 seeks	 to	 overcome	 these	 rational	 obsta-
cles	 by	 counteracting	 the	 non-existing	 (unsecured	 creditors)	 or	
negative	(secured	creditors)	incentives	to	participate	in	court	pro-
ceedings,	while	 preserving	 the	 positive	 incentives	 of	 the	 benefi-
ciaries	 (debtor,	 connected	 persons).	 The	 default	 assumption	 is	
that,	 absent	 insolvency	 proceedings,	 a	 secured	 creditor	 may	
promptly	enforce	 its	 rights	under	 the	general	 law	and	as	agreed	
between	 the	 parties.	 This	 possibility	 incentivizes	 the	 debtor	 to	
invoke	a	preliminary	stay	of	enforcement,	and	to	propose	a	reha-
bilitation	plan.	Such	a	set	of	rules	would	also	mean	that	the	task	
of	 designing	 and	 preparing	 a	 plan	 is	 assigned	 to	 the	 debtor	 be-
cause	 the	 debtor	 is	 the	 stakeholder	 best	 incentivized	 and	 in-
formed	for	this	task.	Further,	creditor	inaction	may	also	be	tackled	
by	the	approval	and	monitored	 implementation	of	codes	of	con-
duct.	The	supervising	authority	should	ensure	that	financial	lend-
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ers	 do	 not	 contribute	 to	 the	 destruction	 of	 viable	 businesses	 by	
not	even	taking	the	time	and	effort	to	consider	the	case.		
Confronted	with	 a	 plan,	 creditors	must	 not	 be	 bound	without	 a	
chance	to	be	heard,	for	constitutional	and	due	process	reasons	in	
most	 jurisdictions.	 The	Modular	 Approach	 seeks	 to	 lower	 credi-
tors’	participation	costs	through	online,	postal,	and	proxy	consul-
tation	and	voting.	At	the	same	time,	the	Modular	Approach	raises	
the	 costs	 of	 non-participation	 through	 “deemed	 approval”,	
whereby	a	creditor’s	failure	to	vote	is	regarded	as	a	vote	in	favour	
of	 the	 rehabilitation	 plan,	 and	 through	 “deemed	 waiver”,	 by	
which	 the	absence	of	 timely	objection,	 such	as	 to	 the	 suggested	
amount	of	their	claim	or	right,	is	treated	as	a	waiver	of	the	right	to	
judicial	 review.	 In	 sum,	 creditors’	 passivity	 after	 due	notification	
binds	 them	 finally	 to	 the	 legally	 stipulated	 outcome	 of	 the	 pro-
ceedings.			
3. Tax	law	incentives	and	disincentives	
The	challenge	of	MSME	insolvency	could	also	be	understood	as	an	
opportunity	to	explore	an	effective	set	of	tools	aimed	at	promot-
ing	 responsible	 credit	 borrowing	 and	 lending,	 responsible	 credit	
monitoring	and	responsible	credit	collection,	including,	if	need	be,	
credit	restructuring.		
Inspiration	 for	 a	 possible	 approach	 can	be	drawn	 from	 the	 legal	
regulation	of	workplace	accidents.	The	previous	unregulated	situ-
ation	was	 replaced	with	a	 system	 that	 compensates	workers	 for	
harms	experienced	 in	the	workplace	and	places	responsibility	on	
employers	for	creating	safe	workplaces,	most	effectively	promot-
ing	 aggregate	 social	 welfare.175	Similarly,	 a	 comprehensive	 ap-
proach	 to	 MSME	 insolvency	 suggests	 that	 professional	 lenders	
have	 some	 responsibility	 in	 lending	practices	 to	MSMEs,	 as	 they	
are	 relatively	 well-positioned	 to	 assess	 risk	 and	 monitor	 early	
																																																						
175	The	initial	approach	of	worker	occupational	health	and	safety,	whereby	
losses	arising	from	such	accidents	should	be	solely	and	directly	borne	by	the	
individual	worker	whenever	it	could	be	shown	that	the	accident	was	imputable	
to	his	or	her	negligence	or	contributory	negligence,	was	ultimately	abandoned	
by	most	of	the	more	developed	legal	systems.	and	no	one	today	would	serious-
ly	advocate	the	reinstatement	of	that	old	approach.	The	reason	is	clear:	since	
society	has	a	vital	interest	in	encouraging	people	to	work,	risks	arising	from	
work	and	the	consequentially	occurring	losses	must	be	legally	handled	in	a	
conscious	social	perspective,	i.e.	by	providing	rules	other	than	the	mere	impu-
tation	of	the	loss	to	the	author/victim	of	the	accident	on	grounds	of	negligence	
or	personal	bad	luck.	
	 	 July	8	2016	version	
107	
warning	 signs	 of	 financial	 distress. 176 		 One	 option	 under	 the	
Modular	Approach	is	to	require	the	observance	of	prudential	rules	
in	 the	 performance	 of	 lending	 activities,	 especially	 designed	 to	
reduce	 the	 risk	 of	 MSME	 insolvencies	 or	 to	 govern	 as	 much	 as	
possible	 their	 occurrence.	 Non-compliance	 with	 such	 especially	
designed	prudential	rules	could	be	sanctioned	by	using	taxation	as	
a	 leverage	 to	 discourage	 inappropriate	 conduct.	 Desirable	 con-
duct	could	be	encouraged	by	affirmative	tax	benefits.		
The	 two	 proposed	 lines	 of	 action—providing	 special	 prudential	
rules	and	using	tax	leverage	to	induce	compliance—must	be	seen	
as	 linked,	 since,	 unless	 they	 are	 taken	 together,	 their	 impact	
might	fail	to	be	significant.		
Virtually	 all	 national	 legal	 systems	 have	 banking	 regulations	
whose	institutional	goal	is	to	prescribe	the	observance	of	pruden-
tial,	 technical	 rules	 in	 the	 granting	 of	 credit;	 the	 monitoring	 of	
credit	granted	and	still	outstanding;	and	the	collection	of	due	and	
payable	 amounts	 or	 the	measures	 to	 be	 taken	 in	 respect	 of	 de-
faults.	These	national	regulatory	and	supervisory	systems,	howev-
er,	 should	 provide	 an	 adequate	 linkage	 with	 the	 fiscal	 conse-
quences	 of	 non-observance.	 Briefly	 stated,	 tax	 deductibility	 of	
losses	arising	 from	bad	claims	against	MSMEs	 should	not	be	au-
tomatically	 available	 to	 professional	 lenders.	 Tax	 deductibility	
should,	rather,	be	conditional	on	the	individual	professional	lend-
er	acting	responsibly	in	the	handling	of	the	credit	relationship	that	
originated	the	non-performing	loan.	
Lenders	 should	not	be	 threatened	with	 the	prospect	of	entering	
into	 null	 and	 void	 transactions	 or	 arrangements	 in	 the	 event	 of	
non-compliance	with	prudential	 rules.	The	heart	of	 this	proposal	
is	a	tax	sanction	or	the	loss	of	a	potential	tax	benefit	in	the	event	
of	non-compliance	with	such	rules,	not	the	imposition	of	manda-
tory	 forms	 or	 conditions	 of	 credit	 contracts	 or	 of	 compulsory	
schemes	of	arrangement.	 	Accordingly,	 the	 legal	 format	of	 these	
rules	should	continue	to	be	issued	on	the	basis	of	the	rule-making	
power	entrusted	to	central	banks	or	other	top	central	regulators,	
permitting	 the	 much-needed	 technical	 flexibility	 that	 statutory	
rules	 cannot	 provide.	 In	 addition,	 this	 approach	 would	 make	 it	
																																																						
176	In	this	respect,	professional	lenders	may	be	expected	to	be	much	better	
candidates	than	their	less	structured	counterparties	for	the	purpose	of	becom-
ing	the	object	of	a	regulatory	framework	institutionally	designed	to	prevent,	
whenever	possible,	and	to	efficiently	administer,	whenever	unavoidable,	the	
insolvency	of	MSMEs.	
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easier	 to	 achieve	 forms	 of	 international	 informal	 cooperation	
among	regulators.177		
More	specifically,	 tax	deductibility	of	banking	 losses	arising	 from	
credit	granted	to	MSMEs	should	be	made	conditional	on	evidence	
provided	by	 the	 bank	 claiming	 the	 deduction	 of	 having	 properly	
complied	with:	(i)	prudential	rules	on	the	initial	granting	or	exten-
sion	 of	 the	 credit;	 (ii)	 prudential	 rules	 on	 the	monitoring	 of	 the	
credit	while	outstanding,	 including	 inter	alia	proper	classification	
of	 it	 in	 cases	of	 threatened	difficulty	of	 reimbursement;	 and	 (iii)	
prudential	rules	on,	initially,	collection	attempts	and,	subsequent-
ly,	 promotion	 of	 or	 participation	 in	 a	 serious	 workout	 arrange-
ment	 prior	 to	 the	 filing	 of	 any	 involuntary	 bankruptcy	 petition	
and/or	prior	to	enforcement	that	would	result	 in	the	destruction	
of	the	business.178		
Difficulties	 in	application,	and	potentially	negative	effects	of	 this	
type	of	reform,	should	not	be	underestimated.	In	practical	terms,	
difficulties	 in	 application	 might	 arise	 depending	 on	 how	 banks	
would	be	required	to	give	evidence	of	compliance	with	the	insol-
vency-related	prudential	rules	at	the	time	of	claiming	the	relevant	
tax	 deduction.	 It	 would	 be	 unreasonable	 and	 impracticable	 to	
require	 a	 bank	 to	 provide	 a	 detailed	 history	 of	 any	 credit	 in	 re-
spect	of	which	the	tax	deduction	is	claimed.	Basically,	it	should	be	
enough	 for	 the	bank	 to	provide	evidence	 (as	 it	would	have	 to	 in	
the	case	of	a	central	bank	inspection)	that	the	credit	was	properly	
analyzed,	classified	and	granted	at	the	time	of	granting	and	that	it	
was	 kept	 under	 proper	 classification	 and	 surveillance	 during	 the	
subsequent	stages	of	the	credit	life.	Lastly,	but	most	importantly,	
with	reference	to	the	insolvency	or	pre-insolvency	stage,	the	bank	
																																																						
177	Including	also	the	“spontaneous”	observance	by	them	of	uniform	policy	
standards	that	may	be	recommended	at	the	international	level,	e.g.,	by	the	
Financial	Stability	Board.	
178	None	of	these	“conditions	precedent”	to	deductibility	of	losses	would	direct-
ly	interfere	with	the	ordinary	contract	rules	or	the	ordinary	creditors’	rights	
regime	under	the	applicable	national	law.	Compliance	with	the	aforesaid	pru-
dential	rules	would	be,	as	is	already	the	case	today,	a	duty	of	the	bank	vis-à-vis	
the	banking	supervisory	system	and	a	conduct,	whose	observance	or	non-
observance	would	determine	the	entitlement	to	or	the	forfeiture	of	a	potential	
future	tax	advantage.	No	actionable	private	right	would,	at	least	in	principle,	be	
vested	in	the	debtor	counterparty	or	in	the	latter’s	creditors	in	the	event	of	
non-compliance.	The	situation,	again,	would	be	no	different	from	the	one	that	
already	prevails	as	of	today	in	the	generality	of	legal	systems,	where	bank	liabil-
ity	for	abusively	granting	or	extending	credit	is	sometimes	found	to	subsist,	but	
only	in	exceptional	circumstances	and	certainly	not	on	the	mere	ground	of	non-
compliance	by	the	bank	with	the	internal	prudential	rules.		
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should	be	required	to	show	that	it	either	(i)	promoted	one	of	the	
solutions	permitted	under	the	applicable	national	 law	to	exit	the	
situation;	or	(ii)	participated	in	the	attempt,	promoted	by	others,	
including	but	not	 limited	 to	 the	debtor,	 to	 arrive	 at	one	of	 such	
solutions.179	
There	would	 be	 certain	 costs	 and	 benefits	 inherently	 associated	
with	this	advocated	proposal.		The	introduction	of	a	change	in	the	
traditional	 regulatory	 philosophy,	 with	 the	 inclusion	 of	 a	 pro-
active	pursuit	of	a	particular	MSME	credit	policy	in	addition	to	the	
traditional	 goal	 of	 ensuring	 the	 banking	 system’s	 stability,	 and	
strong	 linkage	 between	 prudential	 supervisory	 rules	 and	 tax	 de-
ductibility,	 are	 likely	 to	 initially	 cause	 an	 increase	 of	 regulatory	
costs.180		Such	costs	would	be	of	the	same	nature	as	that	which	is	
typically	 associated	 with	 changes	 in	 the	 contents	 of	 applicable	
legal	rules.	After	an	initial	period	of	cultural	adaptation,	the	bene-
fits	 of	 the	new	 rules	 tend	 to	 exceed	 the	weight	of	 the	 initial	 in-
cremental	costs.	
The	conditional	tax	deductibility	proposal	may	initially	be	viewed	
by	professional	 lenders	as	a	source	of	higher	costs	of	doing	busi-
ness	 in	 that	 there	would	be	 the	possibility	of	denial	of	expected	
tax	relief.	However,	to	the	extent	that	such	threat	may	incentivize	
the	 restructuring	 of	 old	 indebtedness	 and	 the	 consequential	 re-
classification	of	 the	“rehabilitated”	 restructured	part	of	 “old	bad	
claims”,	it	may	provide	a	new	opportunity	for	professional	lenders	
to	retain	more	value	in	the	reclassified	treatment	of	their	original	
non-performing	 loans	 than	 the	 more	 drastically	 reduced	 value	
																																																						
179	It	is	impossible	to	articulate	what	should	be	considered	bona	fide	promotion	
of	or	bona	fide	participation	in	a	solution	providing	a	recognized	exit	from	the	
insolvency	or	pre-insolvency	situation.	For	the	purposes	of	this	report,	suffice	it	
to	say	that	(a)	a	strong	presumption	in	favour	of	tax	deductibility	should	be	
fiscally	provided	whenever	a	plan	of	resolution	of	the	insolvency	or	pre-
insolvency,	of	any	nature	and	irrespective	of	its	judicial	or	extrajudicial	nature,	
is	shown	to	have	been	approved	by	the	required	creditors’	consent;	(b)	an	
outright	tax	deductibility	should	be	recognized	whenever	any	such	plan	is	
shown	to	have	produced	a	recovery	for	the	creditors	in	excess	of	certain	levels,	
whether	pre-determined	by	insolvency	law	or	by	tax	law;	(iii)	in	the	absence	of	
an	approved	plan	or	a	certified	minimum	level	of	recovery	for	the	creditors,	tax	
deductibility	should	only	be	granted	on	the	basis	of	a	judicial	finding,	in	the	
order	granting	personal	discharge	of	the	individual/s,	to	the	effect	that	the	
insolvency	had	not	been	caused	or	worsened	by	the	bank’s	recklessness.	
180	In	particular,	in	as	much	as	the	regulatory	and	connected	fiscal	changes	
would	require	more	robust	or	more	sophisticated	or	more	frequent	inspections	
by	the	banking	supervisory	authorities	and/or	by	the	tax	authorities,	more	or	
less	open	(or	hidden)	cost	increases	would	ensue.	
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that	 would	 otherwise	 be	 assigned	 to	 such	 claims	 as	 a	 result	 of	
write-offs.	
Finally,	 what	 remains	 to	 be	 considered	 is	 the	 supply	 of	 new	 fi-
nance,	without	which	 a	 rescue	 plan	 is	 nearly	 always	 doomed	 to	
fail.	 If	new	finance	 is	provided	by	a	new	bank,	an	affirmative	tax	
incentive	 should	 be	 made	 automatically	 available	 by	 the	 fiscal	
legislation	 (e.g.,	 non-taxability	 of	 the	 income	 obtained	 from	 the	
new	finance	 for	a	specified	number	of	years).	 If	 the	new	finance	
comes	from	a	sole	or	leading	bank,	the	issue	of	the	tax	incentive	
might	be	treated	differently,	that	is,	by	articulating	an	appropriate	
scale	 of	 solutions,	 so	 as	 to	 ultimately	 avoid	 inconsistencies	with	
the	objectives	and	the	regime	of	the	deductibility	of	“old”	losses.	
4. Financing	MSME	Proceedings	
In	many	jurisdictions,	MSMEs	have	difficulties	accessing	sufficient	
levels	of	 financing.	This	 situation	particularly	arises	at	 the	 incep-
tion	of	the	business	life	and,	even	more	intensely,	when	the	busi-
ness	suffers	liquidity	tensions	and	financial	distress.	The	rescue	of	
viable	MSMEs	may	only	happen	if	the	business	receives	financing.	
Otherwise,	the	activity	comes	to	a	stop	and	piece-meal	liquidation	
is	 the	only	 real	 alternative.	 In	most	 jurisdictions,	but	particularly	
where	the	market	still	needs	development,	the	absence	of	a	res-
cue	culture	and	the	stigma	associated	with	it,	the	lack	of	an	ena-
bling	 legal	 framework,	 the	 lack	 of	 real	 possibilities	 to	 lower	 the	
risk	of	lending	for	small	debtors	(e.g.,	no	assets	free	for	collateral,	
limited	ability	 to	offer	personal	guarantees),	and	 the	passivity	of	
creditors,	 thwart	 the	 continuation	 of	 the	 business	 activity,	 frus-
trating	 chances	 of	 business	 recovery	 and	 value	 preservation.	 In	
this	light,	the	legal	and	institutional	frameworks	of	a	country	need	
to	 provide	 the	 mechanisms	 to	 ensure	 that	 troubled	 but	 viable	
businesses	are	able	to	access	financing	with	a	view	to	trading	out	
of	 their	 difficulties.	 Possible	 mechanisms	 to	 enhance	 access	 to	
finance	at	times	of	distress,	with	reference	to	relevant	key	stages	
of	MSME	insolvency	and	with	particular	consideration	of	the	spe-
cific	 problems	 encountered	 in	 the	MSME	 context,	 are	 discussed	
below.	The	position	of	the	debtor	that	went	through	the	insolven-
cy	 process	 and	 how	 the	 financing	 framework	 can	 enhance	 the	
concept	of	“fresh	start”	and	encouragement	of	new	businesses	is	
also	discussed.	
It	should	be	stressed,	however,	that	there	does	not	appear	to	be	a	
single	effective	strategy	for	financing	of	MSMEs	in	distress,	given	
the	 size	 and	 range	of	 such	businesses.	 The	universal	 features	 to	
consider	 when	 designing	 the	 framework	must	 be	 efficiency	 and	
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affordability.	Implementation	should	be	left	to	national	variations,	
based	 on	 different	 socio-economic	 contexts	 and	 variety	 of	 legal	
traditions.	
		
	Stage	 I:	During	 the	 initial	 stages	of	 financial	 distress	 of	MSMEs,	
before	 formal	 insolvency	proceedings	have	been	petitioned	 (and	
precisely	with	a	 view	 to	avoiding	 that),	 the	debtor	often	 faces	 a	
number	 of	 challenges.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 as	 noted	 above,	 the	
debtor	may	 face	 lack	of	 interest	of	 financial	 creditors,	 especially	
creditors	that	enjoy	fixed	as	opposed	to	floating	security	over	val-
uable	 assets.	 The	 passivity	 will	 be	 even	 worse	 whenever	 the	 fi-
nancial	 creditors	have	 securitized	 their	 SME	 loan	portfolios.	 Fur-
ther,	 debtors,	 due	 to	 their	 size	 and	urgency	 of	 the	 financial	 dis-
tress,	 are	 placed	 in	 a	 very	 weak	 position	 vis-à-vis	 the	 financial	
creditor,	with	very	limited	leverage	in	the	negotiation.	This	situa-
tion	is	particularly	problematic,	since,	often,	the	key	to	overcom-
ing	 the	 problem	 of	 distress	 is	 to	 keep	 the	 business	 operating	
smoothly	 to	 retain	 the	 trust	 of	 commercial	 suppliers	 and	 other	
similar	 operational	 creditors.	 Generally,	 at	 this	 stage	 it	 is	 im-
portant	to	keep	the	financing	of	the	business	at	the	same	opera-
tional	level	that	the	debtor	had	before	the	distress	arose	(day	zero	
level).	That	would	prevent	suppliers	and	other	commercial	credi-
tors	 from	“smelling	 the	trouble”	and	preserve	the	going-concern	
value	 of	 the	 business	 momentarily	 until	 an	 agreement,	 with	 an	
adequate	 restructuring,	 is	 worked	 out.181	The	 situation	 needs	 to	
be	handled	with	the	main	creditors	of	the	MSME:	one	(or,	rarely,	
																																																						
181	In	any	case,	trade	creditors	would	be	unlikely	to	provide	credit	to	their	trade	
counterparties	in	excess	of	what	is	strictly	needed	for	keeping	afloat	the	ordi-
nary	level	of	current	transactions,	thus	making	a	great	fragmentation	of	the	
aggregate	indebtedness	into	a	plurality	of	claims	likely,	each	of	which	relatively	
unimportant	for	the	individual	holder.	
	 	 July	8	2016	version	
112	
more)	 financial	 creditors	 and	 the	 public	 creditor	 (tax	 authorities	
and	social	security).		
The	 first	 challenge	 will	 be	 to	 get	 the	 attention	 of	 the	 financial	
creditors,	especially	in	cases	where	the	exposure	is	low	and	suffi-
cient	collateral	has	been	provided.182	In	some	cases,	an	additional	
problem	 that	 stems	 from	 the	 internal	 allocation	 of	 tasks	 within	
the	 financial	 institution	 is	 that	 the	 claim	 is	 sent	 to	 the	 recovery	
department;	there	is	no	longer	communication	with	the	commer-
cial/business	 origination	 department	 and	 the	 new	 department	
managing	the	loan	may	no	longer	have	an	interest	in	keeping	the	
business	relationship	alive.	Its	only	focus	will	be	on	recovery,	mak-
ing	 additional	 finance,	 or	 even	 a	 rescheduling,	 not	 a	 beneficial	
option.	 These	 problems	 may	 be	 tackled	 by	 means	 of	 codes	 of	
conduct,	approved	and	implemented	for	the	entire	MSME	lending	
sector	by	banking	associations	or,	more	effectively,	by	the	finan-
cial	sector	supervisor.	The	code	of	conduct	would	make	it	compul-
sory	for	financial	creditors	to	actively	consider	solutions	on	a	case	
by	case	basis,	basing	the	analysis	on	the	viability	of	 the	business	
project,	 irrespective	 of	 their	 holding	 sufficient	 collateral	 or	 not.	
That	way,	viable	businesses	may	be	 rescued	and	 future	business	
for	the	bank	preserved.		
Irrespective	 of	 the	 existence	 of	 such	 codes	 of	 conduct,	 keeping	
the	 “day	 zero	 level”	 of	 financing	 may	 be	 a	 difficult	 task.	 Often	
debtors	 will	 have	 no	 assets	 to	 provide	 as	 collateral	 for	 fresh	 fi-
nancing,	which	 is	why	the	optimization	of	a	 jurisdiction´s	system	
of	 secured	 transactions	 over	movable	 assets	 is	 key.	 Although	 all	
tangible	assets	may	already	be	“attached”,	 the	debtor	should	be	
able	 to	 resort	 to	 its	 immaterial	assets	 to	offer	creditors:	 security	
over	 inventory,	 receivables,	 non-intermediated	 non-certificated	
securities,	 etc.,	 might	 constitute	 an	 additional	 resource	 to	 keep	
the	business	running	during	this	interim	period	of	negotiation.183		
																																																						
182	See	the	discussion	on	creditors’	involvement	in	the	MSME	insolvency	pro-
cess,	Part	VI.B.	
183	Although	this	issue	is	generally	an	access	to	finance	problem,	not	specific	of	
distressed	financing,	it	might	be	useful	to	point	here	to	the	risk	that,	given	the	
weak	bargaining	power	of	the	debtor,	the	financial	institutions	may	demand	
excessive	additional	collateral	in	exchange	for	continued	support	(or	simply	in	
exchange	for	a	moratorium	or	a	rescheduling	of	the	debt).	Over-
collateralization	is	a	banking	practice	that	causes	substantial	damage	in	many	
jurisdictions,	overprotecting	the	banking	sector	at	the	expense	of	the	non-
financial	economy.	
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Beyond	additional	security	and	soft	 law	rules,	 legislation	can	still	
provide	 tools	 to	 foster	 the	 financing	 of	 viable,	 troubled	 but	 not	
yet	insolvent,	businesses.	The	following	are	important	examples:	
• The	regulatory	framework	of	banks	may	increase	the	like-
lihood	 of	 MSME	 business	 rescue	 by	 designing	 balanced	
provisioning	 rules.	 Experience	 shows	 that	when	 rules	 are	
too	 strict	 and	 provisioning	 comes	 at	 a	 very	 early	 stage,	
banks	lose	interest	in	the	rescue	of	their	debtors.	Perhaps	
more	 importantly,	 the	 framework	ought	 to	be	 lenient	on	
the	treatment	of	out-of-court	agreements,	and,	in	the	case	
an	agreement	is	reached	and	implementation	has	success-
fully	started,	the	system	should	provide	for	the	possibility	
of	positive	reclassification	of	the	 loans.	This	option	would	
constitute	 a	 relevant	 incentive	 to	 facilitate	 agreements	
and	the	financing	that	often	comes	with	it.		
• The	 provision	 of	 new	 financing	 to	 distressed	 businesses	
should	be	conferred	high	priority	in	subsequent	formal	in-
solvency	proceedings,	in	case	the	restructuring	fails.		
• Out-of-court	agreements,	and	the	additional	financing	that	
would	come	with	it,	ought	to	be	protected	from	claw-back	
actions	 in	 case	 a	 subsequent	 insolvency	 proceeding	 en-
sues.		
Naturally,	 both	 the	 high	 priority	 and	 the	 protection	 from	 claw-
back	actions	in	failed	out-of-court	rescue	attempts	should	be	sub-
ject	 to	 a	 number	 of	 requirements:	 the	 agreement	 ought	 to	 be	
approved	 by	 a	 large	 percentage	 of	 creditors,	 or	 it	 should	 have	
certain	 characteristics	 that	make	 it	 objectively	 positive	 (i.e.,	 not	
damaging	 to	 non-participating	 creditors),	 or	 be	 subject	 to	 some	
sort	of	control	by	a	 judge	or	assessed	by	an	independent	expert.	
These	 measures	 would	 be	 put	 in	 place	 to	 avoid,	 among	 other	
problems,	banking	malpractice,	which,	although	rare,	is	not	to	be	
ruled	out.	The	strong	bargaining	position	of	the	financial	creditors	
may,	 in	 extreme	 cases,	 lead	 them	 to	 impose	 agreements	 that	
benefit	their	position	at	the	expense	of	the	rest	of	creditors.		
Often,	the	other	important	creditor	of	MSMEs	will	be	the	tax	au-
thority.	 Legislation	 regulating	 public	 creditors	 may	 also	 pose	 a	
very	 serious	 hurdle	 to	 business	 restructuring	 and,	 consequently,	
to	the	provision	of	new	financing:	
• It	 is	not	uncommon	 that	public	 creditors	are,	by	 law,	
not	 allowed	 to	 reach	 restructuring	 agreements	 with	
debtors	 outside	 formal	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 Tax	
authorities	 should	be	 allowed	 to	 reschedule	 the	pay-
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ments	of	the	debtor,	at	least	and	in	any	case	whenev-
er	 the	 debtor	 has	 prospects	 of	 recovery	 and	 is	 only	
experiencing	 liquidity	 problems.	 The	 law	 should	 re-
duce	 the	 guarantees	 generally	 required	 to	 postpone	
payments.	 If	 needed,	 they	 should	 also	 be	 allowed	 to	
accept	write-downs	of	the	debt.	The	alternative	places	
tax	creditors	in	a	position	legally	of	hold-out	creditors,	
which	may	cause	the	provision	of	new	finance	by	oth-
er	creditors	to	disappear,	since	creditors	will	not	want	
to	 provide	 fresh	 money	 that	 will	 go	 directly	 to	 the	
pockets	of	the	public	treasury.	
• In	some	jurisdictions,	the	restructuring	services	of	tax	
authorities	are	understaffed	and	unaccustomed	to	en-
gaging	 in	 negotiations	 to	 reach	 out-of-court	 agree-
ments.	 The	 improvement	 of	 this	 organizational	 ele-
ment	 would	 be	 a	 key	 measure	 to	 facilitate	 business	
rescue	of	MSMEs.	
• Agreements	 reached	 out	 of	 court	 should	 be	 at	 least	
treated	 as	 tax	 neutral.	 Taxing	 these	operations	 often	
poses	 severe	 hurdles	 to	 business	 recovery	 and	 the	
provision	of	new	finance	for	the	debtor.	
Stage	 II:	During	 the	 stage	of	 formal	 insolvency	proceedings,	 and	
until	a	restructuring	plan	(or	a	liquidation	of	the	business	as	a	go-
ing	concern)	has	been	agreed	upon,	 the	main	concern	will	be	 to	
succeed	in	keeping	the	business	alive	and	operating.	For	this	aim,	
suppliers	and	trade	creditors	are	essential.	The	entrance	in	formal	
proceedings	 brings	 about	 an	 unavoidable	 reputational	 damage	
and	an	increase	in	the	perception	of	risk	by	third	parties.	Absolute	
priority	of	all	post-commencement	claims,	an	adequate	system	of	
effects	 on	 executory	 contracts,	 or	 the	 presence	 and	 good	man-
agement	of	an	insolvency	representative	will	not	always	be	suffi-
cient	to	convince	suppliers	and	operational	creditors	to	continue	
to	 provide	 commercial	 credit.	 Additional	 measures	 might	 be	
needed.		
A	 possibility	 would	 be	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 public	 fund	 to	 support	
trade	 creditors	 whose	 claims	 arise	 after	 the	 commencement	 of	
insolvency	 proceedings.	 The	 fund	would	 not	 be	 providing	 direct	
financing,	but	rather,	guarantee	the	provision	of	credit	by	private	
sector	stakeholders:	either	directly	to	trade	suppliers	or	to	finan-
cial	 institutions	 that	 are	 willing	 to	 finance	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
business.	Clearly,	this	type	of	support	would	only	follow	a	careful	
assessment	of	the	viability	of	the	project.	It	could	be	directly	con-
ducted	by	the	 fund,	or,	more	 likely,	 the	 fund	could	avail	 itself	of	
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the	expert	and	independent	opinion	of	the	insolvency	representa-
tive	 appointed	 to	manage,	 	 or	monitor	 the	management	 of,	 the	
debtor	during	the	insolvency	procedure.184	In	certain	areas	of	the	
economy	(often	in	the	rural	economy),	this	type	of	support	is	of-
fered	by	public	or	private	cooperatives	or	by	reciprocal	guarantee	
schemes	 (i.e.,	 all	 the	 members	 of	 a	 certain	 community	 jointly	
guarantee	the	new	debts	incurred	by	one	of	their	members).		
Stage	III:	This	stage	would	commence	with	the	approval	of	a	plan	
and	would	last	during	its	full	 implementation.	During	this	period,	
the	 debtor´s	 situation	with	 regard	 to	 its	 creditors	will	 be	mainly	
ruled	by	the	content	of	the	plan.	New	financing	ought	to	be	more	
simple,	 since	 the	business	will	 have	normally	 been	 restructured,	
often	 downsized,	 and	 always,	 at	 least	 in	 theory,	 improved.	 Pre-
existing	debts	will	have	been	restructured,	and	hence	the	financial	
burden	will	be	lighter.	New	financing	debts	(by	trade	creditors,	or	
new	 financial	 facilities)	will	 be	 payable	 as	 they	 fall	 due,	 and	 the	
insolvency	law	should	include	a	rule	that	protects	the	preferential	
treatment	 of	 financing	 debts	 arisen	 during	 the	 implementation	
stage	in	case	of	failure	of	the	plan.	 In	order	to	underpin	the	suc-
cess	 of	 the	 approved	 plan,	 tax	 regulation	 could	 offer	 tax	 incen-
tives	that	would	be	added	to	the	restructuring	of	debt	as	regulat-
ed	in	the	plan.	A	restructuring	that	should,	to	the	extent	possible,	
include	a	reduction	or	a	full	write	off	of	sanctions	and	default	in-
terest.	This	type	of	special	treatment	ought	to	be	limited	in	time,	
so	 as	 not	 to	 cause	 damage	 to	 other	 businesses	 competing	with	
the	previously	insolvent	debtor.		
The	 former	 considerations	 for	 stage	 III	 refer	 to	 the	 implementa-
tion	stage	of	a	plan;	but	the	need	for	new	financing	and	the	ena-
bling	 framework	must	 also	 exist	 following	 the	 liquidation	 of	 the	
assets	 in	 case	 of	 sole	 entrepreneurs.	 Access	 to	 finance	 is	 para-
mount	 for	 a	 second	 chance.	 Suitable	 financing	 solutions	 for	 re-
entrepreneurs	need	to	be	put	in	place.	Re-starting	entrepreneurs	
need	capital,	cash	flow	and	credit,	with	few,	if	any,	restrictions	on	
future	 trade,	 without	 being	 encumbered	 with	 long	 repayment	
periods	of	debts	captured	by	a	bankruptcy	proceeding.	Distinction	
between	 honest	 and	 dishonest	 entrepreneurs	 should	 translate	
into	 non-discrimination	 of	 those	 entrepreneurs	 that	 are	 non-
																																																						
184	This	solution	could	also	be	helpful	during	the	out	of	court	stage.	This	fund,	
however,	is	not	intended	to	substitute	banks	outside	insolvency	proceedings,	
and	ought	to	be	regarded	–and	used-	as	an	exceptional	solution.	Making	it	
generally	available	to	out	of	court	negotiations	might	create	moral	hazard	
problems	and	end	up	being	negative	for	the	system.	
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fraudulent	bankrupts	in	becoming	beneficiaries	of	any	supportive	
programs	available	on	the	market	for	starting	up	a	new	business	
while	 simultaneously	 avoiding	any	preferential	 treatment	of	 "re-
born"	 entrepreneurs,	 as	 it	 may	 lead	 to	 unfair	 competition	 and	
moral	hazard.	
Many	 jurisdictions	 impose	obligations	on	 financial	 institutions	as	
principal	lenders	to	act	prudentially	in	lending	decisions	regarding	
MSMEs.	However,	for	all	three	stages,	the	banking	law	should	not	
pose	a	hurdle	to	the	restructuring	of	viable	but	troubled	MSMEs.	
Lending	 to	 distressed	 business	 should	 be	 a	 possibility.	 It	 is	 not	
uncommon	 that	 banking	 law	 rules	 on	 corporate	 governance	 in-
clude	 limits	 to	 the	 bank	 and	 personal	 sanctions	 to	 directors	 of	
financial	 institutions	 that	 lend	 to	debtors	 that	are	unlikely	 to	 re-
pay	 the	 loan.	 These	 rules,	 objectively	 reasonable,	 seek	 to	 avoid	
excessive	risk	taking	and	fraud.	They	are	not	aimed	at	prohibiting	
and	sanctioning	the	financing	of	viable	but	troubled	businesses.	If,	
however,	they	are	phrased	in	a	very	general	manner,	directors	of	
banks	and	other	financial	creditors	may	be	hindered	from	financ-
ing	the	rescue	of	viable	MSMEs	to	avoid	the	risk	of	their	own	per-
sonal	liability.		
Similarly,	consideration	ought	to	be	given	to	limiting	securitization	
and	 scope	 of	 permissible	 hedging	 through	 credit	 default	 swaps	
and	other	derivatives,	 still	 allowing	 financial	 institutions	 to	man-
age	 risk	 but	 requiring	 them	 to	 retain	 some	 risk,	 thus	 preserving	
oversight	and	early	 intervention	 in	credit	relationship,	and	creat-
ing	incentives	to	lend	but	controlling	speculative	market.	
C. CONNECTED	PERSONS’	GUARANTORS	
The	treatment	of	connected-person	guarantors	of	MSME	debtors	
raises	particular	issues	that	the	Modular	Approach	addresses:	
• Efficacy	 across	 the	 population	 of	 MSME	 debtors:	
Guarantees	are	taken	in	 large	part	precisely	to	hedge	
against	 the	 principal	 debtor’s	 insolvency.	 Tampering	
with	a	category	of	guarantees	in	bankruptcy	proceed-
ings	 would	 tend	 to	 impair	 their	 value	 to	 the	 lender	
significantly,	and	thus	restrict	the	extent	to	which	that	
category	of	guarantees	would	help	would-be	borrow-
ers	to	access	credit	in	the	first	place.		
• Family	 destitution:	 However,	 micro	 and	 small	 enter-
prises,	 and	 perhaps	 smaller	medium	 ones	 also,	 raise	
particular	issues	where	the	guarantor	is	the	entrepre-
neur	 him	 or	 herself	 or	 another	 natural	 person	 con-
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nected	 with	 him/her. 185 	Allowing	 guarantees	 to	 be	
called	 in	 without	 restriction	 might	 result	 in	 “family	
bankruptcy”,	leaving	an	entire	family	destitute.		
• Accordingly,	the	ex	ante	costs	of	restricting	the	utility	
of	 connected-person	 guarantors	 of	 MSME	 debtors	
have	to	be	carefully	balanced	against	the	ex	post	costs	
of	allowing	their	entirely	unrestricted	enforcement.	
• Guarantors	 benefit	 from	 creditor	 action	moratorium:	
It	may,	in	some	cases,	be	a	powerful	incentive	to	time-
ly	commencement	by	the	debtor,	and	would	create	a	
space	 for	 a	 rational	 decision	 to	 be	made	 collectively	
about	 the	entirety	of	 the	debtor’s	obligations	and	af-
fairs.	
• Creditors	holding	guarantees	must	be	classified	sepa-
rately	for	plan	voting	purposes.	This	class	is	subject	to	
the	cram-down	process,	as	previously	described.		
• Treatment	 of	 guarantees	 depends	 on	 an	 approved	
plan:	 Where	 a	 plan	 is	 approved	 that	 restructures	
and/or	 discharges	 the	 underlying	 liability,	 that	 does	
not	 in	 and	 of	 itself	 constitute	pro	 tanto	 discharge	 of	
the	 guarantor’s	 liability. 186 	The	 plan	 must	 explicitly	
provide	for	the	guarantor’s	discharge.	
• Fairness-based	 unenforceability?	 Should	 a	 court	 be	
able	 to	render	a	connected	natural	person	guarantee	
unenforceable	 on	 the	 presumption	 or	 establishment	
of	 undue	 influence,	 unconscionability,	 etc.?	 If	 so,	
should	 this	 decision	 be	 taken	 only	 in	 the	 principal	
debtor’s	 bankruptcy	 proceedings,	 rather	 than	 when-
ever	 such	 a	 tainted	 guarantee	 is	 sought	 to	 be	 unen-
forced?187	
																																																						
185	Note	-	for	further	discussion:	If	the	invocation	of	the	guarantee	means	that	
the	individual	will	likely	become	bankrupt	should	the	two	processes	be	merged,	
should	we	consider	reduction	of	the	guarantee	in	such	circumstances	as	a	de	
facto	discharge	but	without	necessarily	declaring	the	debtor	bankrupt	(i.e.	
avoiding	their	bankruptcy)?	
186	This	approach	broadly	reflects	the	US	position:	In	re:	Larry	Ralph	Gentry,	No.	
14-1441	(10th	Cir.	Dec.	8,	2015).		
187	This	issue	is	a	contract	law	issue	and	requires	further	discussion	as	to	
whether	there	should	be	any	special	treatment,	or	not,	in	MSME	insolvency.	
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D. THE	ROLE	OF	EMPLOYEES		
1. Employees	in	insolvencies	
Employees	 are	 often	 the	 objects	 of	 specific	 regulation	 with	 re-
spect	to	their	claims	during	insolvency	proceedings.	A	study	of	the	
treatment	of	 employee	 claims	 in	 countries	 that	 are	members	 of	
the	 Organization	 for	 Economic	 Cooperation	 and	 Development	
(“OECD”)	found	most	countries	provide	some	form	of	preference	
for	 such	 claims	 within	 their	 insolvency	 regimes	 and	 many	 also	
have	 guarantee	 programs	 that	 satisfy	 some	 part	 of	 the	 claims,	
with	the	guarantor	pursuing	the	preference	rights	of	the	employ-
ees	within	the	insolvency	proceeding.188	This	section	of	the	report	
will	discuss	the	policy	reasons	for	such	special	treatment	of	these	
claims	and	how	this	policy	can	be	pursued	within	a	MSME	 insol-
vency	regime.		
Two	general	 justifications	 for	 the	separate	 treatment	of	employ-
ees	as	creditors	in	insolvency	proceedings	have	been	offered.	The	
first	 deals	 with	 the	 “weakness”	 of	 employees	 relative	 to	 other	
creditors,	 the	 second	 concerns	 their	 ability	 to	 effectively	 partici-
pate	in	the	insolvency	process.	With	respect	to	employees’	weak-
ness,	 commentators	have	pointed	 to	 the	 lack	of	evidence	 that	a	
risk	premium	for	the	extension	of	credit	is	part	of	their	compensa-
tion	and	to	the	problems	of	cognitive	and	volitional	deficiencies	in	
bargaining	 such	 a	 premium	 or	 other	 form	 of	 insolvency	 protec-
tion.189	As	a	result,	they	conclude	that	this	lack	of	a	risk	premium	
for	employees	allows	secured	creditors	to	shift	some	of	the	insol-
vency	risk	to	the	employees,	allows	employers	to	obtain	cheaper	
credit	and	may	result	in	inefficient	allocation	of	resources	to	firms	
with	a	high	risk	of	insolvency.190	The	same	informational	and	voli-
tional	problems	that	lead	to	the	lack	of	an	employee	risk	premium	
disadvantage	them	in	comparison	with	other	stakeholders	during	
corporate	restructurings.191	Employees	do	not	bargain	for	the	kind	
of	control	mechanisms	that	would	allow	them	to	constrain	man-
																																																						
188	Paul	M.	Secunda,	“An	Analysis	of	the	Treatment	of	Employee	Pension	and	
Wage	Claims	in	Insolvency	and	Under	Guarantee	Schemes	in	OECD	Countries:	
Comparative	Law	Lessons	for	the	United	States	and	Detroit”,	(2014)	41	Ford-
ham	Law	Journal	867,	at	875.	[“Secunda”]	
189	Kevin	Davis	and	Jacob	Ziegel,	“New	Priority	Scheme	for	Unpaid	Wage	Earn-
ers	and	Suppliers	of	Goods	and	Services”	paper	prepared	for	Corporate	Law	
Policy	Directorate	of	Industry	Canada	(April	30,	1998)	at	13.	[Davis	&	Ziegel]	
190	Ibid,	at	14.	
191	Robert	Howse	and	Michael	Trebilcock,	“Protecting	the	Employment	Bar-
gain”,	(1993)	43	U.T.L.J.	751.		
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agement	from	making	post	contractual	changes	to	the	risks,	even	
if	they	were	to	be	able	to	establish	a	risk	premium	at	the	point	of	
entering	 into	 the	 employment	 contract.192	Finally,	 it	 has	 been	
pointed	out	that	employees	are	poor	risk	bearers	relative	to	other	
creditors,	 due	 to	 their	 lack	 of	 relevant	 financial	 information	 and	
inability	to	diversify	the	insolvency	risk	from	their	employment.193	
The	second	 issue	 is	that	 individual	employees	are	 ill	equipped	to	
effectively	 participate	 in	 insolvency	 proceedings.	 They	 lack	 both	
the	requisite	knowledge	and	access	to	legal	expertise.	Individually	
the	amount	of	their	claims	and	likely	recovery	would	not	pay	the	
expense	 entailed	 in	 effective	 participation.	 The	 expense	may	 be	
recoverable	 if	 a	 mechanism	 to	 pursue	 such	 claims	 collectively	
were	available.	
2. Employees	in	MSME	insolvencies	
In	 Canada,	 employees’	 average	 weekly	 compensation	 declines	
with	the	size	of	the	enterprise.194		
Max	#	of	
employees	
19	 49	 99	 299	 499	 <	500	
Avg.	weekly	
earnings	
2014	
$751.88	 $800.70	 $829.60	 $914.85	 $993.87	 $1055.98	
	
According	 to	 Industry	 Canada,	 only	 51%	 of	 small	 and	 medium	
sized	 enterprises	 survived	 more	 than	 5	 years.195	Thus,	 it	 would	
seem	that	employees	 in	such	businesses	are	subject	to	all	of	the	
conditions	previously	discussed	regarding	the	policy	 justifications	
for	specific	treatment	 in	countries’	 insolvency	regimes.	The	 issue	
is	how	best	to	ensure	that	the	policies	adopted	in	individual	coun-
tries	for	the	protection	of	employee	claims	are	effectively	applied	
to	 MSME	 insolvencies.	 These	 employees	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 lower	
wage	employees	and	unlikely	to	have	a	surplus	available	to	fund	
legal	representation.	The	most	efficient	way	for	their	claims	to	be	
																																																						
192	Ibid,	at	755-56.	
193	Davis	&	Ziegel	supra,	note	189	at	15.	
194	Statistics	Canada,	“Earnings,	average	weekly,	by	enterprise	size”	
http://www.statcan.gc.ca/tables-tableaux/sum-som/l01/cst01/labr76a-
eng.htm	accessed	January	31,	2016.	
195Industry	Canada,	“Key	Small	Business	Statistics”,	July	2012	
https://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/061.nsf/vwapj/KSBS-PSRPE_July-
Juillet2012_eng.pdf/$FILE/KSBS-PSRPE_July-Juillet2012_eng.pdf	accessed	on	
January	31,	2016.	
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pursued	would	be	through	a	process	that	allows	them	to	be	pro-
cessed	collectively,	rather	than	individually.	OECD	countries	use	a	
preference,	a	guarantee,	or	a	hybrid	of	both	to	protect	some	por-
tion	of	 employees’	 unpaid	wage	 claims	when	an	 employer	 is	 in-
solvent,	with	most	using	some	form	of	 the	hybrid	system.196	The	
hybrid	system	has	the	advantage	of	providing	earlier	payment	of	
wages,	 while	 allowing	 for	 the	 efficient	 collectivization	 of	 wage	
claims	in	the	insolvency	proceeding	through	the	subrogation	pro-
cess,	 allowing	 the	 guarantor	 to	 pursue	 one	 claim	 using	 the	 em-
ployees’	preference.	
3. Policy	implementation	in	the	MSME	Modular	
Approach	
The	 policy	 approaches	 to	 MSME	 insolvencies	 in	 this	 paper	 are	
grounded	in	the	assertion	that	such	insolvencies	are	generally	low	
asset	enterprises	where	the	implementation	of	ordinary	insolven-
cy	regimes	would	likely	result	 in	the	destruction	of	either	the	re-
sidual	value	or	the	going-concern	value	due	to	the	cost	and	com-
plexity	of	such	regimes.	This	 report’s	suggestions	envision	a	sim-
plified	 Modular	 Approach	 to	 either	 liquidation	 or	 rescue.	 The	
problem	is	how	to	incorporate	existing	employee	protections	into	
the	revised	process.	For	example,	under	the	usual	insolvency	pro-
cess	where	 the	 insolvency	 professional	 is	 a	 key	 participant,	 one	
policy	 option	 that	 has	 been	 implemented	 is	 that	 the	 insolvency	
practitioner	in	the	MSME	insolvency	be	required	to:	calculate	the	
employees’	claims;	advise	the	employees’	of	their	rights	under	the	
applicable	 country’s	 insolvency	 and/or	 wage	 guarantee	 regime;	
advise	 the	 relevant	 guarantee	 organization	 of	 the	 claim	 where	
that	 type	 of	 protection	 is	 offered.197	The	 insolvency	 practitioner	
would	be	compensated	for	the	work	required	to	fulfill	these	obli-
gations.		
This	 procedure	would	 be	 consistent	with	 Convention	 173	 of	 the	
International	Labour	Organization:	Protection	of	Workers’	Claims	
(Employer	 Insolvency)	 1992	 which	 provides	 that	 countries	 that	
ratify	 the	 convention	 should	 provide	 protection	 for	 employee	
claims	 through	 a	 preference,	 a	 guarantee	 scheme	 or	 both.	 It	
would	also	be	consistent	with	the	EU	Directive	on	the	protection	
of	employees	in	event	of	the	insolvency	of	their	employer	requir-
ing	that	protection	be	provided	through	a	form	of	guarantee.198		
																																																						
196	Secunda,	supra	note	188	at	2.	
197	Wage	Earner	Protection	Program	Act,	S.C.	2005,	c.	47,	ss.	1,	22,	23	(Canada).	
198	EU	Directive	(2008/94/EC),	
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However,	 some	 parts	 of	 the	Modular	 Approach	 to	MSME	 insol-
vency	 in	 this	 report	 envisage	minimal	 involvement	 of	 insolvency	
professionals	 in	 the	 process.	 For	 the	 liquidation/discharge	mod-
ule,	the	debtor	employer	will	have	the	most	cost-efficient	access	
to	 the	 information	necessary	 to	 identify	 the	amount	and	type	of	
employee	 claims,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 information	 required	 to	 notify	
employees	 of	 their	 claims	 and	 rights	 under	 existing	 insolvency	
preference	and	guarantee	legislation.	The	requirement	to	include	
such	calculations	and	notifications	to	both	employees	and	guaran-
tee	institutions	should	be	part	of	any	standard	form	MSME	bank-
ruptcy	 discharge	 application.	 The	 collectivization	 of	 employee	
claims	 in	 the	 guarantee	 institution	 and	 their	 pursuit	 by	 it	 in	 the	
bankruptcy	would	provide	a	more	efficient	means	of	dealing	with	
these	 claims	 than	 their	 pursuit	 by	 individual	 employees.	 A	 dis-
charge	 conditional	 on	 the	 relevant	 institution’s	 satisfaction	 that	
the	 debtor	 employer’s	 calculation	 and	 notification	 obligations	
have	been	complied	with	would	provide	the	incentive	for	compli-
ance,	while	a	denial/revocation	of	discharge	for	failure	to	comply	
would	provide	the	negative	incentive.	
For	the	rescue	module,	it	would	seem	the	similar	calculation	and	
notification	obligations	would	apply	and	be	incorporated	into	the	
forms	needed	 to	 initiate	a	MSME	rescue	module.	Pursuit	of	em-
ployee	participation	rights,	for	example,	voting	on	a	plan,	could	be	
exercised	 by	 the	 guarantee	 institution	 or	 the	 employees	 them-
selves,	and	their	interests	in	the	future	revenue	streams	generat-
ed	by	 the	continued	operation	of	 the	business	as	a	 result	of	 the	
compromise	of	 their	 current	claims	would	be	part	of	 the	assess-
ment	of	any	plan’s	“fairness	and	equity”	with	respect	 to	the	dis-
tributions	of	its	burdens	and	benefits.	
Including	such	obligations	in	the	MSME	Modular	Approach	would	
overcome	the	informational	and	expertise	deficits	facing	employ-
ees	in	the	event	that	the	employer	enters	an	insolvency	proceed-
ing.	 Having	 the	 employer	 assume	 some	 of	 the	 responsibility	 for	
assembling	the	needed	information	to	substantiate	the	claims	and	
notify	the	employees	of	their	rights	would	further	the	public	poli-
cy	goals	of	the	particular	country’s	provisions	protecting	employ-
ees	 in	 the	 event	 of	 an	 employer	 insolvency,	 without	 dictating	
what	those	provisions	should	contain.	At	the	same	time,	it	would	
increase	the	fairness	of	the	process	by	providing	assistance	to	the	
																																																																																																																									
	http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:283:0036:0042:EN:PDF,	
accessed	31	January	2016.	
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most	 vulnerable	 and	 disadvantaged	 creditors	 and	 provide	 a	
mechanism	to	comply	with	international	obligations	such	as	those	
in	the	EU	Directive	and	ILO	Convention.	
If	 the	business	 closes	without	any	 formal	 insolvency	proceeding,	
as	many	MSME	 enterprises	 do,	 then	 hopefully	 the	 country’s	 la-
bour	standards	regime	will	provide	some	effective	relief	for	those	
employees,	 but	 that	 eventuality	 is	 beyond	 the	 scope	 of	 this	 re-
port.	
	
